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Articles 
A NEW APPROACH TO THE IDENTIFICATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT OF OPEN QUANTITY 
CONTRACTS:  REFORMING THE LAW OF 
EXCLUSIVITY AND GOOD FAITH 
Shelley Smith* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Among the many varieties of open term contracts, open quantity 
contracts have been particularly problematic for scholars, attorneys, and 
judges, especially in the areas of formation and breach.  Courts are 
issuing decisions on whether the parties have entered into an enforceable 
requirements contract or an unenforceable indefinite quantity agreement 
at a pace that is troubling, given how long courts have been grappling 
with the formation issue.1  Litigation also continues at a steady clip over 
whether the buyer in a requirements contract has breached the implied 
duty of good faith by reducing or eliminating his requirements.2  The 
                                                 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida State University of Law.  Columbia University 
School of Law, 1988, J.D.  I would like to thank Curtis Bridgeman, Donald R. Cassling, and 
Barry Sullivan for their comments and suggestions. 
1 See, e.g., Keck Garrett & Assocs., Inc. v. Nextel Commc’n, Inc., 517 F.3d 476, 479 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Propulsion Techs., Inc. v. Attwood Corp., 369 F.3d 896, 904 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc. v. Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 373, 378 
(7th Cir. 2000); In re Modern Dairy of Champaign, Inc., 171 F.3d 1106, 1110 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 963 (5th Cir. 1999); Orchard Group, 
Inc. v. Konica Med. Corp., 135 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 1998); Essco Geometric v. Harvard 
Indus., 46 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1995); Advanced Plastics Corp. v. White Consolidated Indus., 
No. 93-2155, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 1047 (6th Cir. 1995); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 
925 F.2d 670, 679–80 (3d Cir. 1991); Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 
1120–22 (5th Cir. 1985); Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 461 (9th Cir. 
1979); Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-anim Health Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 
1170, 1177, 1179 (D. Kan. 2007); Boydstun Metal Works, Inc. v. Cottrell, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 
1119, 1132–33 (D. Or. 2007); TVI, Inc. v. Infosoft Techs., Inc., 2007 WL 3565208 at *7–*8 (E.D. 
Mo. 2007); In re Anchor Glass Container Corp., 345 B.R. 765, 769–71 (M.D. Fla. 2006); 
Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int'l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 192–93 (E.D. N.Y. 1986); 
Arrotin Plastic Materials of Ind.v. Wilmington Paper Corp., 865 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007); Billings Cottonseed, Inc. v. Albany Oil Mill, Inc., 328 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1985); Integrated Micro Sys., Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs. (USA), Inc., 329 S.E.2d 554, 556 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
2 See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 95–96 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Brewster of Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp., 33 F.3d 355, 367–68 (4th Cir. 1994); U & W Indus. 
Supply, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 34 F.3d 180, 185–88 (3d Cir. 1994); Empire 
Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir. 1988); Sourcecorp BPS, Inc. v. 
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decisions in these cases have been criticized for displacing the parties’ 
own allocations of risk with misguided evaluations of business 
judgments based on an ill-defined standard.3  Further, the fragmented 
open quantity contracts jurisprudence reveals that courts have failed to 
provide uniform standards and have inconsistently applied the 
standards in cases with comparable facts. 
Scholars have yet to identify a workable set of solutions to address 
these issues.  Some have argued that the implied duty of good faith is 
necessary to validate non-exclusive open quantity contracts,4 but many 
criticize good faith as a performance standard because it undermines the 
contracting parties’ efforts to allocate the quantity risk by agreement.5  
While one author suggests that non-exclusive open quantity contracts 
should be enforced as long as “they are the product of true bargaining 
between parties[,]” he offers no alternative to good faith as a 
performance standard.6  My proposal would provide a principle for 
recognizing and policing non-exclusive as well as exclusive open 
quantity contracts without relying on the implied duty of good faith.  
When parties allocate quantity risks, their allocation should be enforced, 
                                                                                                             
Kenwood Records Mgmt., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680–81 (S.D. Iowa 2008); Vulcan 
Materials Co. v. Atofina Chems. Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1234–36 (D. Kan. 2005); Metal 
One Am., Inc. v. Ctr. Mfg., Inc., 2005 WL 1657128 at *6–7 (W.D. Mich. 2005); MDC Corp. v. 
John H. Harland, Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 387, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Sea Link Int’l, Inc. v. 
Osram Sylvania, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 781, 786 (S.D. Ga. 1997); Trimed, Inc. v. Sherwood Med. 
Co., 772 F. Supp. 879, 886–87 (D. Md. 1991); NCC Sunday Inserts, Inc. v. World Color Press, 
Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1004, 1012–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Schawk, Inc. v. Donruss Trading Cards, 
Inc., 746 N.E.2d 18, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Ind.-Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Town of Seelyville, 
698 N.E.2d 1255, 1260–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
3 Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts:  Reining in Good 
Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 347–66 (2002).  The same lack of clarity and consistency is 
found in the standard of good faith beyond the context of requirements and output 
contracts.  See Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith:  Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith from 
(Some) Contracts, 84 OR. L. REV. 227, 229 (2005).  As Professor Dobbins has observed, 
“Despite decades of attempts to clarify the good-faith duty and its application in various 
contracts, almost all acknowledge that the cases in which courts have applied the duty of 
good faith are rife with inconsistencies and confusion, even within single jurisdictions.”  Id.  
Dobbins advocates limiting the scope of the doctrine where it is used to impose obligations 
that are inconsistent with what the parties bargained for, to deny rights that are expressly 
conferred, and to inject uncertainty into otherwise unambiguous contracts to make them 
more “fair” or “just” in the eyes of the factfinder.  Id. at 231. 
4  Travis W. McCallon, Old Habits Die Hard: The Trouble with Ignoring Section 2-306 of the 
UCC, 39 TULSA L. REV. 711, 735 (2004); Caroline N. Bruckel, Consideration in Exclusive and 
Nonexclusive Open Quantity Contracts Under the UCC:  A Proposal for a New System of 
Validation, 68 MINN. L. REV. 117, 185–11 (1983).  
5  See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 347–66; Bruckel, supra note 4, at 191 n.301. 
6  Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have To Be Ludwig Wittgenstein”:  How Llewellyn’s Concept of 
Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-Quantity Contracts, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 67, 115 
(2006). 
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and when they fail to make an allocation of risk, courts should review 
the relevant evidence and employ analytical tools of contract 
interpretation such as the hypothetical bargain approach to determine 
how the parties would have allocated the quantity risk at issue had they 
anticipated and bargained for its allocation. 
The criticism of good faith as a performance standard in the context 
of requirements and output contracts, and my response to this criticism, 
requires a brief discussion of a broader theoretical debate, as well as an 
inherent doctrinal conflict.  The question is whether good faith is 
essentially a method of contract interpretation that courts use to protect 
the expectations of the parties, or whether, like the doctrine of 
unconscionability, it also makes certain conduct unlawful, regardless of 
the intent of the parties.7  Under the former view, good faith could8 and 
                                                 
7 See Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and 
Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559 (2006).  Professor Dubroff 
explains that while Professor Allan Farnsworth and Professor Steven Burton view the 
implied duty of good faith performance as a mechanism for carrying out the intentions of 
the parties and for protecting their reasonable expectations, id. at 603, Professor Robert 
Summers’s approach is “largely rooted in morality rather than in individual autonomy, 
and therefore may be used to support results contrary to the part[ies’] intentions[.]” Id. at 
598.  Dubroff also describes the confusion that this issue has created in applying the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and portions of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Section 
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts follows  Summers’ approach, but is inherently 
inconsistent in attempting to apply both a good faith standard that would enforce the 
parties’ intentions and one that would invalidate any provisions that violated community 
standards of fairness and decency:  “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as 
involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness.”  Id. at 602.  The Official Comments to UCC section 1-304 provide, “[T]he 
doctrine of good faith merely directs a court towards interpreting contracts within the 
commercial context in which they are created, performed, and enforced, and does not 
create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be independently 
breached.”  U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. (2008).  Dubroff argues that, if good faith is simply a basis 
for contract interpretation, the parties should be able to negate good faith as they can 
negate reliance on trade usage, course of dealing, or course of performance under the 
Comments to UCC section 2-202.  Dubroff, supra, at 614–15.  But the obligation of good 
faith cannot be disclaimed, see U.C.C. § 1-302(b), and because good faith also cannot be 
defined in the contract by the parties in a way that is determined ex post as “manifestly 
unreasonable,” the concept of good faith will always impose an undefined standard that 
may conflict with the parties’ intent.  
8  See Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991).  
We could of course do without the term ‘good faith,’ and maybe even 
without the doctrine.  We could . . . speak instead of implied 
conditions necessitated by the unpredictability of the future at the time 
the contract was made. . . .  But whether we say that a contract shall be 
deemed to contain such implied conditions as are necessary to make 
sense of the contract, or that a contract obligates the parties to 
Smith: A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quan
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possibly should be eliminated whenever the expectations of the parties 
can be protected by applying the modern and inclusive, rather than 
formalistic, approaches to contract interpretation adopted by the 
Restatement Second and the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC” or 
the “Code”).9  Parties would not have to fear liability under the 
amorphous standard of good faith, but would still be subject to existing 
doctrines of fraud, misrepresentation, estoppel, waiver, 
unconscionability, duress, mistake, illegality, and other grounds for 
denying enforcement of contractual rights.10  Scholars who take this view 
posit that using familiar methods of contract interpretation is preferable 
to good faith, a subjective and unprincipled standard that is often used 
to overturn the parties’ rights and expectations rather than to enforce 
them.11  Indeed, despite decades of sustained work in this area by highly 
                                                                                                             
cooperate in its performance in ‘good faith’ to the extent necessary to 
carry out the purposes of the contract, comes to much the same thing.  
They are different ways of formulating the overriding purpose of 
contract law, which is to give the parties what they would have 
stipulated for expressly if at the time of making the contract they had 
had complete knowledge of the future and the costs of negotiating and 
adding provisions to the contract had been zero. 
Id. 
9 Dubroff, supra note 7, at 559 (“The Implied Covenant of Good Faith”).  Dubroff argues 
that the standard of good faith should not be universally applied to all contracts because 
modern methods of contract interpretation make resort to good faith unnecessary for 
protecting the expectations of the parties (as it was under the Nineteenth Century formalist 
approach to contract interpretation) and because imposing an unbargained for covenant of 
good faith conflicts with the principle of party autonomy.  Id. at 562–63, 615.  He applies his 
point specifically to requirements and output contracts:  “[i]n some of these instances, such 
as the obligation to exercise good faith in requirements and output contracts, the same 
criticisms that are suggested with respect to the general implied covenant of good faith 
apply with equal force; that is, the good faith requirement is simply a surrogate for the real 
question at issue, which is the interpretation of the contract.”  Id. at 563.   
In a similar vein, Dobbins responds to Professor Michael Van Alstine’s concerns 
regarding the rise of the “textualist” approach to good faith, which focuses on the parties’ 
expressed intent, as “largely unfounded.”  Compare Dobbins, supra note 3, at 227, with 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1223 (1999).  “Respecting the primacy of the parties’ agreement does not mean relying 
exclusively on the agreement’s text.  Instead, it means that the agreement cannot be 
disregarded in favor of more equitable or “fairer” terms as determined ex post facto by the 
court or jury.”  Dobbins, supra note 3, at 275. 
10 Dobbins, supra note 3, at 232. 
11  Dubroff, supra note 7, at 586–87.  “Moreover, it is submitted that the interpretation 
approach to the case offers a principled basis for determining the agreement of the parties 
[discussing Fortune v. National Cash Register, Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977)], while the 
good faith approach to the case invites the court to simply state conclusively a rule that 
seems proper to the individual judge.”  Dubroff applies his thesis to the analysis of 
requirements contracts under Professor Summer’s identification of “evading the spirit of 
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accomplished scholars, including Professor Robert Summers, whose 
“excluder” analysis has been adopted by the Restatement Second,12 and 
Professor Steven Burton, who formulated the “foregone opportunities” 
test,13 the term “good faith” has, according to Judge Posner, no “settled 
meaning,” and remains, as he famously put it, “a chameleon.”14  As a 
result, the doctrine could be undermining party autonomy by adding 
ambiguity, and hence uncertainty, which the parties cannot avoid by 
agreement, into the performance obligations imposed by all contracts.15 
Returning to the subject of formation, a majority of courts16 and 
commentators17 take the position that a requirements contract is not 
                                                                                                             
the deal” as bad faith rather than under principles of contract interpretation in the 
following passage:  
As examples of evasions of the spirit of the deal, Professor Summer 
offers cases in which a buyer who is a party to a requirements contract 
either attempts to avoid ordering what it really needs (say in the case 
of a falling market), or attempts to expand its requirements beyond its 
normal business needs (say, in the case of a rising market).  
Approaching these cases as matters of interpretation would involve 
inquiring into the negotiations and other contextual factors of the 
transaction (e.g., historical requirements of the buyer, course of 
dealing), and filling any gaps with court-determined fair and 
reasonable terms.  At best, deciding these cases on whether the spirit of 
the deal has been evaded is a less accurate description of what the 
court should be doing—identifying the contract and enforcing it.  At 
worst, such a method of deciding these cases is unprincipled and may 
lead to erroneous results in determining rights under the contract. 
Id. at 597.  See also Dobbins, supra note 3, at 254 (“Instead of viewing the implied covenant 
as an interpretive aid or gap-filler, these courts have implied obligations that add to or 
even contradict the obligations spelled out in the parties’ agreement in the name of 
fulfilling the parties’ (or at least one party’s) reasonable expectations.”). 
12  Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provision of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).  “In contract law, taken as a whole, 
good faith is an ‘excluder.’  It is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own 
and serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.”  Id. at 201.  
(citations omitted).  Summers’ approach was adopted by the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt. d (1981). 
13  Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good Faith, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).  “Bad faith performance occurs precisely when discretion is 
used to recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting—when the discretion-exercising 
party refuses to pay the expected cost of performance.”  Id. at 373. 
14  Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988). 
15  Dubroff, supra note 7, at 617–18.  
16 See, e.g., Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., 270 F.3d 723, 726–27 (8th Cir. 
2001); Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 220 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc. v. Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 373, 377–
80 (7th Cir. 2000); Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 817–18 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 963–64 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 728–29 (8th Cir. 1995); Modern Sys. Tech. 
v. United States, 979 F.2d 200, 205 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, 
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enforceable unless it places an obligation on the buyer to purchase all of 
the requirements of a particular product exclusively from the seller, and 
conversely, that an output contract is not enforceable unless the seller 
agrees to supply his output exclusively to the buyer.  A minority of 
courts and commentators believe that this “exclusivity rule,” which was 
developed under the common law to enforce open quantity contracts, 
has been replaced under section 2-306(1) of the UCC by a “good faith” 
standard that requires buyers and suppliers to tender or demand 
quantities that are not “unreasonably disproportionate” to estimated or 
“normal” quantities.18  Between these two extremes, many jurisdictions 
have adopted modified versions of the exclusivity rule as well as a whole 
host of exceptions.19   
Exceptions to the exclusivity rule show that it is not, in its broadest 
formulation, necessary for validation.  For example, requirements 
contracts are enforced in some jurisdictions when (1) the buyer sets a cap 
on the quantity of goods he is required to purchase from the seller; (2) 
the buyer purchases all of his requirements exclusively from the seller, 
but only for particular customers; or (3) when the buyer purchases his 
requirements exclusively from the seller, but only for a specific project.  
These variations of the exclusivity rule indicate that an alternative rule 
could be formulated that would satisfy the mutuality and definiteness 
doctrines while providing the flexibility to validate any requirements 
                                                                                                             
Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 461 (9th Cir. 1979); Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-anim 
Health Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (D. Kan. 2007); Boydstun Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Cottrell, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1132–33 (D. Or. 2007); Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Steak ‘N Shake, 
Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1149, 1158–59 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., 
Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1411, 1426–27 (D. Minn. 1996); Indus. Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Cummins 
Engine Co., 902 F. Supp. 805, 810 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Propane Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
429 F. Supp. 214, 218–21 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Stacks v. F & S Petroleum Co., Inc., 641 S.W.2d 
726, 727–28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Ind.-Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Town of Seelyville, 698 N.E.2d 
1255, 1259–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Kirkwood-Easton Tire Co. v. St. Louis County, 568 
S.W.2d 267, 268–69 (Mo. 1978); United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Schlang, 894 P.2d 967, 970–72 
(Nev. 1995); Wilsonville Concrete Prods. v. Todd Bldg. Co., 574 P.2d 1112, 1114–15 (Or. 
1978). 
17  See, e.g., ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.15 (4th ed. 2004); 2 
LARRY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306:39 (3d ed. 
Supp. 2005); 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND’S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES 
§ 2-306:1 (Supp. 2005); 10 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29:16 (4th ed. 
Supp. 2005); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-9 (4th 
ed. 1995). 
18 See Amber Chem Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 2007 WL 512410 at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Prods. Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873–74 (E.D. Mich. 2000); 
Plastech Engineered Plastics v. Grand Haven Plastics, Inc., 2005 WL 736519 at *6–*7 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2005); Hoover's Hatchery, Inc. v. Utgaard, 447 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1989).  See also Bruckel, supra note 4, at 185–211; McCallon, supra note 4, at 735. 
19 See infra Part IV.B. 
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contract in which the buyer agrees to purchase, or the seller agrees to 
supply, an ascertainable quantity of goods. 
In all courts, regardless of whether they follow the exclusivity rule, 
and in decisions involving contracts for services as well as goods, courts 
imply a duty of good faith on sellers to generate output and on buyers to 
order requirements that are reasonably consistent with estimated or 
historical quantities, with the caveat that a buyer’s needs can fall to zero 
as long as the decline is not due to the bad faith conduct of the buyer.  
The buyer in a requirements contract cannot order quantities that exceed 
estimates by an unreasonable extent because the buyer might be 
purchasing the products to resell them in a rising market, a risk the 
parties presumably would not have anticipated when they entered into 
the contract.20  Conversely, while the buyer in a requirements contract 
can reduce his requirements to zero, he can do so only if he is acting in 
good faith.21   
The implied duty of good faith serves two functions.  First, in a 
minority of jurisdictions, the duty of good faith replaces the exclusivity 
rule as a validation principle for open quantity contracts.  Second, in 
every jurisdiction, it supplies a definition of quantity that allows courts 
to determine if the quantity-determining party breached the contract 
through a tender or demand of an unreasonably high quantity or by a 
reduction or elimination of output or requirements that is not made in 
good faith.  Accordingly, any alternative to the exclusivity rule that 
eliminates the implied duty of good faith should not be adopted unless it 
performs these functions at least as well as, if not better than, the implied 
duty of good faith. 
This Article addresses whether open quantity contracts must be 
exclusive to satisfy the doctrines of mutuality of obligation and 
indefiniteness, and whether the good faith standard of the Code is 
sufficient to satisfy these doctrines without reliance on the exclusivity 
rule.  In an effort to answer these questions, the Article discusses 
decisions recognizing open quantity contracts that are not entirely 
exclusive but come “close enough” to satisfy the principles of contract 
formation.  From this discussion, a framework will arise for a new 
standard to recognize “partially-exclusive” open quantity contracts.  This 
standard would require courts to enforce open quantity contracts 
whenever there is evidence of a quantity term sufficient to indicate that 
the seller in an output contract has agreed to produce all or an 
ascertainable portion of his output to the buyer, and that the buyer in a 
requirements contract has agreed to purchase all or an ascertainable 
                                                 
20 See infra pp. 881–83.  
21 Id. at 883.  
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portion of his requirements from the seller.  Validation would neither 
rely on the implied duty imposed upon buyers and sellers in open 
quantity contracts under the common law and the Code not to reduce or 
eliminate their requirements or output unless they do so in “good faith,” 
nor would it rely on the implied duty not to tender or demand quantities 
that are unreasonably disproportionate to the parties’ estimates, or 
normal or historical quantities.  Based on an examination of the 
formation cases, this Article also explores whether adoption of a new 
validation standard would be sufficient to address the current lack of 
predictability in the law, or whether new methods of interpretation are 
needed to correctly identify enforceable open quantity contracts.  
Turning to breach of contract cases, this Article examines whether there 
are reasons for retaining the implied duty of good faith, which sets 
upper and lower limits to a seller’s output and a buyer’s requirements, 
or whether the parties should be left to set their own limits when 
drafting their contracts. 
In Part II, this Article briefly summarizes the historical basis for the 
recognition of requirements contracts and asks whether creating a 
requirement of exclusivity and an implied duty of good faith were 
necessary in this regard, or whether a more limited view of the promises 
exchanged in these contracts would have satisfied validation concerns, 
leaving the parties free to allocate the market price and quantity risks. 
Part III examines how the concepts of exclusivity and good faith 
have been affected by the adoption of section 2-306 of the UCC.  
Specifically, this Article analyzes whether good faith is sufficient to 
satisfy the doctrines of mutuality and definiteness, as the Official 
Comments to UCC section 2-306 assert,  the potential inconsistency 
between this claim and application of UCC section 2-306 as a gap-filler, 
and the ability of parties to avoid the application of UCC section 2-306 by 
agreement. 
In Part IV, this Article reviews current case law addressing 
formation issues under the exclusivity rule, its variations, and the duty 
of good faith. 
Part V examines the methods of interpretation used by courts to 
identify enforceable open quantity contracts, focusing on five problem 
areas and offering corrective action in each. 
In Part VI, this Article explores cases in which the seller has alleged 
that the buyer breached a requirements contract by reducing or 
eliminating his requirements in “bad faith.”  The goal of Part VI is to 
compare the results courts are achieving in these cases to the results that 
could be achieved if the parties drafted their own provisions for 
allocating these risks. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/1
2009] Enforcing Open Quantity Contracts 879 
In Part VII, this Article explains why eliminating the implied duty of 
good faith from the law of open quantity contracts will not convert these 
contracts into buyer’s options, as Judge Posner suggests in his decision in 
Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co.22 
Three specific proposals for reform are laid out in Part VIII.  First, I 
propose a new exclusivity rule for courts to apply to the formation 
question.  Second, I recommend a more disciplined approach to contract 
interpretation for courts to use in identifying valid open quantity 
contracts.  To conserve judicial resources and avoid opportunistic 
behavior, private parties would be required to write contracts that state 
the buyer’s or seller’s commitment to purchase or supply the goods, and 
to allocate the risks of variable quantities in a trade-off between the 
interests of the judicial system and business sector that is long overdue.  
In the final proposal, I suggest adopting a revised version of UCC section 
2-306(1) which removes the references to “good faith” and 
“unreasonably disproportionate” quantities.  The purpose of this 
revision is to ensure that the quantity limitations imposed by these terms 
are not used as mandatory, but rather as default rules, and to recognize 
that without further agreement, all the parties to a requirements or 
output contract agree to is that to the extent they have any requirements 
or output, these quantities cannot be purchased from or supplied to one 
of the promisee’s competitors. 
II.  THE CREATION OF THE EXCLUSIVITY RULE AND THE IMPLIED DUTY OF 
GOOD FAITH FOR OPEN QUANTITY CONTRACTS 
When first presented with open quantity contracts in the mid-
nineteenth century, courts refused to enforce them based on the classic 
doctrines of mutuality of obligation and definiteness.  The dilemma was 
that in output and requirements contracts, the promisor does not agree 
to buy or sell any minimum quantity of goods and could therefore 
theoretically perform his obligations without buying or selling any 
goods, making his performance completely discretionary.  Given this 
unbridled discretion, courts found that the promise was illusory and that 
the lack of a quantity term made it too indefinite to be enforced.23  As the 
use of these open-quantity contracts increased, courts eventually 
relented and began to enforce them, on one condition:  the party with 
discretion over quantity had to promise to deal exclusively with the 
promisee for that quantity, so that the quantity under the contract could 
                                                 
22 840 F.2d 1333, 1337–39 (7th Cir. 1988). 
23 See Blair, supra note 6, at 75–84 (providing a thorough description of the history of 
these cases). 
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be calculated based on the actual requirements of the buyer or the actual 
output of the seller.24  In reaching this solution, courts relied on the 
adage, id certum est quod certum reddi potest (that is certain which can be 
made certain).25 
Under the exclusivity rule, the essential obligation of the quantity-
determining party is to deal solely with the promisee for any 
requirements or output the promisor may have.  Thus, in a requirements 
contract, the buyer has breached the contract if the buyer purchases 
requirements from any other seller, and the seller in an output contract 
has breached the contract if he sells output to any other buyer.  The 
buyer’s promise to purchase his requirements, if any, from the seller, and 
from no other source, is also the promise that provides the requisite 
consideration to sustain the contract—there is no doctrinal need to 
impose an additional duty on the buyer to maintain requirements “in 
good faith,” as the Official Code Comments to UCC section 2-306(1) 
purport to do.26  As Arthur Corbin explained, in making such a promise, 
the buyer does not undertake to “continue in business on its present 
scale or even run [a] business at all.”27  The consideration that saves the 
contract is this:  “The promise contains one very definite element that 
                                                 
24 Id. at 88–94. 
25 Id. at 88 n.89. 
26  One Code-era case that illustrates this point nicely is City of Lakeland v. Union Oil Co., 
352 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1973), where the court rejected a lack of consideration challenge 
to a requirements contract based on a 1935 case, Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 160 So. 215 
(Fla. 1935), and on the section from Corbin on Contracts quoted above.  The contract at issue 
in City of Lakeland left the buyer free to purchase as much or as little of the goods as he may 
“capriciously desire[,]” but the buyer was bound to purchase any of the goods he did 
desire from the seller.  Id. at 764–65.  The court did not rely on the buyer’s implied duty of 
good faith to hold the buyer accountable for maintaining the requirements to sustain the 
contract, but rather on the pre-UCC Jenkins case validating, as supported by sufficient 
consideration, “‘[a]greements of the buyer to buy and the seller to sell all that the buyer 
may want during the terms of the contract, i.e., capriciously desire; the buyer agreeing not 
to buy elsewhere during a given time any of the articles covered by the contract.’”  Id. at 
764 (quoting Jenkins, 160 So. at 218).  Despite such authorities, scholars, such as Michael 
Van Alstine, continue to maintain that good faith is necessary to preserve the enforceability 
of open term contracts, including requirements contracts, on the grounds that the 
unfettered discretion of the discretion-exercising party would otherwise “dissolve the 
irreducible core of an enforceable contractual relationship.” Van Alstine, supra note 9, at 
1294.  As to requirements contracts, this position ignores the buyer’s commitment that 
should it have requirements for the goods in question, it will not purchase them from any 
other supplier than the seller, a commitment that under any reasonably current view of 
consideration should be sufficient to support an enforceable contract.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71.  
27 City of Lakeland, 352 F. Supp. at 766 (quoting 1A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 156 (1963)). 
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specifically limits the promisor’s future liberty of action; he definitely 
promises that he will buy of no one else.”28 
The buyer’s obligation to the seller is expanded significantly, 
however, by the rule that parties to requirements contracts must limit 
their demands to quantities that reasonably approximate the parties’ 
expectations.  In the 1903 decision, New York Central Ironworks Co. v. 
United States Radiator Co.,29 the New York Court of Appeals was one of 
the first courts to apply the “implied duty of good faith and fair dealing” 
to reach this conclusion.  In New York Central, the buyer sued the seller 
for breach of contract to supply the plaintiff “‘with their entire radiator 
needs for the year 1899[,]’” on the terms and at prices specified.30  The 
seller asserted the defense of mutual mistake when the plaintiff 
submitted orders for a total of 100,000 feet and the seller was unable to 
supply plaintiff’s orders beyond 48,000 feet, the maximum number of 
feet the plaintiff had ever previously required in a year.31  New York’s 
highest court affirmed the appellate court’s rejection of this defense, 
finding that the defendant “bound the plaintiff to deal exclusively in 
goods to be ordered from it under the contract, and to enlarge and 
develop the market for the defendant’s wares so far as possible.”32  The 
quantity term was therefore intentionally left open, and the seller’s 
failure to anticipate the rising price of iron and manufactured products 
of iron was not a defense.  The needs of the buyer “could be indefinitely 
enlarged” when he had a favorable contract that would allow him to 
undersell his competitors.33 
The only consideration that gave the court pause in reaching its 
decision in New York Central was the testimony from the plaintiff’s 
manager concerning whether the goods ordered were required for the 
needs of the plaintiff’s business.34  This question drew an objection, and 
the decision does not record the witness’ answer.  The court nevertheless 
observed that “[t]he obligation of good faith and fair dealing towards 
each other is implied in every contract of this character.”35  Based on this 
implied duty, the defendant could have offered proof, in defense of his 
breach, that  
                                                 
28  Id. 
29 66 N.E. 967, 968 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1903). 
30 Id. at 967. 
31 Id. 




Smith: A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quan
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
882 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
the orders were in excess of the plaintiff’s reasonable 
needs, and were not justified by the conditions of 
business or the customs of the trade—in other words, 
that the plaintiff was not acting reasonably or in good 
faith, but using the contract for a purpose not within the 
contemplation of the parties; that is to say, for 
speculative as distinguished from regular and ordinary 
business purposes.36 
The court in New York Central recognized that a party is normally 
entitled to the profits that accrue in a rising market because of a 
favorable contract, and that if the defendant fails to anticipate or provide 
for this risk, he must face the prospect of paying substantial damages for 
breach of such a contract.37  What is puzzling is that the court fails to ask 
why, in a fixed quantity contract, the law sees no harm in imposing 
losses on a promisee who fails to anticipate market fluctuations when 
setting the price and quantity terms of his fixed term contracts, but 
relieves the promisee of these risks in the case of upside demands made 
in open quantity contracts.  In both cases, contracting parties have a 
multitude of drafting choices for shielding themselves from the vagaries 
of the market.  These provisions are well-known in long-term supply 
contracts, and can be used just as easily in requirements contracts.  For 
example, in New York Central, if the seller did not have the capacity to sell 
the buyer more than the 48,000 feet annually, he could have stated in the 
contract that this was the maximum quantity of goods the buyer could 
demand.  If the issue was price, the seller could have used a cost-plus or 
price escalation clause to account for any unanticipated market changes 
that would have made it economically impracticable to perform. 
The implied duty of good faith developed in the common law of 
open quantity contracts into a rigid, unrebuttable presumption that the 
New York Central court did not contemplate.  In New York Central, the 
court held that in a requirements contract, the seller should be given an 
opportunity to prove, as a defense to nonperformance, that the buyer 
demanded unusually large quantities of goods in a rising market for 
purposes of speculation, and was therefore not acting in good faith.38  
But the law eventually dispensed with the need for proof of the buyer’s 
intent, and sustained the defense regardless of the buyer’s actual 
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motive.39  Decreases in quantity, on the other hand, were permitted 
under requirements contracts all the way down to zero, as long as the 
buyer was acting in good faith.  In a frequently cited formulation of the 
common law rule, “the seller assumes the risk of all good faith variations 
in the buyer’s requirements even to the extent of a determination to 
liquidate or discontinue the business.”40 
This lop-sided application of the rule was justified “based on a 
reliance on the self-interest of the buyer, who ordinarily will seek to have 
the largest possible requirements.”41  This rationale is not persuasive, 
however, because it does not fit the rule and it assumes market 
conditions which may not exist.  If market conditions do support the 
assumption, so that it is in the buyer’s self-interest to seek the largest 
possible requirements, he would be acting in bad faith, as a matter of 
law, if his requests exceed the parties’ estimates.  The buyer cannot 
demand quantities above the “stated estimate” or the “normal or 
otherwise comparable prior” quantity under UCC section 2-306, no 
matter how pure his motives may be, because the law presumes that he 
intends to use the additional goods for speculation.  The common law 
rationale also fails to explain why courts are not equally intolerant of 
demands that fall below the expected quantities.  A self-interested buyer 
may seek to reduce or eliminate his requirements under many 
circumstances that are not out of the ordinary, especially under a long-
term contract.  These include changes in consumer preferences, advances 
in technology, market fluctuations, and other factors that could reduce 
the buyer’s need for the product or result in a decline in the buyer’s 
business. 
III.  THE UCC RULE ON OPEN QUANTITY CONTRACTS—SECTION 2-306 
 Output and requirements contracts are addressed in UCC section 2-
306, which incorporates the implied duty of good faith in requirements 
contracts, thus preventing a buyer from requesting a quantity of goods 
that is disproportionate to the quantity the parties had estimated.  
Section 2-306 does not expressly repeat the prior rule that a requirements 
contract is only enforceable if the buyer promises to buy all of his 
requirements exclusively from the seller.42  Some commentators contend 
that section 2-306 implicitly adopts the exclusivity rule either because the 
phrase “the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer” means 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d 
471, 473 (3d Cir. 1942). 
40 See HML Corp. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1966). 
41 Id. 
42 U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2008). 
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that the seller under an output contract must supply all his output to the 
buyer and the buyer under a requirements contract must purchase all his 
requirements from the seller, so that exclusivity is understood,43 or 
simply because the parties are required to act in good faith.44  As Part IV 
shows, courts have enforced output and requirements contracts under 
section 2-306 where the parties’ contract for less than one-hundred 
percent of the seller’s output or the buyer’s requirements under 
exceptions and modifications to the exclusivity rule.  Some 
commentators claim that the duty of good faith should be interpreted to 
replace, rather than to incorporate, the exclusivity rule.45  While most 
                                                 
43 See LINDA J. RUSCH, 1 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-306:3 (1982) (“By their very nature, 
output and requirements contracts involve exclusive dealing, because if the seller agrees to 
deliver his entire output to the buyer, the seller can sell to no one else, and the converse is 
true in the requirements contract.”). 
44 See 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:12 (4th ed. 2008) (“A final note concerning the 
obligations of the parties under a requirements or output contract is in order. As was 
previously seen, output and requirements contracts are generally supposed to entail 
exclusivity; at common law, in order to establish mutuality or consideration, and under the 
Code by virtue of the obligation of good faith.”). 
45 See Blair, supra note 6, at 95.  Professor Blair writes that, “[s]ection 2-306, however, 
makes no reference to, and certainly does not require, exclusivity as a prerequisite to the 
validation of open-quantity agreements.”  Id.  He argues that open-quantity contracts are 
validated by the standard of good faith which attaches without regard to exclusivity and 
that contracts will not fail for indefiniteness even without a quantity term as long as the 
parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy.  Id.  Because one of the central difficulties posed by open quantity 
contracts is giving an appropriate remedy when contracts lack a quantity term,  Blair’s 
failure to identify what would constitute a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy in the context of an open quantity contract leaves the core of the 
question unanswered.  Id. at 94.  In Professor Bruckel’s formulation, the implied duty of 
good faith could provide a basis for supplying a remedy and determining performance, but 
only because she believes good faith should be used “as an instrument to conform the 
actual performance of the contract to the parties’ largely unstated expectations[,]” and 
opposes attempts by courts to impose their own normative views of fairness on the parties.  
Bruckel, supra note 4, at 202.  Because the quantity assumptions are “largely unstated[,]” 
and there must be some basis for determining performance and awarding a remedy, she 
would rely on parol evidence to demonstrate the parties’ intent.  Id. at 202, 207.  There are 
at least three problems with this analysis.  One is that Bruckel cannot take the janus-like 
position that the good faith standard of UCC section 2-306 is efficacious when using it as a 
validation device to replace the consideration provided by the promise of exclusivity and 
yet that the good faith standard is not efficacious and should be replaced with the intent of 
the parties as determined by parol evidence.  The second problem is that consideration is a 
bargained for exchange, not an implied duty of law that cannot be disclaimed; thus, the 
UCC implied duty of good faith cannot take the place of consideration.  Finally, Bruckel 
claims that good faith could supply the performance standard equally well for non-
exclusive contracts on the grounds that exclusivity rarely plays a role in determining 
performance standards.  Id. at 181.  But her failure to support this assertion with examples 
or cases is not surprising—if there is no agreement on a formula for ascertaining the 
portion of requirements the buyer has promised to purchase from the seller, good faith 
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courts continue to apply the exclusivity rule, only a few actually rely on 
section 2-306 as authority for the rule.46 
The only reference to exclusivity in section 2-306 is in 2-306(2), which 
relates to “exclusive dealing” agreements.47  As the Official Comments 
indicate, “the principal is expected under such a contract to refrain from 
supplying any other dealer or agent within the exclusive territory.”  This 
discussion of “exclusive dealing” agreements as a subset of output and 
requirements contracts has led several courts to conclude that the 
legislatures adopting this UCC provision intended that requirements 
contracts could be either exclusive or non-exclusive.48  This assumption 
                                                                                                             
provides no basis for determining why a buyer should purchase any given quantity from 
the requirements seller rather than from another source. 
46 For example, in Integrated Micro Systems, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (USA), Inc., 329 
S.E.2d 554, 556 (Ga. App. 1985), the court stated, 
There can be no true requirements contract unless the buyer is under 
an obligation to purchase all of its requirements from the seller.  In the 
absence of such an obligation, there is no requirements contract and 
“the promise of the seller becomes merely an invitation for orders and 
a contract is not consummated until an order for a specific amount is 
made by the buyer.” 
Id. (some quotation marks omitted).  See also Famous Brands, Inc. v. David Sherman Corp., 
814 F.2d  517, 522 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the prospective 
buyer’s good faith in filling all of its requirements through the seller is deemed sufficient 
consideration to support the contract.”); Stacks v. F & S Petroleum Co., Inc., 641 S.W.2d 726, 
727 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (“Both at common law and under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
a requirements contract is simply an agreement by the buyer to buy his good faith 
requirements of goods exclusively from the seller.”). 
47 See U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (2006).  Section 2-306(2) of the UCC provides:  “A lawful 
agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods 
concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to 
supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale.”  Id. 
48 In General Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Products, Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873–74 
(E.D. Mich. 2000), the court reached the conclusion that “M.C.L. § 440.2306 expresses a 
legislative intent to enforce both exclusive and non-exclusive requirements contracts[]” 
from the fact that “M.C.L. 440.2306(2) applies a standard to ‘exclusive dealing’ that is not 
applicable to the class of output requirements contracts referred to in M.C.L. 440. 2306(1).”  
Id.  See also Amber Chem. Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 2007 WL 512410 at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(concluding that the rule of exclusivity is contrary to the plain language of UCC section 2-
306 because it provides that a requirements contract can be either without exclusivity, UCC 
section 2-306(1), or in the form of an exclusive dealing arrangement, UCC section 2-306(2)); 
Plastech Engineered Plastics v. Grand Haven Plastics, Inc., 2005 WL 736519 at *6–7 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2005) (reasoning that because UCC section 2-306 acknowledged “exclusive 
dealing” requirements contracts as a subset of “requirements contracts[,]” it followed that 
“exclusivity” was not a necessary element of a requirements contract).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also appears to have confused the meanings of the 
terms.  See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 674 (3d Cir. 1991).  In Advent, a 
computer manufacturer entered into a distribution agreement to sell the buyer hardware 
products and software licenses “on a non-exclusive basis[,]” meaning of course, that the 
buyer would not be the exclusive distributor, and the manufacturer could sell the products 
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is problematic because the term “exclusive dealing” is not used in section 
2-306(2) in the same sense that courts have traditionally used the term 
“exclusivity” as a necessary element for enforcing requirements contracts 
under the doctrines of mutuality and definiteness.  “Exclusive dealing” 
in section 2-306(2) means what can be termed “mutual exclusivity,” in 
that it affects both the buyer and the seller.  The term “exclusivity” as a 
requirement for validity is used in a unilateral sense to affect only the 
quantity-determining party.49  For a requirements contract, “exclusive 
dealing” under section 2-306(2) binds the seller as well as the buyer to a 
promise of exclusivity.  The seller agrees that he will sell product A to the 
buyer and to no other customers—at least in a defined geographic area 
or other specified market such as exclusive or partially exclusive 
dealerships—in an amount the buyer requires.  If the buyer does not use 
his best efforts, the seller will sacrifice opportunities because he will have 
no other potential customers to whom he may sell product A, at least 
within the affected market.50  For an output contract, “exclusive dealing” 
                                                                                                             
and software licenses to others.  The Third Circuit correctly recognized that this language 
kept the contract from being one of “exclusive dealing” within the meaning of UCC 
section 2-306(2), so that the “‘best efforts’” required when the buyer is the only distributor 
of the seller’s product do not apply.  The court went further, however, and found that this 
language also made the contract a “non-exclusive” contract within the meaning of UCC 
section 2-306(1) for “good faith” requirements contracts.  Id. at 678–80.  This conclusion 
raised the issue of whether the statute of frauds could be satisfied with a contract 
containing a “non-exclusive” requirements term for the quantity because prior law had 
recognized a statute of frauds exception only for “exclusive” requirements contracts under 
UCC section 2-306.  Id.  In fact, the contract in Advent was simply a “non-exclusive” 
distribution agreement as contrasted with an “exclusive” distribution agreement, meaning 
that it did not prevent the seller from selling the same products through other distributors, 
making the exclusivity unilateral, rather than mutual. 
49 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 82 n.1 (“[A]s long as the seller is not bound to sell 
exclusively to the buyer, the fact that the buyer is to buy exclusively from the seller does 
not make the contract one for ‘exclusive dealing’ under U.C.C. 2-306(2)”); MDC Corp. v. 
John H. Harland Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concluding that “the duty to 
use best efforts applies to exclusive agents only, and not to all requirements buyers”). 
50 As the court explained in Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 962 F.2d 1119, 1125 (3d Cir. 
1992): 
This obligation [the best efforts obligation under UCC section 2-306(2)] 
is intended to protect the original seller, who in an exclusive 
arrangement depends solely upon the buyer to resell the goods.   
In a non-exclusive arrangement the buyer’s efforts in reselling the 
product may have little effect on the original seller. If the buyer does 
not resell the product, the seller, without breaching the contract, may 
solicit orders from other potential buyers.  By contrast, in an exclusive 
dealing arrangement the seller has only one outlet for its goods.  It is 
obligated not to sell to anyone except the buyer.  In such a situation, 
the seller’s interests are inextricably bound up with the success of the 
buyer in reselling the product. The obligation placed on the buyer to 
use best efforts reflects its monopoly power; the exclusivity 
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means that the buyer will only buy product A from the seller in the 
amount that the seller produces.  If the seller does not use his best efforts 
to manufacture the product, the buyer would be vulnerable to sacrificed 
opportunities because he would have no other source for product A.  In a 
“normal” output contract, only the seller would have an obligation to 
sell his output to the buyer, and if the seller failed to produce, the buyer 
would be free to purchase from other suppliers.  This mutual type of 
“exclusive dealing” agreement is a sufficient, but not a necessary, 
condition for satisfying the element of “exclusivity” required to enforce 
open quantity contracts.51 
It is somewhat more reasonable to infer, as at least one court has 
done,52 that the legislatures adopting the UCC intended to revoke the 
exclusivity rule for requirements contracts, based on the omission from 
UCC section 2-306(1) of any reference to the exclusivity rule and the 
explanation in the Official Comments to UCC section 2-306 that the good 
faith obligations imposed under the section satisfy the doctrines of 
mutuality and definiteness.  Even this inference is flawed, but it takes a 
bit more effort to discern the problem.  As discussed in more detail in 
Part III.A, the argument in the Official Comments applies only to 
contracts involving one-hundred percent of the buyer’s requirements or 
the seller’s output, and therefore necessarily incorporates the exclusivity 
rule.  Despite the debate among commentators and the ambiguity in the 
Code, the majority of courts are unmoved and continue to insist upon 
exclusivity as a condition for enforcing output and requirements 
contracts.53 
For example, in a recent case involving an alleged output contract, 
Arrotin Plastic Materials v. Wilmington Paper Corp.,54 the court refused to 
rely on section 2-306 to enforce the agreement without a commitment by 
the seller to sell all of his output to the buyer, and held that the 
                                                                                                             
arrangement makes the seller as subject to the decisions of the buyer as 
a subsidiary within the buyer’s firm. 
Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
51 See Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 815 F.2d 806, 811–12 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming a 
directed verdict for the seller, the First Circuit enforced a requirements contract despite the 
absence of a specific quantity term based on evidence that the parties’ contract was an 
exclusive dealer arrangement). 
52 In Hoover's Hatchery, Inc. v. Utgaard, 447 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989), the 
court decided, as a matter of first impression, that under Iowa’s version of UCC section 2-
306, exclusivity was not a prerequisite to a valid requirements contract.  Id.  The court 
noted that the statute did not contain any language suggesting exclusivity was necessary, 
but it did contain a separate section addressing exclusive dealing agreements and Official 
Comments distinguishing the two sections.  Id. 
53 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.   
54 865 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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agreement was illusory and therefore unenforceable.  The agreement 
provided that the buyer was “pleased to purchase the following 
materials you have available for sale” and then listed categories of scrap 
plastic materials with the word “ALL” before each item.55  If the court 
had applied section 2-306(1) as the “primary ‘gap filler’” for missing 
quantity term contracts, as several federal circuit courts have held is 
appropriate,56 the court would have found that the seller’s good faith 
duty not to tender “unreasonably disproportionate” quantities to the 
buyer was sufficient to prevent the agreement from being illusory, and 
enforced the agreement as a valid output contract.57  The court’s 
unwillingness to do so is representative of a broader reticence among the 
judiciary to replace the exclusivity rule for validating open quantity 
contracts with the good faith standard of the UCC. 
In addition to the confusion over whether exclusivity has been 
incorporated or rejected as a condition for valid open quantity contracts, 
the language of section 2-306(1) has also raised questions concerning the 
intended nature and scope of the implied duty of good faith.58  While the 
provision defines output and requirement quantity terms as the actual 
output or requirements that “may occur in good faith[,]” it also provides 
that no quantity that is “unreasonably disproportionate to any stated 
estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise 
comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or 
demanded.”59  As Judge Posner has observed, a literal interpretation of 
this Section would place both an upper and a lower limit on the quantity 
of goods that could be tendered or demanded, regardless of the buyer’s 
or seller’s intent, and would therefore represent a departure from the 
common law rule permitting a buyer to decrease his requirements to 
                                                 
55 Id. at 1040. 
56 See Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Gestetner, 815 F.2d at 811; Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784, 789 (5th 
Cir. 1975). 
57 U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2008).  Even courts that claim to accept the proposition that the 
exclusivity rule has been replaced by the “good faith” standard under UCC section 2-306(1) 
for output and requirements contracts, continue to invalidate open quantity contracts on 
the ground that the buyer is not obligated to purchase goods from the seller under the 
terms of the contract.  See United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Schlang, 894 P.2d 967, 971–72 (Nev. 
1995) (reversing the trial court’s finding that a valid requirements contract had been 
reached and holding that because “there [w]as no basis for the implication of a reciprocal 
promise by either party[,] . . . no valid requirements contract existed[.]”). 
58 Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1337–39 (7th Cir. 1988). 
59 U.C.C.§ 2-306(1) (2008). 
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zero as long as he was acting in good faith.60  Several portions of the 
Official Comments support this view. 
First, an obligation to maintain output and requirements is implied 
in Official Comment 2, which describes the interplay between the 
concepts of “good faith” and the ban on “unreasonably 
disproportionate” quantities by explaining that, “under this section, the 
party who will determine quantity is required to operate his plant or 
conduct his business in good faith and according to commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade so that his output or requirements 
will approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure.”61  Second, 
symmetrical treatment of increased and decreased quantities is 
supported by Official Comment 3, which provides that “the agreed 
estimate is to be regarded as a center around which the parties intend the 
variation to occur.”62  Third, Official Comment 2 also indicates that good 
faith is relevant to permitting what would otherwise be unreasonably 
disproportionate increases as well as decreases.  For increases, the 
Official Comments provide that, “a sudden expansion of the plant by 
which requirements are to be measured would not be included within 
the scope of the contract as made but normal expansion undertaken in 
good faith would be within the scope of this [S]ection.”63  In the case of 
decreases, “good faith variations from prior requirements are permitted 
even when the variation may be such as to result in discontinuance.  A 
shut-down by a requirements buyer for lack of orders might be 
permissible when a shut-down merely to curtail losses would not.”64  
This reference to decreases has been relied on to support the view that 
the “unreasonably disproportionate” proviso does not apply to 
decreases, since extreme variations are permitted in “good faith,65 but in 
                                                 
60 Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1337 (“The proviso does not distinguish between the buyer 
who demands more than the stated estimate and the buyer who demands less, and 
therefore if read literally it would forbid a buyer to take (much) less than the stated 
estimate.”).  In Empire Gas, Judge Posner held that it was error, although not reversible 
error, to read UCC section 2-306(1) to the jury verbatim, given its literal meaning.  Id. at 
1339.  The statute’s “‘unreasonably disproportionate’” language was interpreted in Empire 
Gas as a redundancy that simply provides an additional gloss on the nature of “‘good 
faith’” by specifying that, in the requirements contract context, it is clearly an act of bad 
faith to make increased demands, given the possibility that the buyer may be exploiting 
opportunities created by rising prices to resell the seller’s goods.  Id. at 1338.  The 
unreasonably disproportionate language does not apply, according to Judge Posner, when 
the buyer takes less than the stated estimate.  Id. at 1339.   
61 U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt 2. 
62 Id. § 2-306 cmt 3. 
63 Id. § 2-306 cmt 2. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1339. 
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the subsequent sentence the Official Comments apply the concept of 
good faith to permit significant increases in quantity. 
Taking the Official Comments into account, the Code would require 
the factfinder to perform a two-step analysis, first deciding whether a 
particular increase or decrease was “unreasonably disproportionate” to 
the stated estimate or “normal” quantity, and then deciding whether the 
increase or decrease was the result of good faith.  The Comments offer no 
suggestions on how to determine what degree of variation is 
“unreasonable” in a given case, and the examples they provide for 
determining whether the variations arise from good faith are of little 
value.  Financial losses and sudden plant expansion—the impermissible 
reasons given for quantity variation—are foreseeable risks from which 
parties to open quantity contracts can protect themselves far better than 
judges and juries acting after the bargain has been made based on 
limited information and biases created by hindsight.  It is also unclear 
how decreased quantities caused by financial losses or increased 
quantities caused by sudden plant expansion could be seen as examples 
of bad faith, even when contrasted with falling orders or “normal” 
expansion. 
The majority view is that despite the provision’s seemingly parallel 
structure, the UCC, like the common law, permits a buyer to order an 
unreasonably disproportionate quantity that is below estimates or 
normal quantities as long as he acts in good faith, but does not allow him 
to order an unreasonably disproportionate quantity of goods that is 
above estimates or normal quantities, even in good faith.66  In cases 
where the parties have not set a minimum or maximum quantity limit by 
agreement, courts use the “unreasonably disproportionate” test of UCC 
section 2-306(1) to place limits on the quantity of goods that sellers can 
supply in excess of the contract estimates in an output contract, 
                                                 
66 Many courts have held that under UCC section 2-306(1), a buyer cannot demand 
disproportionately more than the buyer’s anticipated requirements, as measured by a 
stated estimate or normal or otherwise comparable prior requirements, but may in good 
faith take disproportionately less.  See Brewster of Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp., 33 F.3d 
355, 365 (4th Cir. 1994); Atlantic Track & Turnout Co. v. Perini Corp., 989 F.2d 541, 544–45 
(1st Cir. 1993) (output contract case); Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1339–40; Godchaux-Henderson 
Sugar Co. v. Dr. Pepper-Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Dyersburg, Inc., 1985 WL 13561 at *6 
(6th Cir. 1985); Angelica Uniform Group, Inc. v. Ponderosa Sys., Inc, 636 F.2d 232, 232 (8th 
Cir. 1980); R. A. Weaver and Assocs., Inc. v. Asphalt Const., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1321–22 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Fisons Corp., 1993 WL 54535 *3–*5 (N.D. Ill. 1993); N. 
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Colo. Westmoreland, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 613, 635–36 (N.D. Ind. 1987), 
judgment aff'd without opinion, 845 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1988); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Imperial Prof. Coatings, 599 F. Supp. 436, 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (applying UCC section 2-
306 to a federal requirements contract); Ind.-Am. Water Co. v. Town of Seelyville, 698 
N.E.2d 1255, 1260–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
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regardless of the seller’s good faith,67 and on the amounts that buyers 
can demand in excess of the estimates in a requirements contract, again 
regardless of the buyer’s good faith.68 
In support of this approach, Judge Posner argued in Empire Gas that 
there is no indication that the UCC drafters were concerned with a case 
in which the buyer takes less than his estimated requirements, as long as 
he does not buy from anyone else, and that the purpose of the provision 
was solely to prohibit disproportionately large demands.69  As 
previously indicated, the Official Comments contain language 
demonstrating that the drafters were concerned with cases in which a 
buyer took less than estimated requirements as a result of financial 
losses, surely not a rare occurrence, and one which the drafters felt 
would indicate bad faith.70  There are several jurisdictions, however, that 
reject Judge Posner’s view, resulting in a lack of uniformity in the 
interpretation of the “unreasonably disproportionate” as well as the 
“good faith” provisions of section 2-306(1).71  Under the minority 
                                                 
67 See State of Wash. Dept. of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 610 P.2d 390, 394 (Wash. App. 
1980) (holding that the seller’s tender of three times the estimate for salmon eggs and over 
two-thirds the estimate for salmon carcasses created a genuine dispute over the buyer’s 
obligation to pay the contract price under an output contract for accord and satisfaction 
purposes). 
68 See Shea-Kaiser Lockheed Healy v. Dept. of Water and Power of the City of L.A., 73 
Cal. App. 3d 679, 686–90 (Cal. App. Ct. 1977); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada 
Hess Corp., 59 A.D.2d 110, 116–17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (holding that buyer could not 
demand twice the estimated quantity because disproportionality, rather than good faith, is 
the test for excessive demands under UCC section 2-306(1)). 
69 Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1338.  The court stated that  
The proviso thus seems to have been designed to explicate the term 
‘good faith’ rather than to establish an independent legal standard.  
And the aspect of good faith that required explication had only to do 
with disproportionately large demands.  If the buyer saw an 
opportunity to increase his profits by reselling the seller’s goods 
because the market price had risen above the contract price, the 
exploitation of that opportunity might not clearly spell bad faith; the 
provision was added to close off the opportunity.  There is no 
indication that the draftsmen were equally, if at all, concerned about 
the case where the buyer takes less than his estimated requirements, 
provided, of course, that he does not buy from anyone else. 
Id. 
70 U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (2008) (“A shut-down by a requirements buyer for lack of orders 
might be permissible when a shut-down merely to curtail losses would not.  The essential 
test is whether the party is acting in good faith.”). 
71 See Simcala, Inc. v. Am. Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So. 2d 197, 201–02 (Ala. 2001) (holding 
that under the clear language of UCC section 2-306(1), the drafters intended that buyers 
would not be entitled to increase or reduce their requirements to a level that was 
unreasonably disproportionate to a stated estimate regardless of their good faith); Romine, 
Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 160 S.E.2d 659, 660–61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (interpreting the 
statute to apply to deviations both above and below the stated estimate); Orange & 
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interpretation of the Section, the Alabama Supreme Court in Simcala, Inc. 
v. American Coal Trade, Inc. held that the buyer had breached his 
requirements contract by purchasing only forty-one percent of his 
estimated annual requirements for coal, despite a finding that the buyer 
had acted in good faith and was unable to use any more coal due to 
furnace problems.72 
Given the ambiguity of the good faith standard under section 2-
306(1), there should be sound policy reasons for the majority 
interpretation.  A ceiling is necessary regardless of the buyer’s good 
faith, according to the theory, because if the price became advantageous, 
the buyer would resell the goods at a profit in competition with the 
seller—a result which would be contrary to the intent of the parties.73  It 
has been suggested that the economic justification for this position is that 
there is no limit to the potential losses from increased requirements, as 
compared to the losses to the seller from the buyer’s decreased 
requirements down to zero.74  This economic point is correct as far as it 
goes, but it does not explain why the parties cannot protect themselves 
by appropriate drafting from the unlimited upside risk.  The theory 
supporting a ceiling on requirements, regardless of the buyer’s intent, 
should be rejected because it rests upon several faulty assumptions. 
One of these flawed assumptions is that all requirements contracts 
are between sellers and end users.  For requirements contracts where the 
buyer is a distributor, dealer, jobber, or other “middleman,” the seller 
knows that the buyer intends to resell the goods, so the theoretical basis 
                                                                                                             
Rockland, 59 A.D.2d at 115 (stating that, because a statute should be construed to give effect 
to every provision, it was clear that the phrase “‘unreasonably disproportionate’” was not 
the equivalent of “‘lack of good faith[,]’” but rather was keyed to stated estimates or, if 
there was none, to “‘normal or otherwise comparable’” requirements). 
72 Simcala, 821 So. 2d at 203. 
73 See Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1337.  The court explained that  
If there were no ceiling, and if the price happened to be advantageous 
to the buyer, he might increase his ‘requirements’ so that he could 
resell the good at a profit . . . This would place him in competition with 
the seller–a result the parties would not have wanted when they 
signed the contract. 
Id. (citing John C. Weistart, Requirements and Output Contracts:  Quantity Variations Under the 
UCC, 1973 DUKE L.J. 599, 640–41 (1973)). 
74 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 347. 
The preference for asymmetric treatment stems from the recognition 
that there is less opportunity for the quantity-determining party to 
take advantage of price variations by decreasing its requirements.  A 
requirements buyer could increase its purchases without limit (if the 
contract placed no limit) to take advantage of a rising market, but it 
could only cut its requirements to zero to take advantage of a market 
price decline. 
Id. 
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for placing a ceiling on quantity demands does not exist.  The seller may 
not have anticipated the increase in the market price when it entered into 
the requirements agreement, but the fact that the buyer took advantage 
of that increase to purchase a greater quantity of goods than the parties 
estimated should hardly come as a shock to the seller when the buyer is 
a reseller of the goods.  It is no secret under these circumstances that the 
buyer’s demand will increase when the market price increases.  Given 
this relationship, the law should not protect sellers from the risk of the 
buyer’s increased demands any more than it protects sellers from the 
risk of increases in the market price.  As with any foreseeable risk, the 
parties should be expected to bargain for protection from this quantity 
risk.  Because section 2-306(1) applies to requirements contracts between 
sellers and resellers, as well as to contracts between sellers and end-
users, it prohibits the buyer/reseller from ordering quantities that are 
unreasonably disproportionate to estimates or normal quantities, even 
though the seller anticipated or should have anticipated that the buyer 
would resell greater quantities of the goods if the market price increased. 
Even in cases where the buyer is an end-user, such as a manufacturer 
who purchases component parts or raw materials from the seller to make 
other products, there are flaws in the assumption that the buyer will 
automatically begin selling the parts or raw materials in competition 
with the seller whenever the market price increases.  Buyers who are not 
already competing in the market for the parts or raw materials may not 
find the increase in the market price a sufficient incentive to begin doing 
so if there are significant barriers to market entry.  While entry may be 
relatively costless in some markets, as it appears to have been in the oil 
and gas cases,75 it would be wrong to assume that end-users in every 
industry will routinely have the economic wherewithal and the 
motivation to enter the business of reselling goods in competition with 
their suppliers whenever changes in market prices may make it 
theoretically advantageous to do so.  In addition, even when the buyer is 
an end-user, the buyer’s demand will increase with the market price, but 
the degree of the relationship will depend on the impact the price of the 
seller’s goods under the requirements contract has on the price of the 
end-user’s final product.  Since this relationship is foreseeable, as it is in 
the case where the buyer is a reseller of the goods, the seller should 
contract for protections from the risk that the buyer will increase its 
orders when the market price increases. 
The majority interpretation of section 2-306 also tends to discourage 
conduct that our economic system would normally strive to promote.  
                                                 
75 See City of Lakeland v. Union Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 758, 762 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Orange & 
Rockland, 59 A.D.2d at 116–17. 
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For example, if the buyer’s actual requirements exceed expectations 
because it hired a brilliant marketing director and an exceptional sales 
team, the buyer’s requirements would violate the “unreasonably 
disproportionate” standard under the Code, despite the fact that the 
buyer is not only acting in good faith, but is running its business 
successfully.  But courts have interpreted section 2-306 to mean that a 
buyer acts in bad faith if it takes advantage of an increase in the market 
price to expand its sales to new customers who were not included in the 
estimates of its requirements when the contract was formed.76  If not for 
an increase in the market price or a capacity shortage, both of which are 
problems the seller could have guarded against with quantity limits, 
price adjustment clauses, termination provisions, or similar contract 
terms, the seller may well have profited if the buyer had operated its 
business so skillfully that its requirements were “unreasonably 
disproportionate” to the parties’ estimates.  No rationale is given in the 
Official Comments to explain why, in a case where the seller has excess 
capacity, the parties may not prefer a requirements contract in which an 
order for an “unreasonably disproportionate” quantity of goods 
compared to the estimate, or any “normal” or “otherwise comparable 
prior requirements,” would not only be permitted, but welcomed.  
Similarly, the parties may prefer that in a business downturn, the buyer, 
acting in good faith and with no ill will towards the seller or intent to 
evade the contract, may purchase significantly fewer goods than its 
estimate or a normal or previously ordered quantity because it has 
decided to spend a larger portion of its marketing budget on products 
where losses can still be avoided, which it should be able to do as long as 
the requirements contract is not an exclusive dealing arrangement 
carrying with it a best efforts obligation.77 
Without demonstrated social benefits to outweigh the costs, a wise 
policymaker would be hesitant to adopt the current rule.  Under this 
rule, the buyer in a requirements contract has essentially surrendered its 
right to run its business according to its best business judgment given 
                                                 
76 See Orange & Rockland, 59 A.D.2d at 116. 
77 See Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 815 F.2d 806, 811 (1st Cir. 1987).  The court 
stated:   
We recognize that the good faith obligation is not the same for a 
requirements contract and an exclusive dealing contract.  Under a 
requirements contract the obligation is to use good faith in 
determining requirements.  The good faith obligation under an 
exclusive dealing contract is for the seller to use “best efforts to supply 
the goods and the buyer to use best efforts to promote the sale.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  See also Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 613–15 (2d Cir. 
1979); Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.Y. 1975). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/1
2009] Enforcing Open Quantity Contracts 895 
current market conditions, and must instead pursue the goal of 
producing requirements that are not “unreasonably disproportionate” to 
estimates or “normal” quantities on the upside, for any reason, or, on the 
downside, can no longer suspend operations simply because they are 
unprofitable, and may only do so for lack of orders or other “legitimate 
business reasons” that cannot be linked to the requirements contract.78  
Many courts, as well as the drafters of the Official Comments to UCC 
section 2-306, have taken the position that the duty of good faith 
deprives a buyer in a requirements contract of the right to eliminate its 
requirements by ceasing operations because they are unprofitable.79  The 
buyer has made an implied promise to remain in business, even if the 
business is unprofitable, and can only cease doing business, and 
therefore eliminate its requirements under the contract, if the buyer is no 
longer receiving orders for the goods, or if the buyer can convince the 
factfinder that it has some other motivation for the shut-down that is not 
a ruse for avoiding the contract.   
If this case law were more widely known, it might impact corporate 
conduct in two ways.  First, if the buyer in a requirements contract was a 
public company, the exposure to lost profits damages that it would face 
if it closed down unprofitable plants or businesses that had requirements 
under the contract would arguably impose reporting requirements on 
the buyer under the securities laws, including Sarbanes-Oxley.80  Second, 
a well-counseled buyer would be far more careful to include protections 
in its requirements contracts such as express minimum and maximum 
                                                 
78 Schawk, Inc. v. Donruss Trading Cards, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 18, 26 (1st Dist. 2001).  A 
related observation made by the court was as follows:  “[a]bsent contract language, 
appreciable party reliance, or evidence of evasion, a requirements business does not give 
up its fundamental managerial right of disengaging from an unprofitable business, and the 
courts should avoid usurping that right through a restrictive interpretation of good faith.”  
Id. at 27. 
79 See, e.g., Cent. States Power & Light Corp. U.S. Zinc. Co., 60 F.2d 832, 833–34 (10th Cir. 
1932); Metal One Am., Inc. v. Ctr. Mfg., Inc., 2005 WL 1657128 *6–*7 (W.D. Mich. 2005); 
NCC Sunday Inserts, Inc. v. World Color Press, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1004, 1010–11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.Y. 1975); 407 E. 61st 
Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37, 41–42 (N.Y. 1968); Wigand v. 
Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co.,118 N.E. 618, 619–20 (N.Y. 1918); U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 
(2008). 
80 Such a disclosure may be required, for example, under 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), so 
that pro forma financial information included in any periodic or other 
report filed with the Commission pursuant to the securities laws, or in 
any public disclosure or press or other release, shall be presented in a 
manner that—(1) does not contain an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the pro 
forma financial information, in light of the circumstances under which 
it is presented, not misleading . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1) (2004). 
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limits on the quantities that could be demanded, as well as notice of 
termination and liquidated damages provisions. 
Section 2-306 also imposes inconsistent “good faith” duties on 
buyers in exclusive dealing/requirements contracts.  These buyers are 
subject to both the good faith duty of section 2-306(1) not to order 
quantities that are “unreasonably disproportionate” to estimates or prior 
orders, and the duty to use their “best efforts” in the promotion and sale 
of the supplier’s goods under section 2-306(2).81   No exception is made 
under current law for the case where the buyer’s “best efforts” in 
promoting the sale of the goods to his own customers exceed 
expectations so that his requirements from the seller also exceed 
expectations.  One commentator who has recognized this conflict 
suggests that the solution lies in reading the “best efforts” obligation as 
synonymous and co-extensive with the “good faith” standard for any 
exclusive dealing agreements that are also output or requirements 
agreements.82  This solution has not been adopted by courts.  Even if it 
                                                 
81 There can be little doubt that the drafters of the Code intended to subject exclusive 
dealing agreements under UCC section 2-306(2) to the good faith obligations set forth in 
UCC section 2-306(1) given Official Comment 5.  This Comment states that “[a]n exclusive 
dealing agreement brings into play all of the good faith aspects of the output and 
requirements problems of subsection (1).”  U.C.C. § 2-306(1) cmt. 5 (2008). 
82 See LORD, supra note 17, at 300–01.  Williston explains that 
[S]ince, in an output contract, the seller may be obligated to sell 
exclusively to the buyer, and, in a requirements contract, the buyer 
may be obligated to buy exclusively from the seller, this would seem to 
impose yet another standard upon the quantity-determining party, 
and might even give rise to an argument that an output seller or 
requirements buyer should affirmatively undertake to expand 
significantly the amount of goods supplied or required. Such a reading 
would be inappropriate to the extent that it sought to displace the 
more particular good faith and proportionality rule set forth in 
subsection (1). Rather, in the output and requirements context, the 
seller's obligation to supply and the buyer's obligation to require 
should be governed by subsection (1), a result that can be achieved by 
reading subsection (2) as coextensive with the good faith and 
proportionality rule of the former subsection. Thus, the buyer, in using 
best efforts to promote the sale of the goods supplied under a 
requirements contract or the seller, in using best efforts to supply 
goods under an output contract, would have an obligation to do so in 
good faith and reasonably, that is, in an amount not unreasonably 
disproportionate to the parties' estimate or normal requirements or 
output. Read in this manner, it is not altogether clear whether 
subsection (2) adds much, if anything, to the obligations imposed 
under subsection (1), though at least one case has suggested, by 
emphasizing the best efforts language of subsection (2) that it does. 
Id.  Several courts have held that the best efforts obligation for exclusive dealing 
requirements and output contracts constitutes a different and more exacting standard than 
the duty of good faith.  See supra note 77. 
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were adopted, buyers who must employ their best efforts to resell the 
goods will still have to restrain their efforts in light of their 
countervailing duty to refrain from demanding “unreasonably 
disproportionate” quantities from their supplier.   
A. The Code’s Use of Good Faith Quantity Controls To Validate Open 
Quantity Contracts 
The Official Comments claim that the concept of “good faith” set 
forth in UCC section 2-306(1) satisfies the formation requirements of 
definiteness and mutuality of obligation, thereby supporting the view 
that the good faith rule is intended to supplant the exclusivity rule for 
validating open quantity contracts.83  According to the Official 
Comments, the promise of the buyer that satisfies the mutuality of 
obligation doctrine is not its promise to purchase all of its requirements 
exclusively from the seller, but its promise to operate its business in good 
faith and according to commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade 
so that its requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable 
figure.84  But if the buyer has no obligation to purchase those 
requirements exclusively from the seller, rather than from other 
suppliers, in what sense does the buyer’s obligation to maintain its 
requirements at foreseeable levels satisfy the mutuality doctrine?  If the 
seller has an obligation to supply the buyer with its requirements, but 
the buyer’s only obligation is to maintain its requirements at a 
foreseeable level, and it remains free to purchase its requirements from 
any source, the result is a buyer’s option, not a requirements contract. 
The Official Comments also fail to explain how the doctrines of 
mutuality and definiteness are satisfied by the duty of good faith for 
contracts where the buyer purchases less than 100% of its requirements 
from the seller, or the seller supplies less than 100% of its output to the 
buyer.  As we have seen,85 if the Code applies only to contracts that cover 
100% of the seller’s output or the buyer’s requirements, the exclusivity 
rule has been adopted by implication, not rejected.  The seller in an 
output contract who must sell all of its output to the buyer must 
necessarily deal exclusively with the buyer for these goods, and the 
buyer in the requirements contract who must purchase all of its 
requirements from the seller must necessarily deal exclusively with the 
seller.  If the Code is interpreted to apply to contracts that cover less than 
100% of the seller’s output or the buyer’s requirements, the good faith 
                                                 
83 U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 
84 Id. 
85 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
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duty of a business to maintain its output or requirements at foreseeable 
levels would not give the factfinder any standard for determining what 
portion of the total “reasonably foreseeable” output or requirements 
have been committed to by the parties under the contract, and would 
therefore fail as a validation tool.  Whatever their intent, the drafters of 
the Official Comments did not succeed in replacing the exclusivity rule 
with good faith as a validation principle. 
Another potential flaw in the theory that a requirements contract is 
validated by the buyer’s good faith obligation to maintain its 
requirements at reasonably foreseeable levels is that the parties could 
theoretically eliminate this obligation by agreement.  As discussed in 
Part III.B below, if courts applied section 2-306(1) as a true gap-filler, the 
parties could avoid the good faith obligation regarding quantity risks by 
agreement.  If they did so, the good faith obligation of maintaining 
reasonable requirements would no longer exist to validate the contract.  
In Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,86 where the parties 
did allocate the upside quantity risk, the court avoided this problem by 
holding that when the duty of good faith imposed under section 2-306(1) 
is disclaimed by agreement, the duty of good faith under section 1-203 
steps in to fill the void.  The court observed that section 2-306(1) is both a 
gap-filler that applies “only when a contract does not unambiguously 
specify the quantity of the output of the seller or the requirements of the 
buyer[,]” and a validation principle which “renders output and 
requirements contracts sufficiently definite as to quantity and 
enforceable by reading into such contracts a quantity that is the actual 
good faith output or requirements of the particular party.”87   
In Lenape, the parties agreed that the buyer took the risk of accepting 
or paying for eighty-five percent of the seller’s capacity, and granted the 
seller unlimited discretion to increase its capacity.  Although the seller 
had disclaimed its good faith duty under section 2-306(1), the court held 
that the buyer still had a duty not to increase its capacity in bad faith 
under the general duty of good faith applicable to all Code contracts 
under section 1-203.  The court’s implication—that the good faith 
limitation on unreasonable quantities in UCC section 2-306(1) can be 
disclaimed but the good faith obligation under UCC section 1-203 
cannot—is flawed.   Section 1-302 states that the obligations of good faith 
and reasonableness prescribed by the Code cannot be disclaimed by 
agreement without referring to any specific sections in which these 
obligations are imposed, and should therefore apply with equal force to 
UCC section 2-306(1). 
                                                 
86 925 S.W.2d 565, 584 (Tex. 1996). 
87 Id. at 570. 
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The Official Comments also claim that the principle of definiteness is 
satisfied for open quantity contracts by the “actual good faith output or 
requirements of a particular party.”88  According to the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, the definiteness standard is satisfied if there is “a 
basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an 
appropriate remedy.”89  The elusive standard that courts apply under 
section 2-306(1) to decide whether a buyer has demanded an 
“unreasonably disproportionate” quantity of goods provides little 
guidance in determining whether the buyer has breached the contract 
and if so, what remedy should be awarded.  Judge Posner has observed 
that the Code does not contain a definition of “good faith” that seems 
applicable to the buyer’s decision, concerning how many goods to order 
under a requirements contract, or to the seller’s decision as to how many 
goods to produce under an output contract.90  How indeed does a court 
or jury use “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing”91 as a guide to quantify the buyer’s 
requirements in an open quantity contract?  What if the buyer repudiates 
the contract before placing any orders, and there is no estimate or history 
of sales because the contract involves a new product?  How does the 
concept of good faith assist the courts in defining the quantity of goods 
the buyer agreed to purchase under these circumstances? 
Notions of “honesty and . . . fair dealing”92 shed little light on the far 
reaching questions of whether the seller is running its plant to produce 
output or a buyer is running its business to create requirements that 
approximate a “reasonably foreseeable figure.”  A legitimate operational 
goal of a business may be to generate the optimal level of output or 
requirements given current market conditions, whether that quantity is 
far higher, as may occur in good times, or far lower, as may occur in bad 
times, than the parties predicted.  In a market where demand is rising, 
this goal may result in a buyer—who is acting in good faith, and with no 
intention of using the goods for unanticipated purposes—purchasing 
significantly more goods than its “stated estimate,” or, if there was no 
stated estimate, purchasing more than the “normal or otherwise 
comparable prior . . . requirements” as is prohibited under section 2-
306(1).93 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981). 
90 Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988). 
91 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(j) (2008). 
92 Id. § 1-201(b)(20). 
93 Id. § 2-306(1).  See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  If the seller has no objection, 
the parties can agree to amend any estimates or caps on quantity set forth in the contract to 
accommodate the buyer’s increased requirements, but if they do not, the current default 
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The phrase “actual good faith output or requirements of a particular 
party[]” does satisfy the definiteness standard if you remove the words 
“good faith.”  Using this definition of the quantity term, it would be 
simple to determine the existence of a breach and give an appropriate 
remedy in open quantity contracts, but only because you would be 
adopting the exclusivity rule.  For a requirements contract, the buyer 
would breach the contract by purchasing the product from other 
suppliers.  The remedy would be the seller’s lost profits based on the 
quantity of goods the buyer purchased from other suppliers.  For an 
output contract, the seller would breach the contract if it sold the goods 
to other customers, and the remedy would be the lost expectations, or 
“cover” damages, that the buyer incurred based on the quantity of goods 
the seller sold to other customers. 
By removing the implied duty of good faith from open quantity 
contracts, and measuring quantity by the “actual output or 
requirements” of the seller or buyer, the underlying promise made by 
the seller or buyer would undergo a fundamental change.  Instead of 
promising to abide by an ill-defined duty to act in good faith to maintain 
output or requirements at estimated levels, the seller in an output 
contract would simply be promising not to sell its output to other 
customers and the buyer in a requirements contract would be promising 
not to purchase its requirements from other suppliers.  They would not 
be promising to maintain a particular level of output or a particular level 
of requirements.  Indeed, to make such a contract they would need to do 
so expressly, by setting the minimum and maximum levels of quantity 
they would sell or purchase. 
B. The Code’s Potentially Inconsistent Use of Good Faith Quantity Controls 
as a Gap-Filler and Validation Rule 
In addition to distorting the natural motivations of businesses to 
increase their profits by increasing sales when materials can be 
purchased at below-market prices, and to reduce losses by closing 
businesses when they are unprofitable, the use of good faith in UCC 
section 2-306(1) as a condition to the enforcement of open quantity 
contracts is inconsistent with the use of the provision as a gap-filler, in at 
least one important sense.  If parties cannot limit by agreement the duty 
of good faith on the party with discretion over quantity in an open 
quantity contract without invalidating the contract, then the good faith 
                                                                                                             
rule is that the buyer has acted in bad faith by demanding greater quantities than those 
estimated or previously ordered.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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duty in section 2-306(1) is not operating as a default rule, or gap-filler, 
but as an “immutable” or “mandatory” rule. 
This inconsistency raises the related issue of whether parties may 
vary the good faith quantity limitations under section 2-306(1) by 
agreement, and if so, whether there are any restrictions on the extent to 
which they may do so.  Specifically, is section 2-306(1) functioning as a 
gap-filler or default rule that applies only when the parties have not 
reached an agreement on the quantity term, or is it functioning as a 
mandatory rule for all open quantity contracts that cannot be disclaimed 
by agreement?  Courts claim to treat section 2-306(1) as the “primary” 
gap-filler in the Code for missing quantity terms. 94  But the Section is 
both more and less than a traditional gap-filler—more because it is 
applied even when the parties have reached agreement on the quantity 
term, and less because it cannot be used when the parties have failed to 
reach agreement on the quantity term.  Unlike gap-fillers such as section 
2-305 for contracts with an open price term, which applies where the 
“price is not settled,” courts apply section 2-306(1) to open quantity 
contracts even when the parties have unambiguously stated their 
agreement that the quantity term would be defined as the buyer’s 
requirements or the seller’s output, with or without minimum or 
maximum limits, or as some portion thereof.95  But this “gap-filler” 
cannot be used to supply a quantity term when there is no writing 
concerning quantity because quantity is a required term for enforcement 
under the Code’s statute of frauds, section 2-201(a).96  It is more accurate 
to say that courts apply section 2-306(1) as a general rule of law 
applicable to all output and requirements contracts, including 
ambiguous contracts that the factfinder decides contain sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the parties intended to contract for the 
buyer’s requirements or the seller’s output. 
The response of the courts may well be a reaction to the way the 
provision is drafted.  As written, section 2-306(1) does not operate as a 
                                                 
94 See Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 815 F.2d 806, 811 (1st Cir. 1987); Riegel Fiber Corp. v. 
Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784, 789–90 (5th Cir. 1975). 
95 See, e.g., Miami Packaging, Inc. v. Processing Sys., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 560, 563–64 (S.D. 
Ohio 1991); Schawk, Inc. v. Donruss Trading Cards, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 18, 22–23, 25 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
96 See Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 270 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“‘[W]here the writing relied upon to form the contract of sale is totally silent as to 
quantity, parol evidence cannot be used to supply the missing quantity term.’”); Merritt-
Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 963 (5th Cir. 1999) (“While the quantity 
term in requirements contracts need not be numerically stated, there must be some writing 
which indicates that the quantity to be delivered under the contract is a party’s 
requirements or output.” (citations omitted)). 
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classic gap-filler for a missing term, but as a rule that provides a set 
meaning for quantity terms that are stated in the contract.  Section 2-
306(1) is definitional, providing,  
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the 
seller or the requirements of the buyer means such 
actual output or requirements as may occur in good 
faith, except that no quantity unreasonably 
disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence 
of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise 
comparable prior output or requirements may be 
tendered or demanded.97   
Thus, if a contract expressly states that the quantity is the “buyer’s 
requirements” or the “seller’s output” for the term of the agreement, 
these stated quantity terms are defined under section 2-306(1), despite 
the fact that the contract is not missing a quantity term that must be 
cured by resort to one of the Code’s gap-fillers.  Given the Official 
Comments’ reliance on good faith to validate these contracts, can the 
parties, by agreement, define “the buyer’s requirements” or “the seller’s 
output” to avoid the duty of good faith in creating the actual output or 
requirements and the ban on making unreasonably disproportionate 
demands or offers that would otherwise be imposed under section 2-
306(1)?  Is the section a default, or conversely, a mandatory rule in this 
sense? 
In decisions expressing the majority view of how section 2-306(1) 
should be applied as a gap-filler,98 courts have enforced the implied duty 
of good faith as an “immutable” or “mandatory” rule, rather than a 
default rule, even when parties have been quite specific concerning the 
limits of the quantity term.99  Indeed, Professor Victor Goldberg favors 
deleting section 2-306(1) from the Code partly because courts so often 
apply the implied duty of good faith to sabotage the parties’ own 
allocation of quantity risk in open quantity contracts.100   
                                                 
97 U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2008). 
98 See Zemco Mfg., Inc., 186 F.3d at 818; Gestetner Corp., 815 F.2d, at 811–12; Riegel Fiber 
Corp., 512 F.2d, at 789–90; Lenape Res. Corp. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565, 570 
(Tex. 1996). 
99 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 367–74 (citing Utah Int’l, Inc. v. Colo.-Ute Elec. Ass’n, 
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1976); City of Lakeland, Fla.v. Union Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 
758 (M.D. Fla. 1973), and Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 59 A.D.2d 
110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)). 
100 Id. at 381.  Because Goldberg believes deleting UCC section 2-306(1) “is not about to 
happen[,]” he proposes a number of new comments to the provision.  Id.  These comments 
would retain the full exclusivity rule to satisfy the mutuality doctrine (“It is now 
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An example of this misuse of the good faith doctrine is provided in 
Canusa Corp. v. A&R Lobosco, Inc.,101 where the court refused to enforce 
the minimum quantity terms of an output contract on the grounds that 
these terms would convert the agreement into a fixed quantity 
agreement.  In Canusa, the buyer sued for breach when the supplier 
failed to produce the minimum quantities required, and the seller argued 
that it was only liable for the quantity it actually produced.102  The 
evidence from both parties, however, demonstrated that they 
understood the figures in the output contract to mean the minimum 
quantity that the seller was required to supply to the buyer.103  The court 
instead treated these figures as estimates, and concluded:  “An output 
agreement is not transformed into a fixed quantity contract by the 
insertion of an estimate.  Thus, where an output contract provides for a 
certain amount of goods to be produced, the appropriate test for a 
seller’s reduction in output is good faith rather than the estimate in the 
contract.”104  The court then decided that an estimate of quantity was 
necessary to measure the seller’s good faith, but determined that the 
estimate in the parties’ agreement did not provide the “appropriate 
yardstick,” so it chose instead to rely on the testimony given at trial by 
the seller’s president.105  Despite quoting Comment 3’s reference to the 
parties’ right to set their own minimum or maximum quantity limits in 
open quantity contracts under section 2-306, the court invalidated the 
parties’ minimum quantity provision.106 
Even Professor Goldberg’s suggestion of eliminating section 2-306 
from the Code may not be sufficient to remedy this problem, because 
courts have also held that the duty of good faith implied in all Code 
contracts under section 1-304 would still constrain the ability of the 
quantity-determining party to increase quantities above the estimated or 
                                                                                                             
recognized that the invocation of good faith is not necessary for finding adequate 
consideration in a requirements (or full output) contract.  It is sufficient that the promisor 
commits that if it has any requirements (or output) that it must obtain it from (deliver it to) 
the counterparty.”)  See id.  The other comments are generally designed to convert the good 
faith rule from a mandatory rule into a default rule, so that it will not be used to “undo the 
decisions of the parties.”  Id.  This suggestion is fine as far as it goes, but will not help the 
parties who did not want the good faith rule limiting quantities read into their contracts, 
but either neglected to include explicit minimums and maximums, or were justifiably 
concerned, based on decisions like Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518, 1521 
(7th Cir. 1989), that if they included these limits, the court may not interpret their 
agreement as a requirements contract. 
101 986 F. Supp. 723, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
102 Id. at 728. 
103 Id. at 726. 
104 Id. at 730. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 728–31. 
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normal amount even when the parties attempted to avoid the good faith 
limitation in section 2-306(1) by agreement.  For example, in Lenape, 
discussed above, the parties agreed that the buyer would “take or pay” 
for 85% of the seller’s delivery capacity of gas, and that the seller had 
complete discretion to increase its capacity.107  Since the parties had 
agreed on a quantity term that differed from the “unreasonably 
disproportionate” quantity limit imposed by section 2-306(1), the court 
held that this gap-filler provision did not apply.108  As a result, the buyer 
had to increase the annual payments it had been making under the 
contract for the past 12 years of no more than $300,000 to $89 million.109  
When the buyer complained that the court’s ruling eliminated the seller’s 
duty of good faith, the court disagreed, holding that the seller’s ability to 
increase its capacity under the parties’ contract was still subject to its 
duty of good faith based on the Code’s general provision concerning 
good faith in UCC section 1-203.110  While the court gave no examples, 
the fact that the seller’s conduct could still be challenged for lack of good 
faith even after the parties anticipated and expressly provided for the 
risk that the seller would increase its capacity indicates that good faith is 
being applied to open quantity contracts as a mandatory rule rather than 
a default rule, even when it has to come in through the back door of 
section 1-203. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took a similar position in 
Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co.,111 where the court declined to 
decide whether the parties’ contract to purchase all the cotton produced 
on certain specified acreage was governed by section 2-306(1), but 
sustained the contract as sufficiently definite under section 2-204(3).  As 
in Lenape, the court relied on the Code’s general good faith provision, 
section 1-203, to accomplish a section 2-306(1) result.  In this case, the 
court concluded the contract unenforceable beyond a quantity not 
unreasonably disproportionate to the estimated yield in the contract, 
holding that this would obviate any difficulty with those individual 
contracts where no estimated yield was stated.112  Thus, even if the 
parties could draft around the “unreasonably disproportionate” 
limitation on quantities in section 2-306(1), the general good faith 
                                                 
107 925 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex. 1996). 
108 Id.  An agreement that the buyer would purchase one-hundred percent of the seller’s 
committed gas reserves or “the seller’s reserves” would, of course, also provide an 
unambiguous “standard for determining a specific quantity[]” but would not provide a 
different standard than the UCC section 2-306(1) gap-filler.  Id. at 570. 
109 Id. at 568, n.1. 
110 Id. at 571. 
111 512 F.2d 784, 790 (5th Cir. 1975). 
112 Id. at 790 n.14. 
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provision in section 1-203 would, at least in the Fifth Circuit’s view, 
create the same limitation. 
In Shea-Kaiser-Lockheed-Healy v. Department of Water and Power of the 
City of Los Angeles,113 a case that pre-dated Lenape, the California Court of 
Appeals took a different approach by applying section 2-306(1) to the 
parties’ requirements contract even though the parties had agreed on a 
quantity term that differed from the “unreasonably disproportionate” 
quantity limit in that section.  Specifically, the contract required the 
buyer to purchase a minimum quantity that was twenty percent lower 
than the estimate.114  Despite this agreement, the court applied the 
section 2-306(1) “gap-filler[,]” and held that the buyer had breached the 
contract by demanding over twenty percent more than the estimate, on 
the theory that this demand was “unreasonably disproportionate” to the 
estimate.115  In implying a corresponding maximum quantity from the 
agreed upon minimum, the court relied on the median theory set forth in 
Official Comment 3 to section 2-306(1), which states that “the agreed 
estimate is to be regarded as a center around which the parties intend the 
variation to occur.”116  The buyer argued that this definition of what an 
“estimate” means, and the “unreasonably disproportionate” language of 
section 2-306(1), had been avoided by contract, since the buyer had 
expressly stated a different purpose for the estimate when it was 
provided. 117  The court rejected this argument on the grounds that 
section 2-306(1) could not be avoided “so indirectly[,]” an odd rationale 
given that the purpose of the estimate was stated in the portion of the 
agreement that the court considered “at issue” in the case.118  As 
additional grounds for its conclusion, the court stated that the obligation 
of reasonableness cannot be disclaimed by agreement, and that the 
“unreasonably disproportionate” obligation of section 2-306(1) is “but a 
specific application of the obligation of reasonableness running 
throughout the [C]ode.”119  Under this reasoning, it appears unlikely that 
the court would have ruled in the buyer’s favor, regardless of whether 
                                                 
113  73 Cal. App. 3d 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
114 Id. at 685 n.4. 
115  Id. at 688–89. 
116  Id. at 688. 
117  Id. at 689.  The portion of the agreement the court said was “at issue” stated that “[f]or 
the purpose of comparing bids to determine the lowest bidder, it will be assumed that the 
following respective quantities of aggregate will be purchased during the contractual 
period.”  Id. at 687.  The buyer’s minimum quantities were then stated.  As for maximums, 
the contract stated that “the Department shall have the option of purchasing . . . additional 
quantities of aggregate up to the Department’s maximum quantity requirements for 
operation and storage during the contractual period.”  Id. 
118  Id. at 687, 689. 
119  Id. at 689. 
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the contract expressly stated that there was no upper limit on the 
maximum quantity of goods the buyer could demand, or even if it had 
established a maximum higher than twenty percent. 
Language in the Official Comments to section 2-306(1) and in section 
1-302(b) supports the view that parties should be able to contract around 
the “good faith” and “reasonableness” limitations on quantity under the 
Code, whether they arise under UCC section 2-306(1) or under the 
general duty of good faith prescribed in UCC section 1-304.120  The 
Official Comments to section 2-306 indicate that the parties can avoid by 
agreement the good faith ban on unreasonably high or unreasonably low 
or nonexistent requirements, stating that “[a]ny minimum or maximum 
set by the agreement shows a clear limit on the intended elasticity.”121  
Section 1-302(b) provides that while the obligations of good faith and 
reasonableness implied in all Code contracts cannot be disclaimed by 
agreement, the “parties, by agreement, may determine the standards by 
which the performance of those obligations is to be measured if those 
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”122  Taken together, these 
statements could be interpreted to mean that a buyer can enter into a 
requirements contract without assuming either the duty to act in good 
faith to maintain its requirements or to refrain from demanding 
quantities that are unreasonably high compared with the parties’ 
estimates. 
As an example, the buyer could enter a requirements contract 
expressly disclaiming any duty to run its business to maintain its 
requirements at “normal” levels, either on the high side or the low side, 
promising not to buy any requirements it may have of a particular 
product from any other supplier until it had purchased a specified 
maximum quantity, at which time it would be free to buy the product 
from other suppliers, and promising to make a minimum payment to the 
seller if it had no requirements.  These terms should satisfy UCC section 
1-302(b)123 by setting reasonable standards for measuring the buyer’s 
good faith.  The buyer has disclosed upfront that he is not promising to 
stay in business, or conversely, that his requirements will not increase 
dramatically, but he has agreed to limit the seller’s exposure by making a 
minimum payment if his requirements are reduced below a certain level, 
for any reason, and by agreeing that he will not demand requirements 
above a certain level, for any reason.  Sensible as this approach appears, 
                                                 
120  U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001) (“Every contract or duty within [the Code] imposes an obligation 
of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”); § 2-306, cmt. 2. 
121  Id. § 2-306, cmt. 2. 
122  Id. § 1-302(b). 
123  Id. 
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cases such as Lenape, Riegel, and Shea-Kaiser indicate that the courts may 
reject it on the grounds that even express allocations of quantity risk are 
insufficient to disclaim the good faith quantity limitations under the 
Code. 
Termination clauses should also be given effect to avoid the quantity 
restrictions imposed by the implied duty of good faith under section 2-
306(1).  As with agreements on minimum and maximum quantity limits, 
parties should be able to modify the general obligation of good faith 
implied in all Code contracts under section 1-304(b) by providing that 
the good faith standard is satisfied by termination upon notice.  If the 
parties have agreed that either side can terminate upon notice for any 
reason, the buyer should be able to terminate the contract even if its 
reasons would not otherwise satisfy the implied duty of good faith.  For 
example, a buyer could terminate such a contract when the market price 
falls below the contract price, when another vendor offers discounts or 
other terms that are more attractive, when the buyer is able to obtain the 
goods from an affiliate, when the buyer begins to produce them in-
house, or when the buyer shuts down its operations to “curtail losses” as 
would otherwise be prohibited under Official Comment 2.124  The 
implied duty of good faith should play no role in protecting the 
reasonable anticipations of the parties under these circumstances 
because the parties were on notice of their reciprocal ability to terminate 
their agreement and could have bargained for a damages clause to 
protect them against any reliance losses arising from early termination, 
nor should courts undertake to provide post hoc relief for unknown risks 
when the parties expressly assumed such risks by agreeing to a 
provision for “termination for any reason.” The parties should not have 
to enumerate each type of risk assumed under such a clause, since the 
clause is as clear an assumption of unknown risks as can reasonably be 
required. 
This reasoning was adopted by a federal court in Indiana in Q.C. 
Onics Ventures, LP v. Johnson Controls, Inc.125  In Q.C. Onics, the buyer 
terminated a series of requirements contracts for automobile parts, in the 
form of purchase orders, in order to shift the business to another 
supplier.  The purchase orders contained provisions that permitted the 
buyer to terminate at any time and covered the seller’s costs through a 
termination claims procedure.126  The seller’s first argument was that 
because requirements under a requirements contract must be set in good 
faith under section 2-306(1), the seller was obligated to continue 
                                                 
124  Id. § 2-306 cmt. 2.  
125  2006 WL 1722365, at *4 (N.D. Ind. 2006). 
126  Id. at *3–4. 
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purchasing from the buyer as long as it had requirements.127  In support, 
the seller relied on two cases—General Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal 
Products, Co.128 and Plastech Engineered Plastics v. Grand Haven Plastics, 
Inc.129—discussed below,130 which hold that requirements contracts are 
validated by the good faith duty that prevents the buyer from 
unilaterally terminating the contract.131  The court in Q.C. Onics 
distinguished these cases as formation decisions, and held that where the 
buyer is not relying on its reduced requirements as a defense, the buyer’s 
good faith duty to order estimated requirements is not inconsistent with 
its right to end the contracts under the termination clauses in the 
contracts.132   
The problem the court’s position in Q.C. Onics raises for the Code’s 
validation theory, as applied in cases like General Motors and Plastech, is 
that if the parties can eliminate the implied duty of good faith that 
prevents the buyer from unilaterally terminating the contract simply by 
adding a termination clause, and the exclusivity rule has been discarded, 
the Code is left without a validation principle for requirements contracts 
that contain termination clauses.  For these contracts, the quantity-
determining party can terminate the contract whenever its demand or 
tender would otherwise violate the ban on unreasonably 
disproportionate or bad faith quantities, down to zero.  By doing so, the 
quantity-determining party effectively eliminates the implied duty to 
operate its business to maintain its output or requirements at a 
“reasonably foreseeable figure”—the very duty that satisfies the 
mutuality doctrine according to the Official Comments.133 
The court in Q.C. Onics was also presented with a Michigan decision, 
Metal One America, Inc. v. Center Mfg., Inc.,134 discussed in more detail 
below,135 where the court refused to enforce a termination clause in a 
requirements contract.  In Metal One, the court held that the buyer acted 
in bad faith when it terminated a requirements contract to avoid losing 
money.  The court in Q.C. Onics declined to follow the “unpublished 
[decision]” in Metal One, where “the court did not give any reason why 
termination pursuant to an expressly stated right to terminate was not 
                                                 
127  Id. at *7. 
128  90 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
129  2005 WL 736519, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
130  See infra text accompanying notes 213–20. 
131  Q.C. Onics,  at *7–8. 
132  Id. 
133  U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (2008). 
134  2005 WL 1657128 (W.D. Mich. 2005). 
135  See infra text accompanying notes 306–12. 
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allowed, and it addressed the breach of contract claim without 
discussing the effect of the termination clause.”136  
The seller’s second argument in Q.C. Onics was that the buyer’s right 
to terminate was limited by the duty of good faith implied in every 
contract under UCC section 1-203137 and by the common law.138  Based 
on its findings that the express termination clause in the contract was 
bargained for in good faith, the court held that the buyer could not 
violate good faith by exercising its rights under the clause because the 
exercise of fairly bargained for termination rights “does not defeat the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, and is not a violation of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing.”139  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
relied heavily on a Sixth Circuit exclusive dealing arrangement case, 
Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc.,140 which held, “If properly 
bargained for, the right [to terminate a contract] is given full effect and 
may be exercised for any reason.”141  The majority rule for open quantity 
contracts that take the form of distribution agreements, such as the 
agreement at issue in Cloverdale, is that the general rule of good faith 
implied in all contracts under section 1-304 does not prevent arbitrary 
termination.142 
                                                 
136  Q.C. Onics, at * 10. 
137  UCC section 1-203 is the pre-2001 version of UCC section 1-304.  Revised Article I of 
the Code also expands the definition of “good faith” from “honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned,” the pre-2001 definition contained in UCC section 1-201(19), to the 
current definition of good faith:  “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.”  U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001).  Although courts have not 
placed significant reliance on the Code definitions of good faith in the open quantity 
contract context, this change would tend to make the standard less predictable because it 
moves from a narrow, subjective standard of good faith to a standard that takes into 
account the objective, but ill-defined factor of “fair dealing.” 
138  Q.C. Onics, at * 6. 
139  Id. at *6–7. 
140  869 F.2d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1989). 
141  2005 WL 736519, at *6 (Mich. App. 2005). 
142  See Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell Co., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(reversing a ruling that the manufacturer/buyer had violated its implied duty of good faith 
under UCC section 1-203 by exercising its rights under the termination provision of its 
distribution agreement in bad faith, and holding that the “U.C.C. good faith provision 
[UCC section 1-203] may not be used to override explicit contractual terms[]”); Cardinal 
Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396–97 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendant-buyer on the grounds that the duty of good faith implied in all 
contracts under UCC section 1-203 did not prevent the buyer from arbitrarily terminating 
its purchase orders with the seller under express provisions giving the buyer the right to 
terminate at any time or override the provisions in the purchase orders for stipulated 
damages upon termination); Frank Lyon Co. v. Maytag Corp., 715 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. 
Ark. 1989) (holding that a distribution agreement allowing termination by either party, 
with 60 days notice, would not be interpreted as requiring good cause under the common 
law or the Code’s implied duty of good faith absent evidence of unequal bargaining power 
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In Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,143 an early case on the 
subject that has been widely followed,144 the court dealt with the ban on 
disclaiming the duty of good faith set forth in section 1-102(3), by noting 
that the provision allows the parties to determine the standards of good 
faith, and would therefore permit the parties to stipulate that 
termination “without cause” or “for any reason” was not in bad faith.145  
Corenswet had filed suit to prevent Amana from terminating its 
exclusive dealership agreement for the sale of appliances in southern 
Louisiana.  The district court entered judgment for Corenswet, finding 
that Amana’s real reasons for its termination decision were its desire to 
switch distributors and its animosity towards a Corenswet executive.146  
Based on these findings, the lower court held that Amana had violated 
the general obligation of good faith under section 1-203, despite the 
contract’s language, which allowed Amana to terminate the relationship 
“at any time and for any reason[.]”147  The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding 
that “[w]hen a contract contains a provision expressly sanctioning 
termination without cause[,] there is no room for implying a term that 
bars such a termination.”148  The court also held that cases of economic 
overreaching through the use of unequal bargaining power could be 
                                                                                                             
because “the U.C.C. good faith provision may not be used to override explicit contractual 
terms[]”); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 777 (N.D. Ga. 
1983) (holding that “the court declines to conclude that the UCC prohibits arbitrary 
termination of distributorship contracts[]”); Mason v. Farmers Ins. Cos., 281 N.W.2d 344, 
347 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1979) (holding that the doctrine of unconscionability, not the implied 
duty of good faith under UCC section 1-203, limits an express contractual right of 
termination); Contra Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 670 (7th Cir. 
1987) (affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing a breach of 
contract claim on the grounds that 27-year distributorship could be modified and narrowed 
under a 10-day notice-to-terminate clause, where the distributor had not presented 
evidence to support an inference of bad faith which was defined as “actual or constructive 
fraud or sinister motive[]”); B.E. deTreville, Jr. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 
1100 (4th Cir. 1971) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a claim for wrongful exercise of 
termination clause under a dealership agreement where the defendant failed to repurchase 
inventory on the grounds that under common law “regardless of broad unilateral 
termination powers, the party who terminates a contract commits an actionable wrong if 
the manner of termination is contrary to equity and good conscience[]”). 
143  594 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979). 
144  See Grand Light, 771 F.2d at 679; Cardinal Stone, 669 F.2d at 396–97; Blalock Machinery, 
576 F. Supp. at 777 (following Corenswet, affirming defendant-buyer’s motion for summary 
judgment in a suit for wrongful termination of a 27-year distributorship agreement, where 
distributor argued that the manufacturer violated the UCC’s implied duty of good faith by 
exercising an express right to terminate under the agreement). 
145  Corenswet, 594 F.2d at 138 n.10. 
146  Id. at 133. 
147  Id. at 135–36. 
148  Id. at 138. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/1
2009] Enforcing Open Quantity Contracts 911 
addressed through the unconscionability doctrine, which can be used to 
override express contract terms.149 
By enforcing termination clauses in open quantity contracts, the 
courts in Q.C. Onics and in the majority of distribution contract cases 
allow the parties to set the time period and damages remedies best 
tailored to protect the seller’s reliance interest.  Similarly, enforcing 
minimum and maximum quantity limitations would encourage the 
parties to allocate the risks, ex ante, based on the best available 
information.  Neither exercise should be defeated by enforcing the “good 
faith” and “unreasonably disproportionate” standards of section 2-306(1) 
as mandatory rather than as default rules, or by insisting that the general 
duties of good faith and reasonableness implied in all Code contracts 
under section 1-304 cannot be varied by agreement under section 1-
302(b). 
Since the seller in a requirements contract can protect its transaction-
specific reliance interest in the negotiation process with a minimum 
purchase requirement, cancellation fee, take or pay clause, liquidated 
damages provision, or termination clause, the burden should be on the 
seller to prove that had the parties anticipated the quantity risk that has 
materialized, they would have placed it on the buyer, rather than the 
seller.  So, if a seller sues to enforce a requirements contract when the 
market price has fallen below the contract price so that the buyer can no 
longer sell its own products using the seller’s materials and still cover its 
costs, or when new technology is developed that makes the seller’s 
goods obsolete and unmarketable for a buyer who purchased the goods 
for resale, the question will be, had the parties anticipated these 
eventualities, would they have agreed that the buyer would continue to 
purchase the same quantity of goods for the term of the contract, as 
many courts would hold under the “good faith” test, or would the 
parties agree, at most, to cover the seller’s transaction-specific reliance 
investments?   
IV.  RESOLVING FORMATION ISSUES UNDER THE EXCLUSIVITY RULE, ITS 
EXCEPTIONS, AND THE CODE’S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
With this understanding of the Code’s section on open quantity 
contracts, the questions become, (1) what function is the exclusivity rule 
performing today?; (2) can and should the implied duty of good faith 
take its place?; (3) is there a better alternative for validating open 
quantity contracts?; and (4) if so, how would this alternative be used to 
                                                 
149  Id. at 138–39.   
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identify enforceable open quantity contracts and determine when they 
have been breached? 
As to the first issue—the  purpose served by the exclusivity rule—
the case law demonstrates that exclusivity is often used as a stand-in for 
the buyer’s reciprocal obligation to buy the goods from the seller in 
response to the seller’s promise to sell the goods to the buyer.  As such, 
the rule plays a critical role in differentiating requirements contracts 
from buyer’s options, where the buyer has no obligation to purchase the 
goods subject to the option.  The reason there are so many variations on 
the exclusivity rule is that the existence of this reciprocal obligation does 
not require that the buyer promise to purchase all of its requirements 
exclusively from the seller, and from no other source, because any 
ascertainable portion of its requirements would be equal.  Below, Part IV 
discusses cases applying both the exclusivity rule and its variations, 
followed by an analysis of the views of commentators and courts 
concerning the use of good faith, rather than the exclusivity rule, as a 
validation device. 
A. The Exclusivity Rule 
Generally, when courts refer to the need for exclusivity in 
requirements contracts, they refer to the buyer’s promise to buy 
exclusively from the seller,150 as it is this exclusivity that permits the 
court to determine the quantity term and to ensure that the promise is 
not illusory.151  The exclusivity doctrine is not often discussed in 
connection with output contracts, although these contracts are generally 
defined as agreements in which the buyer promises to buy and the seller 
to sell all of the goods or services that a seller can supply, so that the 
seller is necessarily required to sell its goods or services exclusively to 
the buyer.152  The promise of exclusivity is also used to distinguish an 
                                                 
150 See Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 493 (1923); In re Anchor 
Glass Container Corp., 345 B.R. 765, 770 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 
626 (Cal. 1958). 
151 See, e.g, Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-Anim Health Servs., Inc., 502 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (D. Kan. 2007) (“For a requirements contract to be valid, the buyer 
must promise to buy the goods exclusively from the seller.”); Embedded Moments, Inc. v. 
Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that a contract that did not 
contain a promise that the buyer would buy exclusively from the seller and left the buyer 
free to purchase from other suppliers was unenforceable as a requirements contract, where 
even the plaintiff’s representative recognized it as an option contract). 
152 See Arrotin Plastic Materials v. Wilmington Paper Corp., 865 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2007) (affirming summary judgment on the grounds that the contract was an 
illusory indefinite quantity contract rather than a valid output contract, where nothing in 
the document indicated that the buyer had agreed to purchase “ALL[]” of the products that 
the seller had procured).  Courts will, however, enforce output contracts for less than all a 
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enforceable commitment from a voluntary one, especially a voluntary 
relationship that has been exclusive for many years.  Reliance on the 
parties’ prior course of dealing may be misleading when their history of 
exclusive dealing reflects the buyer’s continued satisfaction with the 
seller’s goods or services rather than the buyer’s contractual commitment 
to purchase those goods or services from the seller.153  As a result, some 
courts have held that “there can be no partial performance in the context 
of a requirements contract . . . for it is the promise of exclusivity that 
provides the consideration to the seller.”154 
Upon closer analysis, the requirement of “exclusivity” may mean no 
more than the reciprocal obligation on the part of the buyer to purchase 
the goods that the seller is required to sell to the buyer.155  A frequently 
cited definition of requirements contracts that includes the element of 
exclusivity provides that a requirements contract exists only when the 
contract “(1) obligates the buyer to buy goods, (2) obligates the buyer to 
buy goods exclusively from the seller, and (3) obligates the buyer to buy 
                                                                                                             
seller’s output, as long as the quantity term is sufficiently ascertainable to satisfy the 
definiteness doctrine.  See, e.g., Sw. Dairy Prods., Co. v. Coffee & Moore, 62 F.2d 174 (5th 
Cir. 1932) (holding that an output contract for all the dairy’s milk production up to a 
maximum of 150 gallons per day was not void for lack of mutuality); Am. Original Corp. v. 
Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 966–67 (D. Del. 1986) (denying motion to dismiss claims 
under an output contract for all the surf clams caught by defendant in certain waters as 
well as all quahogs up to 1000 cages); Fort Hill Lumber Co. v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 493 P.2d 1366, 
1368 (Or. 1972) (holding that a contract providing that the buyer would purchase all 
hemlock timber located in a stated area was enforceable because it contained a sufficiently 
definite quantity term); Lenepe Res. Corp. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 
1996) (enforcing contract requiring buyer to “take or pay” for eighty-five percent of 
plaintiff’s gas capacity). 
153  See Billings Cottonseed, Inc. v. Albany Oil Mill, Inc., 328 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1985) (citing Loizeaux Bldrs. Supply Co. v. Donald B. Ludwig Co., 366 A.2d 721, 724 (N.J. 
1976)).  See generally 2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-306:9–2-306:12 (3d Ed. 
1982). 
154  Billings Cottonseed, 328 S.E.2d at 429–30 (citing Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, 
Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979)).  See also Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 908 F. 
Supp. 1084, 1091 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that an alleged requirements contract could not 
be enforced under the statute of frauds based on partial performance because partial 
performance would only permit enforcement of the specific purchase orders that had been 
filled). 
155 This point was made in Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 
1979), where the defendant was obligated to sell to plaintiffs while plaintiffs were free to 
purchase from any supplier.  The Harvey court held that the contract was invalid under 
Idaho law, explaining,  
Mutuality of obligation as it pertains to an executory contract requires 
that each party to the agreement be bound to perform; if it appears that 
one party was never bound on his part to do the acts which form the 
consideration for the promise of the other, there is a lack of mutuality 
of obligation, and the other party is not bound[.] 
Id. at 460 n.12 (quoting McCandless v. Schick, 380 P.2d 893, 898 (Idaho 1963)). 
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all of its requirements for goods of a particular kind from the seller.”156  
One can remove the second element from this definition without 
changing its substance because an obligation of the buyer to buy goods 
“exclusively” from the seller adds nothing to the buyer’s obligation to 
“buy all of its requirements for goods of a particular kind from the 
seller.”157 
To determine whether exclusivity means more than the reciprocal 
obligation of the buyer necessary to satisfy mutuality, compare the 
promise of the buyer in a requirements contract to the promise of a buyer 
in a fixed quantity contract.  The difference is that a buyer in a fixed 
quantity contract purchases “X” quantity of goods “exclusively” from 
the seller while in a requirements contract the buyer purchases “all its 
requirements” “exclusively” from the seller.  The concept of exclusivity 
therefore performs two functions:  (1) it represents the reciprocal 
obligation of the buyer to purchase the goods that the seller is required 
to supply, thereby satisfying the mutuality of obligation doctrine; and (2) 
it assists in defining quantity when there is no other means of 
determining quantity, by providing that the buyer will deal only with 
the seller for the procurement of all the goods the buyer may require, 
thereby satisfying the requirement of definiteness.  The point is that 
there is “exclusivity” in every sales contract for the quantity of goods 
agreed upon to the extent that the buyer agrees to purchase a certain 
number of items from the seller rather than from other suppliers.  When 
understood in this fashion, it becomes clear that “fully” exclusive rights 
are not necessary to adequately define the quantity term.  Indeed, courts 
have recognized exceptions to the general rule in an ad hoc fashion, but 
have not articulated a unifying principle for the exceptions.  For 
example, the quantity term can be supplied by agreeing that the buyer 
will buy all of his requirements from the seller up to a maximum 
quantity, at which point he will be free to buy from others.  It can be 
supplied by agreeing that the buyer will buy all of his requirements to 
fill orders for specific customers, or to fill the needs of particular plants, 
or for particular projects.  The options for determining the quantity term 
are no doubt endless; the point is that the parties must agree on some 
calculation method, so that a court can decide the issues of breach and 
damages should a dispute arise.  
Exclusive dealing arrangements are perhaps the ultimate example of 
requirements contracts where there is no doubt as to the buyer’s 
obligation to purchase the goods exclusively from the seller.  Under 
                                                 
156 Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp., Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(citing WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at § 3–9); FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 135–37. 
157 Zemco Mfg., 186 F.3d at 817 (emphasis added). 
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these contracts, the buyer cannot purchase any of its requirements for the 
goods from any other supplier and the supplier cannot sell the goods to 
any other buyer, at least within an agreed upon geographic area, so there 
is no question as to the mutuality of the parties’ obligations or the ability 
to eventually define the quantity term.158  A similar contract exists where 
the buyer agrees to purchase all of its requirements of a trademarked or 
brand-named product from the manufacturer of that product.  In cases 
where the manufacturer is the only entity authorized to supply the 
brand-named product, the contract is inherently exclusive to the extent 
that the buyer cannot obtain its supply of the product from any other 
source.159 
One serious downside to using the exclusivity rule as an 
indispensible condition for enforcing requirements contracts is that 
courts may be unwilling to recognize requirements contracts that the 
parties tailor to match their allocation of risks, by, for example, placing 
their own express minimum or maximum limits on the buyer’s 
requirements.  A case in point is Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co.,160 in 
which the parties carefully drafted a requirements contract with express 
limits on the buyer’s discretion, only to find that their care was rewarded 
by a determination that these limits raised a fact issue for the jury as to 
whether the contract could be enforced as a requirements contract.  The 
contract provided that the seller would furnish the buyer with 16,000 A-1 
copiers in 1980 and in subsequent years with “its requirements for A-1 
Copier Machines in accordance with [buyer’s] orders . . . but not more, 
without [seller’s] consent[,] than . . . (20,000) machines in any one year[,]” 
and that after 1980, the buyer’s orders could not be fifteen percent higher 
or lower than its order the preceding month.161  Here the parties are 
expressly stating the requirements that the seller would find excessive, 
as well as a minimum below which purchases could not fall.  There was 
evidence in Agfa-Gevaert that the seller was unable to provide the 
capacity of 20,000 copiers a year without increasing its price.  Setting the 
fifteen percent monthly deviation in quantity may well have been used 
as a way of implementing the language in Official Comment 3 to UCC 
section 2-306(1)—that parties can set a “clear limit on the intended 
elasticity” by including minimum and maximum figures in their 
agreement.  The trial court held, as a matter of law, that the contract 
                                                 
158  See O.N. Jonas Co., Inc. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1983).  
159  See Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-Anim Health Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 
2d 1170 (D. Kan. 2007). 
160 879 F.2d 1518, 1520 (7th Cir. 1989). 
161  Id. 
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language required the buyer to purchase its requirements of low-volume 
plain-paper copiers from the seller. 
Judge Posner reversed a judgment entered upon a jury verdict for 
damages to the plaintiff, and sent the case back to a jury, finding the 
contract too ambiguous to be decided as a matter of law.  Despite finding 
that the “natural reading” of the contract’s language required the seller 
to provide the buyer’s “requirements for A-1 Copier Machines[,]” Judge 
Posner concluded that in light of the quantity caps and monthly limits, 
“the agreement is perfectly intelligible and [is] not a requirements 
contract[] [that] obligates the buyer to buy all his requirements from the 
seller.”162  This insistence on adherence to the complete exclusivity rule 
ignores the case law recognizing requirements contracts that set 
minimum and maximum quantity limits.163  It also ignores Official 
Comment 3 to section 2-306(1), which allows parties to set their own 
parameters limiting the quantities that are considered “unreasonably 
disproportionate” to estimates provided.  This decision highlights the 
need for reform because Judge Posner, of all our jurists, is sensible to the 
benefits of allowing contracting parties to allocate the business risks in 
their transactions in an economically efficient manner. 
While the topic of exclusive dealing arrangements is beyond the 
scope of this Article, it appears that courts are divided on the related 
issue of whether exclusive dealership agreements governed by section 2-
306(2) are enforceable based on the dealer’s obligation to exercise his 
“best efforts.”  In some jurisdictions, the buyer’s duty in an exclusive 
dealership contract to use “best efforts” to promote the seller’s product is 
considered “too indefinite and uncertain to be an enforceable standard[]” 
and such contracts are held void for lack of mutuality unless the buyer is 
                                                 
162 Id. at 1521.  Judge Posner was concerned, it seems, that the seller was not willing to 
sell the buyer all of its requirements, even at a higher price.  This logic seems to contradict 
the notion of unreasonably disproportionate demands that are too high, which is a concern 
that Judge Posner believes warrants an asymmetrical reading of UCC section 2-306(1), so 
that unreasonably low demands are not treated with the same level of concern.  It is also 
difficult to accept Judge Posner’s claim that “[l]ooked at from the seller’s side, a 
requirements contract guarantees him a market for his good; in exchange he must offer the 
buyer a price break,” when he also takes the position that the buyer can reduce his 
requirements to zero as long as the buyer acts in good faith.  Id. 
163 See, e.g., Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc. v. Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Prods., Inc., 212 
F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2000); U & W Indus. Supply, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 34 
F.3d 180, 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that under the parties’ requirements contracts, the 
buyer was only obligated to place one order within the first ninety days, and the contracts 
placed a maximum level on quantities the buyer could order without written agreement by 
the parties). 
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required to sell a specific quantity or meet a quota.164  While the best 
efforts obligation should provide sufficient consideration to satisfy the 
need for mutuality, and to distinguish the contract from a buyer’s option, 
because the buyer with a buyer’s option has no such obligation, it may 
not be sufficient for definiteness.  An appropriate remedy may be 
calculated if the parties have a prior course of dealing, have agreed on 
estimates of sales, or can offer evidence of comparable distributors’ sales.  
If, however, the contract involves the sale of a new product, the best 
efforts obligation may not provide “a reasonably certain basis for giving 
an appropriate [remedy,]” as required under section 2-204(3).165 
B. Exceptions and Modifications to the Exclusivity Rule 
1. Performance Standards 
Courts have held that a requirements contract will not fail for lack of 
exclusivity if the buyer’s promise to purchase its requirements 
exclusively from the seller is conditioned on the seller meeting quality 
standards, Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc.,166 or the buyer gives 
the provider, in a service contract, an opportunity to perform before 
contacting other providers, Ceredo Mortuary Chapel, Inc. v. United States.167  
In Porous Media, the Eighth Circuit held that under Minnesota law, the 
exclusivity necessary to enforce the parties’ requirements contract was 
satisfied despite a provision giving the buyer the right to purchase the 
goods from other suppliers if the seller failed to meet the contract’s 
                                                 
164 See Ryan v. Wersi Elecs. GmbH & Co., 3 F.3d 174, 181 (7th Cir. 1993); A.T.N., Inc. v. 
McAirlaid’s Vliesstoffe GmbH & Co., 2008 WL 696916 at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Kraftco Corp. v. 
Kolbus, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).  In Kolbus, the court explained that 
[i]n this case, there was no obligation upon Kolbus other than to use 
his best efforts. He had no obligation to sell any specific quantity and 
no obligation to meet any quotas. The operation of this contract was 
totally dependent upon the actions of Kolbus. The mere allegation of 
best efforts is too indefinite and uncertain to be an enforceable 
standard. As such, the contract was lacking in mutuality of obligation 
and unenforceable. 
Id.  Cf. Brewster Wallcovering Co. v. Blue Mountain Wallcoverings, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 518, 
533 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that the parties had entered into an exclusive oral 
requirements contract that was exempt from the statute of frauds under UCC section 2-
306(1) and was not void for indefiniteness despite the lack of a quantity term, based on the 
evidence of Brewster’s long history as the sole distributor of the products in the mid-
Atlantic region). 
165 See TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2007). 
166 220 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2000). 
167 29 Fed. Cl. 346, 353 (1993) (holding that a requirements contract was enforceable 
where the government reserved the right to seek services from another source if the 
contractor failed to provide them). 
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quality standards or delivery deadlines.168  Performance standards 
restrict the buyer’s discretion, since the buyer must purchase the goods 
or services exclusively from the seller unless the seller’s performance 
falls below the standards.  The contract’s conditions also provide a 
method for ascertaining quantity sufficient to determine breach and 
damages, because the buyer will be in breach if it purchases its 
requirements from another source when the seller has satisfied the 
conditions, and those purchases will serve to calculate the seller’s 
damages. 
2. Maximum Quantity Limitations 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying the law of Texas, 
has held that a requirements contract must include the promise of a 
buyer to purchase exclusively from the seller either the buyer’s total 
requirements or its requirements up to a specified amount.169  Courts 
offer no rationale for this modified version of the exclusivity rule, but the 
reason it satisfies the validation function of the rule seems clear.  The 
buyer’s discretion is limited and the quantity is ascertainable because the 
buyer promises that he will not turn to any other suppliers to satisfy his 
requirements before he has purchased the maximum quantity from the 
seller.  If the buyer purchases from other suppliers before purchasing the 
set maximum from the seller, he has breached the contract. 
                                                 
168 Porous Media, 220 F.3d at 960; cf. Polyad Co. v. Indopco, Inc., No. 06-C-5732, 2007 WL 
2893638 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 25, 2007) (holding that under Illinois law a requirements contract 
exists only when the contract “obligates the buyer to buy all of its requirements for goods 
of a particular kind from the seller.” (citing Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 
Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1999))). 
169 See Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 963 (5th Cir. 1999); Mid-
South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1985).  See also Ind.-
Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Town of Seelyville, 698 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) 
(enforcing a requirements contract that required the buyer to purchase all of its needs for 
water from the seller up to one million gallons per day and permitted the buyer to 
purchase amounts in excess of one million gallons a day from other suppliers).  In 
Propulsion Technologies, Inc. v. Attwood Corp., 369 F.3d 896, 904 (5th Cir. 2004), the court 
relied on Mid-South in refusing to enforce a purported requirements contract on statute of 
frauds grounds, despite testimony that the parties intended the contract to be exclusive.  
The contract provided that the buyer “agrees to establish minimum order requirements 
which are suitable to [seller] and [buyer] . . . on an annual basis, beginning in June of 1997.”  
Id.  The court found that “because it lacks any promise by [the buyer] to purchase an 
ascertainable quantity, the agreement is not enforceable for lack of consideration or 
mutuality.”  Id.  The court cited approvingly its own prior precedent in Mid-South that a 
requirements contract fails for want of consideration unless the buyer commits to purchase 
exclusively from the seller either the buyer’s entire requirements or the buyer’s 
requirements up to a specified amount. 
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This rule was also used by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 
PMC Corp. v. Houston Wire & Cable Co.,170 a case which has been 
described by Professor Blair as a “remarkable” example of the 
enforcement of a non-exclusive open quantity contract.171  Professor Blair 
claims that the “[c]ourt fashioned an exception to the exclusivity rule[]” 
consisting of “some sort of sliding scale of exclusivity[,]” which “is either 
so ill-defined as to be useless as a normative standard or . . . so expansive 
that it subsumes the general rule.”172  He also contends that the only 
example of the exception the court provided was of a contract in which 
the “requirements buyer will purchase up to a certain amount of the 
product from the seller[,]” and that because the example was not present 
in the case, the court could not have relied on the exception it 
articulated.173  My review of the case suggests that this description may 
not be accurate. 
In PMC, the disputed letter agreement contained estimates of 
Houston’s annual requirements for thermocouple products, and stated 
that Houston intended to purchase a “major portion” of these products 
from PMC.  The jury entered a verdict enforcing the agreement as a 
requirements contract.  The court affirmed, holding that the terms 
“major portion” and “major share” in the letter were sufficiently precise 
to satisfy the need for a quantity term under the statute of frauds, and 
that parol evidence was properly admitted to show what the parties 
intended as to the exact quantity.174  The court also rejected Houston’s 
claim that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that 
exclusivity is a prerequisite to a valid requirements contract.  Relying on 
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, rather than on a newly-
fashioned exception to the exclusivity rule, the court held that a 
requirements contract may be sufficiently exclusive to be enforced, 
despite the presence of another supplier, “where a purchaser agrees to 
purchase exclusively from a seller up to a certain quantity.”175  This 
exception is not “ill-defined” since the maximum quantity set by the 
parties establishes the “mechanism for deciding when to stop[]” on the 
“sliding scale[,]”176 and therefore addresses Professor Blair’s concerns. 
The court in PMC also found as the basis for two of its rulings that 
the exception to the exclusivity rule applied to the facts of the case, again 
contrary to Professor Blair’s analysis.  First, the court held that the letter 
                                                 
170 797 A.2d 125 (N.H. 2002). 
171 See Blair, supra note 6, at 71. 
172 Id. at 112–13. 
173 Id. at 113. 
174  PMC, 797 A.2d at 128–29 (emphasis omitted). 
175  Id. at 130 (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at § 3-9). 
176  See Blair, supra note 6, at 113. 
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agreement contained language from which the jury could have 
determined that Houston agreed “to purchase exclusively from PMC up 
to a certain quantity,” indicating that the jury instructions on 
requirements contracts were not improper.177  Second, the court denied 
the buyer’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
grounds that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict 
on the issue of contract formation, including testimony that “Houston 
had committed to purchasing thermocouple products from PMC except 
in the rare circumstance that PMC could not meet an order.”178  Thus, 
while Professor Blair is correct that no specific numerical quantity was 
established, the parties did agree on an ascertainable maximum by 
agreeing that Houston would obtain all of its requirements from PMC 
except in a case where PMC was unable to provide them.  On this 
evidence, the court may not have needed to apply an exception to the 
exclusivity rule because limitations on the buyer’s capacity to satisfy the 
buyer’s requirements will always be an implied exception to the 
exclusivity rule.  If the seller is unable to provide the buyer’s total 
requirements, so that the buyer must look elsewhere to satisfy those 
requirements, the seller can hardly hold the buyer to the exclusivity 
term.  Either way, the doctrines of mutuality and definiteness are 
satisfied under such a contract because the buyer has to purchase all of 
its requirements from the seller unless the seller is unable to supply 
them, and the buyer will be in breach if it purchases any of its 
requirements from others before the seller has indicated its inability to 
provide those requirements. 
3. Minimum and Percentage Quantity Limitations 
Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying 
Illinois law, held in Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc. v. Earthgrains Refrigerated 
Dough Products, Inc., that “an essential element of a requirements 
contract is the promise by the buyer to purchase all of its requirements, 
or at least a minimum quantity, from the seller.”179  This formulation 
                                                 
177 PMC, 797 A.2d 125 at 130.  The court also observed that the requirement of exclusivity 
was implicit in the court’s instructions.  The instruction that the jurors could measure 
quantity either by the actual requirements of the buyer “or such proportion thereof as was 
reasonably contemplated by the parties[]” reasonably informed “the jury that the parties 
can specify all requirements or a specific portion of the buyer’s requirements.”  Id. at 131.  
Because this instruction fairly presented the law concerning the exclusivity rule, it was not 
erroneous.  Id. 
178 Id. 
179 212 F.3d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 2000).  See also Slocomb Indus., Inc. v. Chelsea Indus., 1983 
WL 160582, *4 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting a statute of frauds defense to a contract that defined 
quantity as the buyer’s requirements with minimum purchases of $500,000). 
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does not state an exception to the exclusivity rule because a non-
exclusive requirements contract with a promise to purchase a fixed 
quantity of goods, at a minimum, would satisfy the doctrines of 
mutuality and definiteness based on the promise for the fixed quantity.  
Thus, even a court that rejects the exclusivity rule may sustain a 
requirements contract on the grounds that the buyer has agreed to 
purchase a minimum fixed quantity of goods.180 
In the services context, courts have held that an agreement on sales 
terms that does not require the buyer to purchase either its requirements 
or a minimum quantity from the seller is an unenforceable indefinite 
quantity arrangement.  As the court explained in Ceredo,181 the cases 
involving contracts for the procurement of services and supplies define 
three types of enforceable contracts—definite quantity contracts, 
indefinite quantity contracts with an ascertainable minimum, and 
requirements contracts—and one kind of unenforceable agreement, 
described as follows:  “[I]ndefinite quantity arrangements with no 
ascertainable minimum are unenforceable even if they are mutually 
agreed upon, having the legal status of a price list or proposal.”182  Even 
this statement is too definitive, however, because at least one court has 
enforced indefinite quantity contracts with no stated minimums that are 
not requirements or output contracts.  In Howell v. United States, the court 
enforced service contracts that referred to a minimum quantity, but did 
not actually contain a minimum quantity term, by supplying a minimum 
purchase of $1,000 worth of services, relying on section 2-204 to supply 
an essential missing term, and on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
section 204 to derive a minimum quantity term that was “reasonable in 
the circumstances.”183 
Courts have also sustained requirements contracts against invalidity 
attacks when the contract defines quantity as a percentage of the buyer’s 
total requirements.  In R. E. Phelon Co. v. Clarion Sintered Metals, Inc., the 
court entered summary judgment for the seller on the issues of 
enforceability and breach when the buyer purchased less than eighty to 
ninety percent of its annual requirements of the specified products as set 
forth in the parties’ agreement.184 
                                                 
180  See Amber Chem. Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 2007 WL 512410 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(rejecting the exclusivity rule as contrary to UCC section 2-306, but holding that the 
requirements contract at issue was supported by consideration because the buyer had 
promised to purchase a minimum quantity of goods). 
181 29 Fed. Cl. 346 (Fed. Cl. 1993). 
182 Id. at 349.  
183 51 Fed. Cl. 516, 523 (Fed. Cl. 2002). 
184 2006 WL 2573136, at *4–6 (D.S.C. 2006). 
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4. Project Exclusivity 
In some jurisdictions, the exclusivity rule has been supplemented by 
an exception for contracts, whereby the buyer promises to purchase all of 
its requirements for a particular project on the theory that the parties 
could ultimately learn whether the buyer had purchased any goods for 
the project from another source.  Courts began recognizing the exception 
in pre-Code cases, such as the Fifth Circuit’s 1930 decision in Tampa 
Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. v. General Construction Co.185  In Tampa 
Shipbuilding, the court enforced a contract for “the rock needed for 22nd 
Street Bridge and Causeway[,]” on the grounds that, “[a] contract for 
one’s needs for a particular enterprise is sufficiently definite, and is not 
unilateral.”186  There is no need for exclusivity in the classic sense to 
satisfy the definiteness or mutuality doctrines in these cases because the 
buyer has promised to purchase the quantity of materials needed for a 
particular project and that quantity will be ascertainable and certain once 
the project has been completed.  Damages are not an issue because the 
court can award the profits the seller lost on the materials that the buyer 
purchased for the project from another source.  This exception is often 
applied in the construction contracting context, where the initial request 
for bids sets the estimates of the materials needed for the project, and the 
contracts quantify the requirements by referring to the project.187 
5. Customer List Exclusivity 
New York and Michigan recognize an exception to the exclusivity 
rule that applies when the buyer has promised to purchase all of the 
goods it needs for certain customers from the seller.  The buyer has still 
constrained its freedom to purchase goods from whomever it chooses to 
the extent that it cannot fill the orders of particular customers from any 
source other than the seller.  The factfinder can decide the issues of 
breach and damages by asking whether the buyer purchased any of its 
requirements for customers who were covered by the agreement with 
goods from other suppliers.  A federal district judge recognized this 
                                                 
185 43 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1930). 
186 Id. at 310–11. 
187 See Port City Const. Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 266 So. 2d 896, 900 nn.10–11 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1972) (holding that a contract to furnish “all concrete for slab” was sufficient to 
enforce a requirements contract); Md. Sup. Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 369 A.2d 1017 
(Md. 1977) (noting that writing the phrases “for the above mentioned project[]” and 
“throughout the job” were sufficient quantity terms); Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & 
Co., 770 P.2d 692, 694 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that the statute of frauds was satisfied by a 
subcontractor’s purchase order for concrete to be delivered “as called for[]” for the project 
of expanding a high school). 
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point in a recent decision in which he reversed himself on 
reconsideration after realizing that leaving some customers outside of 
the scope of the buyer’s obligation did not render the quantity term in a 
requirements contract too uncertain to enforce. 
In Corning, Inc. v. VWR International, Inc.,188 the parties’ agreement 
provided that “VWR [would] catalog inventory and sell only Corning’s 
Pyrex reusable glass product line, except as warranted by Tier II 
customers, to the exclusion of other non-Corning brands, including 
private label reusable glass.”189  Corning argued that VWR had agreed to 
buy all of its requirements of reusable glass from Corning except when 
VWR’s Tier II customers asked VWR to fill their orders from other 
suppliers.190  The court initially granted VWR’s motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the contract failed to satisfy the statute of frauds because it 
was not an exclusive requirements contract.  In its reconsideration 
decision, the court referred to the maximum quantity exception 
discussed in PMC and White & Summers, concluding that a contract may 
be “sufficiently exclusive[,]” despite the presence of another supplier, 
where a purchaser agrees to purchase exclusively from a seller up to a 
certain quantity, at which point he may begin buying from others.191  The 
court also discussed the minimum quantity exception and then applied 
these principles to hold that the contract at issue was sufficiently 
exclusive because it set both a maximum and a minimum standard for 
the quantity the buyer would purchase from the seller.192  In explaining 
its changed position, the court stated that in its original ruling it had 
found it significant that the parties’ agreement “provided no way of 
knowing or even estimating how much or how little reusable glass the 
Tier II customers might buy, and therefore the Court found that the 
memorandum lacked a sufficient quantity term.”193  This difficulty was 
resolved when the memorandum was understood to require VWR to 
purchase exclusively from Corning for all of its non-Tier II customers, at 
a minimum, and even to require VWR to purchase from Corning for its 
Tier II customers who did not ask for goods from other suppliers.194 
                                                 
188 2007 WL 841780 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 
189 Id. at *1. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at *6. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id.  See also Ind.-Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Town of Seelyville, 698 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998) (noting that a requirements contract is illusory and unenforceable without a 
guaranteed minimum quantity that the buyer must purchase from the seller). 
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Similarly, in GRM Corp. v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc.,195 the 
defendant issued a request for quotations (“RFQ”) for a five-year 
contract to supply thermostats for engine components that the defendant 
would, in turn, sell to Chrysler.  This RFQ estimated annual quantity 
needs and asked the bidders to state whether they could meet “all 
specified requirements at the volume levels[.]”  While the parties did not 
discuss exclusivity, and their “blanket [purchase] orders” did not require 
the buyer to purchase all of its requirements from the seller but were to 
be followed by delivery schedules requesting specific quantities, the 
seller understood that the orders would fluctuate based on the orders 
Chrysler placed with the defendant.  The court held that while Michigan 
law was unsettled as to whether exclusivity was necessary to enforce a 
requirements contract, the parties’ contract writings contained sufficient 
language indicating the existence of a requirements contract, and 
therefore a valid quantity term, to permit sending the case to the jury for 
consideration of parol evidence.196  Even if Michigan law did not require 
exclusivity, the parties agreed that the seller would supply the buyer 
with the quantity of products required by Chrysler.  Thus, the validation 
came from a limited exclusivity agreement that the buyer would buy 
from the seller all of the products it needed to fill Chrysler’s orders, 
which was considered to be an ascertainable quantity.  Here, the buyer 
had decided to start making the thermostats itself, and the issue was 
therefore whether it acted in good faith in doing so.197 
C. The Code’s Duty of Good Faith for Open Quantity Contracts 
As discussed above, the Official Comments to UCC section 2-306 
take the position that output and requirements are validated by the 
implied duty of good faith imposed on the quantity-determining party to 
run its business and to maintain quantities at reasonably foreseeable 
levels, and they do not mention the exclusivity rule.198  In 1983, Professor 
                                                 
195 2008 WL 82224 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
196 Id. at *5–6. 
197 See also Trimed, Inc. v. Sherwood Med. Co., 772 F. Supp. 879, 886 (D. Md. 1991) 
(holding that a requirements contract for the buyer to distribute a particular brand of 
surgical instruments could give the buyer the right to sell competitors’ brands without 
being illusory because the buyer’s customers’ choice of product was the determining factor, 
such that the buyer was obligated to fulfill its requirements needed to satisfy its own 
customers’ orders for that particular brand from the seller).  
198  See generally supra Part III.A–B.  At least one court has relied on the Official Comments 
to UCC section 2-306 to find that the duty of good faith provides a basis for validating 
output and requirements agreements while also interpreting UCC section 2-306(1) to 
incorporate the exclusivity requirement.  In Stacks v. F & S Petroleum Co., Inc., 641 S.W.2d 
726, 727 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982), the court found that, like the common law, UCC section 2-
306(1) defines requirements contracts as contracts under which the buyer agrees to 
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Bruckel wrote an article asserting that the effect of section 2-306(1) was to 
replace the exclusivity rule with good faith as the validation device for 
open quantity contracts.199  Professor McCallon sought to “reaffirm” her 
claim in a 2004 comment based on his observation that the “use of 
exclusivity as a validating device appears to be as accepted today as it 
was prior to Professor Bruckel’s article and prior to the enactment of the 
UCC.” 200 
Professor Goldberg has taken the opposite position, arguing that it 
was a mistake for the drafters of section 2-306(1) to use good faith to 
address the enforcement issue, which he characterizes as a lack of 
consideration under the illusory contract doctrine, without addressing 
the indefiniteness issue.201  He does not offer an alternative to good faith 
or the exclusivity rule, but claims that the discretion of the quantity-
determining party in open-quantity term contracts will not be 
unbounded in any case because these contracts typically relate the 
quantity to physical constraints, such as the capacity of a particular plant 
of the buyer or seller.202  He offers no empirical support for this claim, 
and the cases discuss many significant contracts that do not include such 
provisions.  Either way, enforcement surely should not depend on 
whether the contract contains an express cap on the quantity term.     
Finally, Professor Blair would require courts to enforce non-
exclusive requirements contracts based on an inquiry into whether the 
parties intended to enter into a bargain.203  Blair argues that, for open 
quantity contracts, “[c]ourts do not need to find mutuality of obligation, 
either through exclusivity or good faith.”204  According to Blair, 
“nonexclusive open-quantity agreements are capable of being validated 
so long as there is sufficient evidence to persuade a factfinder that the 
parties actually bargained for such a contract.”205  He emphasizes that for 
validation, nonexclusive open-quantity agreements must be “the product 
of true bargaining between the parties[,]”206 and that there must be 
sufficient evidence that the contract was actually bargained for, 
indicating that the factfinder must conduct a fact-intensive examination 
                                                                                                             
purchase all of its requirements exclusively from the seller, and then relied on the Official 
Comments to conclude that the duty of good faith is sufficient to defeat the defenses of lack 
of mutuality and indefiniteness.  Id. 
199  Bruckel, supra note 4, at 117. 
200  McCallon, supra note 4, at 712.  
201  Goldberg, supra note 3, at 103. 
202  Id. at 104. 
203  Blair, supra note 6, at 110.  
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 125. 
206 Id. at 115. 
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of parol evidence to determine whether negotiations took place over the 
contract terms and whether each party received something in exchange 
for the concessions given.  Viewed this way, the concept of “bargained 
for” exchanges appears to be little more than the mutuality doctrine in 
disguise.  It would be difficult to imagine a requirements contract 
surviving this “bargained for” test if the seller did not seek, in exchange 
for his promise to sell the buyer its requirements, a reciprocal promise 
from the buyer to purchase its requirements from the seller. 
Blair also criticizes a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc.,207 for its reliance on the 
exclusivity rule,208 but this decision actually demonstrates the 
importance of the doctrine of mutuality in real world business 
transactions.  Business people take very seriously the distinction between 
business documents that do not impose a commitment on the buyer to 
purchase goods from the seller, such as price lists, proposals, or options, 
and business documents that require the buyer to purchase its 
requirements exclusively from the seller, and not from any other source, 
for the duration of the agreement.  In Mid-South, the business people 
involved in the transaction for the buyer understood this distinction, but 
their attorneys apparently did not.  The seller in Mid-South gave the 
buyer a proposal for the sale of pork products at prices that could be 
changed upon forty-five days notice.  The proposal did not list specific 
quantities or refer to the buyer’s requirements, but the buyer had given 
the seller an estimate of its requirements at the parties’ initial meeting.  
The buyer claimed that it accepted the seller’s proposal as a 
requirements contract when it began filling all of its needs from the 
seller, based on purchase orders or phone calls, which were followed by 
shipments and invoices from the seller.  The buyer’s agent, however, 
testified that the buyer was free to purchase from other suppliers, that it 
continued to purchase exclusively from the seller because it was satisfied 
with the seller’s service and the quality of its goods, and that the only 
commitment it made was based on its individual purchase orders.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that under the common law 
and the Code, “an essential element of a requirements contract is the 
promise of the buyer to purchase exclusively from the seller either the 
buyer’s entire requirements or up to a specified amount.”209  Based on 
the lack of exclusivity, the court found that the parties’ agreement was a 
section 2-205 firm offer rather than a requirements contract. 
                                                 
207 761 F.2d 1117, 1120–21 (5th Cir. 1985). 
208 Blair, supra note 6, at 99. 
209 Id. at 98–99. 
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Courts have encountered a number of difficulties when attempting 
to validate requirements contracts using the concept of good faith 
without evidence that would satisfy the exclusivity rule or one of its 
exceptions.  One is that the standards of good faith and reasonableness 
cannot satisfy the doctrines of mutuality and definiteness when the 
buyer in a requirements contract has made no commitment to purchase 
any quantity of goods that can be ascertained by a factfinder.  One early 
case involving this issue is City of Louisville v. Rockwell Manufacturing 
Co.,210 a 1973 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
where the court sustained a contract in which the seller was to furnish 
only “part of the City’s requirement for parking meters,” with no further 
aids in establishing an ascertainable quantity.211  Relying on UCC 
section 2-306(1), the court held that 
[t]he further provision for furnishing “part” of the City's 
requirements likewise does not render the agreement 
illusory or lacking in mutuality, both in light of the full 
record upon the trial and in light of the further provision 
in the agreement for furnishing “approximately 7650” 
parking meters.  The word “approximately” when used 
in this context merely indicates that precision in quantity 
is not intended, but rather a margin is intended either 
for excess or deficiency in the quantity stated.212 
Providing an estimate is not sufficient to satisfy the mutuality and 
definiteness doctrines, however, when the buyer has promised to 
purchase an unascertainable quantity such as “part” of its requirements.  
Saying that the City promised to purchase a “part” of its requirements 
from Rockwell does not tell you, for example, that the City promised to 
purchase eighty percent of its requirements from Rockwell, and all the 
court can do under the UCC is to determine whether the quantity the 
City actually purchased is “unreasonably disproportionate” to the 
estimate of 7,650 meters. 
Some courts have extended the reach of good faith as a validation 
principle even further, applying it to enforce purported requirements 
contracts when the buyer has not promised to purchase any portion of its 
                                                 
210 482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1973).  See also Hoover's Hatchery, Inc. v. Utgaard, 447 N.W.2d 
684, 688 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the inclusion of defendant’s expected 
requirements in the correspondence, which constituted the agreement, provided a 
sufficient standard to measure the defendant’s good faith in purchasing its requirements 
under the contract). 
211 City of Louisville, 482 F.2d at 164. 
212 Id. 
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requirements from the seller, ascertainable or not.  In General Motors,213 
the seller moved for summary judgment dismissing the buyer’s claims 
on the grounds that the purchase orders were terminable at will and did 
not require the buyer to order any seat frames, the purchase orders were 
not exclusive, and the purchase orders became effective only when the 
buyer issued releases authorizing the seller to build and ship a specific 
number of seat frames.214  Without identifying evidence to contradict any 
of these points, the court denied the buyer’s motion on the grounds that 
UCC section 2-306 rejects the exclusivity rule215 and that under Official 
Comment 2, requirements contracts are validated by the duty of good 
faith.216  Specifically, the court found that the buyer would be in breach 
of the contract if “in bad faith or inconsistent with commercial standards 
of fair dealing, the plaintiffs exercised a unilateral right not to purchase 
seat frames or to terminate the purchase orders[]” or had “acted in bad 
faith and not issued a release.”217  So without evidence that the buyer 
had promised to purchase any goods from the seller, the court found 
that section 2-306 provides a sufficient basis for the factfinder to 
determine when the buyer has breached its duties of good faith and fair 
dealing by failing to purchase goods from the seller.  The court then sent 
the case back to the jury, expressing no concern over how it was to 
decide what quantity the buyer was required to purchase from the seller 
under this good faith standard when the purchase orders were not 
exclusive and provided no method of calculating the buyer’s quantity 
commitment. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals followed the General Motors decision 
in Plastech,218 reversing a summary judgment ruling for the buyer when 
the seller’s purchase order stated, “Scheduled Purchase Order to cover 
100% Johnson Controls requirements[,]” but the seller was only one of 
buyer’s “preferred providers[,]” and the contract was not exclusive.219  
As to quantities, which were not set forth in the purchase order, the 
court relied on the good faith duty of the buyer not to order quantities 
unreasonably disproportionate to the estimates contained in the parties’ 
                                                 
213 90 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
214 Id. at 873. 
215 Id. at 874 (“The statute and official comments simply do not support Paramount’s 
assertion that all requirements contracts are exclusive requirements contracts; a 
requirements contract may exist where ‘all or some of’ the purchaser’s requirements are 
purchased from the seller.”). 
216 Id. at 873. 
217 Id. 
218 2005 WL 736519 at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
219 Id. at *6, 2. 
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communications.220  But if the buyer has not undertaken a commitment 
to purchase all or any ascertainable portion of its requirements from the 
seller, as was the case in Plastech, it is unclear how the buyer’s implied 
duty of good faith to operate its business so that its requirements will be 
maintained at reasonably foreseeable levels—the duty the Official 
Comments rely on to satisfy the doctrines definiteness and mutuality—
can create such a commitment. 
A buyer should be able to enter into valid requirements contracts 
with a group of suppliers for a particular product, but there is an 
alternative to the approach taken in Plastech.  Rather than providing an 
estimate of the requirements, around which the buyer cannot demand 
quantities that are “unreasonably disproportionate,” as the parties did in 
Plastech, the buyer could simply promise to buy a percentage of its actual 
requirements from each supplier.221  An estimate could be given, if 
appropriate, but would not be necessary.  This form of “exclusivity” 
would be sufficient to satisfy the mutuality and consideration doctrines 
because the buyer would be obligated to buy a specific percentage of any 
needs it had for the product from the seller.  The definiteness 
requirement would also be met because courts could determine the 
existence of a breach and an appropriate remedy by reviewing evidence 
of the buyer’s total purchases of the goods to see whether the buyer 
purchased the requisite percentage from the seller. 
Another difficulty with using good faith as a validation device is that 
if the contract does not contain a quantity estimate, and there is no 
evidence of “normal” quantities, the courts have no device for 
ascertaining quantity.  This issue arose in Orchard Group, Inc. v. Konica 
Medical Corp.,222 a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
where the court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff-buyer.  The buyer 
was a new company with no history of purchases from the seller or any 
other suppliers.  The purported requirements agreement did not include 
an estimate of the buyer’s requirements or a promise that the buyer 
would purchase its requirements exclusively from the seller.  Instead, it 
described the discount and rebates available for certain products and 
                                                 
220 Id. at *7. 
221 Although the issue in this case was a breach, rather than the formation of a contract, 
the parties in Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d 471, 
473 (3d Cir. 1942), entered into requirements contracts whereby the buyer agreed to 
purchase not less than seventy-five percent of its requirements of glass containers from the 
seller, and estimated that its requirements would not exceed 800 carloads a year.  Id.  
Similarly, in HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 79 (3d Cir. 1966), the buyer 
agreed to purchase seventy-five percent of its salad dressing requirements from the seller, 
and a cap was placed on the buyer’s requirements of 5,000 gallons per day.  Id. 
222 135 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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stated that the seller was “pleased to offer these terms in return for a film 
commitment of 36 mos.”223  Based on the reference in section 2-306(1) to 
quantities that are unreasonably disproportionate to a “stated estimate,” 
the court in Orchard Group concluded that the agreement “fails as a 
requirements contract because it lacks a specific quantity term—estimate 
or otherwise—and there is no prior course of dealings from which a 
quantity term could be implied.”224  The court also rejected the argument 
that under Official Comment 2 the buyer’s duty of good faith in 
maintaining requirements that approximate a reasonably foreseeable 
figure was sufficient to satisfy the quantity term, concluding that 
without an identifiable quantity term, an exclusive relationship must 
exist.225 
The facts of Orchard Group set up Professor Blair’s thesis nicely 
because the parties’ agreement reflected their intent to reach a bargain 
for the buyer’s “film commitment of 36 months” in exchange for the 
seller’s discounted pricing terms, but the agreement did not contain 
language showing that the buyer committed to purchasing any 
ascertainable quantity of goods.  What the court sensibly held under 
these circumstances was that even if the parties intend to enter into a 
binding supply agreement, and exchange promises to do so, if they do 
not provide the courts with any method for ascertaining the quantity of 
goods that they have agreed to buy and sell, they cannot expect the 
courts to enforce their agreement.  The situation calls to mind Judge 
Posner’s comments on the doctrine of definiteness in Goldstick v. ICM 
Realty: 
If people want courts to enforce their contracts[,] they 
have to take the time to fix the terms with reasonable 
definiteness so that the courts are not put to an undue 
burden of figuring out what the parties would have 
agreed to had they completed their negotiations.  The 
parties have the comparative advantage over the court 
in deciding on what terms a voluntary transaction is 
value-maximizing; that is a premise of a free-enterprise 
system.226 
                                                 
223 Id. at 423. 
224 Id. at 428. 
225 Id.  Along these lines, the court distinguished the City of Louisville decision on the 
grounds that it dealt with a non-exclusive requirements agreement that contained a specific 
numeric quantity term.  Id. 
226 788 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1986). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/1
2009] Enforcing Open Quantity Contracts 931 
The Third Circuit appears to have recognized the importance of 
preserving the exclusivity rule to satisfy the doctrines of definiteness and 
mutuality, even while finding the rule unnecessary for statute of frauds 
purposes.  In Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.,227 the parties’ 
distribution agreement provided that “Unisys desires to purchase, and 
Advent desires to sell, on a non-exclusive basis, certain of Advent 
hardware products and software licenses for resale worldwide[,]” and 
later included a mutual obligation of sale and purchase provision 
whereby, “Advent agrees to sell hardware and license software to 
Unisys, and Unisys agrees to buy from Advent the products listed in 
Schedule A.”228  The seller was free to sell to other distributors, and the 
buyer could purchase competing products, but the buyer was required 
to purchase its requirements of the products described in the contract 
exclusively from the seller, as the sole supplier of these products.229  
Thus, the agreement was sufficiently “exclusive” to satisfy courts that 
have required exclusivity as a condition for enforcing requirements 
contracts, but it was not an “exclusive dealing” arrangement within the 
meaning of section 2-306(2). 
The Third Circuit was correct in Advent in finding that the statute of 
frauds was satisfied, but Advent has caused considerable confusion by 
holding that “non-exclusive” requirements contracts automatically 
satisfy the statute of frauds because in Advent the contract at issue was 
exclusive under the exclusivity rule required for validation.  The Fifth 
Circuit has declined to follow the Third Circuit’s holding in Advent that, 
as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, “a specific quantity term is not needed 
to satisfy the statute of frauds in a non-exclusive requirements 
contract[,]” and instead applies section 2-201 to require a writing 
indicating that the quantity term is defined by the buyer’s requirements 
or up to a specified quantity.230 
Although the Fifth Circuit in Advent was willing to go along with 
Professor Bruckel’s recommendation to apply good faith as a substitute 
                                                 
227 925 F.2d 670, 671, 678 (3d Cir. 1991). 
228 Id. at 674. 
229 The only suggestion in the facts of Advent that this may not have been a completely 
exclusive distribution contract is that the hardware products and software licenses that 
were the subject of the distribution agreement were developed by Advent as part of a new 
proprietary electronic document management system, so that the “products listed on 
Schedule A” of the agreement may have been described as Advent trademarked products.  
If so, the case would be comparable to Trimed, Inc. v. Sherwood Medical Co., 772 F. Supp. 879, 
886 (D. Md. 1991), where the exclusivity was limited to a particular brand name product 
and the buyer was free to purchase similar products from the seller’s competitors.  The 
definiteness problem is still solved by the limited exclusivity inherent in the buyer’s 
promise to purchase all of the seller’s brand name products only from the seller. 
230 See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Medallion Co., 31 Fed. Appx. 159 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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for exclusivity in dealing with the statute of frauds defense,231 the court 
was unwilling to extend the theory to the formation defense of 
indefiniteness under section 2-204.  The court explained that “unlike the 
statute of frauds issue discussed earlier, the definiteness required to 
provide a remedy rests on a very solid foundation of practicality.  A 
remedy may not be based on speculation and an award cannot be made 
if there is no basis for determining if a breach has occurred.”232  In this 
case, Unisys underwent a restructuring, in the midst of which it decided 
to develop its own document system, and terminated the distribution 
agreement with Advent.233  The court noted that Unisys could stop 
devoting resources to the project, and therefore eliminate its 
requirements for Advent’s products, without necessarily breaching its 
duty of good faith.  The court therefore remanded the case, commenting 
that “[w]hether Advent can establish the definiteness required to sustain 
a remedy is a serious question.”234 
Other courts have also shied away from the full implications of 
jettisoning the exclusivity rule in favor of the good faith standard, 
retaining the need for either an explicit or implicit promise that the buyer 
will purchase either its actual requirements, the stated estimate of its 
requirements, or quantities within a reasonable variation of the estimate.  
In Cyril Bath Co. v. Winters Industries,235 the Sixth Circuit recognized that 
a requirements contract could be upheld under the Ohio version of UCC 
section 2-306(1),236 either because the buyer made an implied promise to 
purchase the goods exclusively from the seller or on the alternative 
ground that the buyer made an explicit promise to purchase a portion of 
                                                 
231 Advent, 925 F.2d. at 679 (citing Bruckel, supra note 4, at 171).  It is important to note 
here that other circuits have interpreted the statute of frauds and UCC section 2-201(1) to 
require more than just written evidence that the parties intended to enter into an agreement 
that had some quantity term, even if that quantity term may be too indefinite for 
enforcement, and enforced the language in section 2-201(1) that “the contract is not 
enforceable under this subsection beyond the quantity of goods shown in the record.”  Id.  
In Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 749 (2d Cir. 1998), the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed summary judgment and held that the 
statute of frauds under UCC section 2-201 was satisfied by a writing stating a requirements 
range because the agreement could be enforced for the minimum quantity stated.  Id. 
232 Advent, 925 F.2d at 679. 
233 Id. at 672. 
234 Id. at 680. 
235 892 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1989).  See also Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 
451, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the argument that the Official Comment to UCC 
section 2-306 displaces Ohio law on the doctrine of mutuality by expressly stating that 
requirements contracts have mutuality, and holding that “the provision for ‘good faith’ in 
§ 28-2-306 cannot stretch the statute to make such a one-sided [non-exclusive] executory 
agreement enforceable[]”). 
236 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.19(A) (West 2001). 
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its requirements from the supplier, up to a specified figure, subject to 
good faith variation in the buyer's requirements.  In Cyril, the seller’s 
revised quotation specifically stated that the prices “are based on a three 
year program with annual production requirements” of 800,000 tubes in 
each of the first two years and 400,000 tubes in the third year.237  In 
response, the buyer sent a confirming purchase order calling for a 
delivery date of March 1984, “As Released.”  Noting its holding in City of 
Louisville,238 the court found that the buyer in this case was explicitly 
obligated under the agreement to purchase its tubes from the seller, “at 
least up to the number specified, subject to good faith variation in the 
buyer’s requirements.”239  Since the seller’s prices were specifically based 
on the stated requirements, and the buyer accepted those prices in its 
purchase order, the court could also have chosen to protect the seller’s 
expectation interests by holding that the buyer had entered into a 
contract for at least the minimum of the stated requirements necessary to 
receive the price discount.240 
V.  IDENTIFYING ENFORCEABLE OPEN QUANTITY CONTRACTS  
Although the exclusivity rule is preferable to the implied duty  of 
good faith as a validation tool for open quantity contracts, courts have 
not succeeded in using the rule to achieve predictable or even-handed 
results.  Part of the difficulty arises from the propensity of many courts 
to interpret purported open quantity contracts as if there are only two 
possibilities:  either the document is an enforceable output or 
requirements contract, or it is not an enforceable contract and is 
therefore, from the court’s perspective, meaningless.  But the contested 
document could also be a price list, a proposal, a response to a request 
for proposals, a letter of intent, a buyer’s option or “[f]irm [o]ffer[]” 
under UCC section 2-205, or a blanket purchase order or master 
purchase agreement that merely sets out the terms of the parties’ future 
dealings and disclaims any liability of the seller for the purchase of 
goods.  Because courts fail to consider the breadth of non-contractual 
business documents that may exist, and the utility of these documents, 
they often strain to interpret them as contracts. 
Even among the two options courts tend to focus on, the chances are 
much greater than courts seem willing to acknowledge that business 
people will engage in prolonged negotiations that do not result in 
                                                 
237 Cyril, 892 F.2d at 466. 
238 482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1973). 
239 Cyril, 892 F.2d at 467. 
240 See Detroit Radiant Prods. Co. v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., 473 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
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binding agreements.  While there is an enormous practical and legal 
difference between the two scenarios, the documentation is often 
remarkably similar for:  Case (1) the “we’ll give you the business” deal, 
meaning that we will start ordering from you rather than your 
competitors under these terms and will continue ordering from you until 
we become dissatisfied or find a better deal elsewhere; and Case (2) the 
contract under which, “we promise to give you the business and to be 
liable for breach if we go to a competitor for the duration of our 
contract.”  Given the size and market significance of the buyer, a seller 
may find the first option very appealing, despite the fact that it does not 
represent a binding contract.241  The trick for the seller is to ensure he 
does not unwittingly enter into a binding requirements contract at overly 
favorable pricing terms. 
In some jurisdictions, courts will find an implied promise by the 
buyer to purchase its requirements exclusively from the seller based on 
the thinnest of evidentiary grounds (such as the parties’ history of 
exclusive dealing that could be explained as easily by voluntary rather 
than contractually mandated motives),242 or will squeeze every possible 
ambiguity out of the parties’ agreement to send the issue of 
enforceability to the jury for consideration based on parol evidence243 
and reject statute of frauds defenses on any mention of quantity in a 
writing, no matter how imprecise or uncertain.244  Other courts will take 
a firmer stance, insisting on some indication in writing that the buyer 
actually committed itself to purchase at least an identifiable portion of its 
                                                 
241 See infra text accompanying notes 295–98 (discussing Tingstol Co. v. Rainbow Sales, Inc. 
218 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
242 See Universal Power Sys., Inc. v. Godfather’s Pizza, Inc., 818 F.2d 667, 670–71 (8th Cir. 
1987); Kan. Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N. Ry. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 788–89 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
243 See Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 817–18 (7th Cir. 
1999); Cryovac Inc. v. Pechiney Plastic Packaging, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 346, 360 (D. Del. 
2006). 
244 For example, in Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group, 164 F.3d 736, 748–49 (2d Cir. 
1998), the court held that the statute of frauds was satisfied by a letter claiming to serve as 
an agreement for plastic bottles that included the price and estimated the buyer’s needs 
from one-half to a million cases of bottles but did not contain any indication that the buyer 
had agreed to purchase all or an ascertainable portion of its requirements from the seller.  
The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to present a material issue of fact on 
validity, based largely on the possibility that the letter’s reference to an estimated range of 
the buyer’s possible product needs could be interpreted as an agreement to purchase a 
minimum of 500,000 cases.  Id. at 749.  See also Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 795 
(4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the term “direct basis” was insufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds for an alleged requirements contract, but holding that plaintiff’s claim failed not 
because the writing contained no reference to the buyer’s requirements, but because “there 
is a lack of something, anything, in the writing that might evidence the quantity dimension 
of Kline’s claim[]”). 
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requirements from the seller, and on some basis for awarding a 
remedy.245  These discrepancies obviously frustrate one of the principal 
purposes of the UCC, which, as section 1-103(a)(3) indicates, is to make 
the law uniform among the various jurisdictions, thereby providing 
greater certainty to transactions conducted by parties located in multiple 
states. 
This discussion of the methods of interpretation courts are using to 
identify valid open quantity contracts will focus on five areas where 
flawed methods are leading to inconsistent results.  The first deals with 
the rule that a promise from the buyer to purchase its requirements 
exclusively from the seller can be implied based on the seller’s promise 
to sell the buyer its requirements.  The second discusses cases in which 
courts base the buyer’s promise of exclusivity on an expression of intent 
that would not, under other circumstances, constitute a binding 
agreement.  The third section covers cases involving agreements that 
expressly state that the buyer has no obligation to purchase goods until it 
issues individual orders to the seller and the seller accepts them.  The 
fourth section discusses cases concerning agreements offering volume 
discounts with no express promise by the buyer to purchase its 
requirements from the seller, and the fifth analyzes cases involving 
opportunistic contracting behavior by buyers. 
My goal will be to determine whether courts’ assumptions are 
justifiable based on current law, whether their methods achieve the 
correct balance between the need for predictable results,  on the one 
hand, and the need for equity in particular circumstances, on the other, 
and whether these methods permit parties, especially buyers, to 
speculate on litigation outcomes.  I suggest that a better methodology for 
                                                 
245 See Propulsion Techs., Inc. v. Attwood Corp., 369 F.3d 896, 904 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that a purported requirements contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds 
because there was no writing to support the testimony of an agreement to exclusivity); FFP 
Mktg. Co. v. Medallion Co., 31 Fed. Appx. 159 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary 
judgment dismissing breach of alleged requirements contract under the statute of frauds 
because there was no writing indicating the quantity was the buyer’s requirements); 
Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 963 (5th Cir. 1999) (“While the 
quantity term in requirements contracts need not be numerically stated, there must be 
some writing which indicates that the quantity to be delivered under the contract is a 
party’s requirements or output.”); Zayre Corp. v. S.M. & R. Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 
1989) (affirming summary judgment under UCC section 2-306(1) that letter agreements 
were unenforceable under the statute of frauds where there was no express or implied 
written promise by the buyer to purchase its requirements exclusively from the seller); 
Robart Mfg. Co. v. Loctite Corp., 1986 WL 893, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1986) (“To meet the 
statute's [statute of fraud’s] prerequisites, therefore, requirements contracts must state that 
it is a requirements contract or that the quantity will be defined by the buyer’s needs or 
contain similar language.”); Cardiovascular Servs., Inc. v. W. Houston Health Care Group, 
Inc., No. 01-94-01075, 1995 WL 523615, at *6 (Tex. App.  Sept. 7, 1995)) (same). 
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deciding these cases would be to place the risk on the party who could 
most easily have allocated that risk through proper drafting, assuming 
the courts would enforce the contract language, rather than replace their 
allocation with a distribution based on the good faith rule.  In most cases, 
this will mean that to create an enforceable requirements contract, the 
duty should be placed on the buyer to expressly state, in either the 
supply agreement or its individual purchase order or release, that it has 
promised to purchase all or an ascertainable portion of its requirements 
from the seller and the seller has promised to supply those goods to the 
buyer.  For “battle of the forms” transactions, the buyer’s purchase 
orders should expressly limit acceptance to these terms.246 
A. Implied Promises of Exclusivity and Buyer’s Options   
The buyer’s promise of “exclusivity” may be either express or 
implied.247  Courts will generally find that the buyer has made an 
implied promise to purchase all of its requirements from the seller in 
situations where, (1) the contract is an exclusive dealing agreement 
involving goods that are available only from the seller;248 (2) the contract 
contains language that for some other reason suggests that it is a “sole-
source” contract;249 and (3) the contract includes an express promise by 
the seller to supply all of the buyer’s requirements and there is evidence 
                                                 
246 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) cmt. 3. 
247 See, e.g., Essco Geometric v. Harvard Ind., 46 F.3d 718, 728 (8th Cir. 1995); O.N. Jonas 
Co. v. Badische Corp., 46 F.3d 718, 728–29 (11th Cir. 1983). 
248 See Famous Brands, Inc. v. David Sherman Corp., 814 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(enforcing a requirements contract based on an implied promise to buy under the terms of 
the contract, which consisted of an exclusive dealership arrangement, under which a liquor 
bottler gave exclusive distribution rights within a state for a brand of liquor to a 
wholesaler); O.N. Jonas, 706 F.2d at 1161 (holding that an implied promise that the seller 
would be the buyer’s exclusive supplier could be found where the buyer would be 
purchasing the seller's  yarn pursuant to a trademark licensing agreement and the seller 
stated in a memorandum that the seller would supply the yarn for the program if certain 
conditions were met); Brewster Wallcovering Co., 864 N.E.2d at 533 n.37 (holding that an oral 
distribution agreement giving the buyer the exclusive right to sell the supplier’s wallpaper 
brands in certain mid-Atlantic states was enforceable as a requirements contract without an 
express quantity term or promise of exclusivity). 
249 In Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1975), the court implied a 
buyer’s promise to purchase propane exclusively from the seller from a contract provision 
requiring the plaintiff to attach all of its distribution facilities to the seller’s header piping to 
obtain its supply of propane.  See also Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Steak 'N Shake, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 
1149 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that a factual question existed as to whether the parties had 
created a requirements contract sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds where exclusivity 
could be implied from language in the contract indicating that the buyer, a restaurant 
chain, would undergo a “transition” from its current soft drink supplier to Pepsi-Cola and 
that it could add additional Pepsi-Cola products). 
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that the parties intended to be bound.250  The reasons for implying a 
promise of exclusivity in the first two cases are evident, but in the third 
case the inference is not justified because a binding promise by the seller 
to provide the buyer with its requirements may be a buyer’s option 
rather than a requirements contract, as demonstrated in In re Modern 
Dairy of Champaign, Inc. 251 
In Modern Dairy,252 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed a summary judgment ruling for two school districts seeking to 
recover damages for breach of requirements contracts that specified they 
had to purchase milk from a dairy that had fallen into bankruptcy.  None 
of the contract documents included any express agreement by the dairy 
to supply the districts with their milk requirements.  The court held that 
the seller’s obligation could be implied if the contracts required the 
districts to purchase their requirements exclusively from the dairy.253  
When the court reviewed the evidence, however, it found that the 
premise for this inference was missing, concluding, “So far as the 
contractual documents are concerned, all there is is the dairy’s 
agreement to sell milk to the districts at a specified price that it cannot 
raise during the school year:  in other words, a buyer’s option.”254  As 
options, the contracts were unenforceable because section 2-205 puts a 
three-month time limit on firm offers unsupported by consideration, and 
the common law, though lacking a deadline, also requires 
consideration.255  Because neither the intrinsic nor the extrinsic evidence 
provided a reasonable factfinder with a basis to infer either that the 
                                                 
250 Propane Indus., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 429 F. Supp. 214, 219 (W.D. Mo. 1977) 
(“In construing a contract in which only the seller has agreed to sell, a court may find an 
implied reciprocal promise on the part of the buyer to purchase exclusively from the seller, 
at least when it is apparent that a binding contract was intended.” (citing City of Holton v. 
Kan. Power & Light Co., 9 P.2d 675, 679 (Kan. 1932)); Hutchinson Gas & Fuel Co. v. Wichita 
Natural Gas Co., 267 F. 35, 39 (8th Cir. 1920); Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kan. City Bolt & Nut 
Co., 114 F. 77, 81 (8th Cir. 1902).  See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F. Supp. 
723, 728 (M.D. Ga. 1942) (“In a requirements contract, an agreement by the seller to sell 
imports an agreement by the buyer to buy.”). But cf. Brem-Rock, Inc. v. Warnack, 624 P.2d 
220 (Wash. App. Ct. 1981) (finding an implied agreement by the buyer to purchase all of its 
good faith requirements from the seller in an agreement that gave the buyer the exclusive 
right to purchase gravel from the seller’s gravel pit, although the seller could sell to others 
with the buyer’s consent). 
251 171 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 1999). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 1108 (“The contracts do not expressly obligate the dairy to supply the districts 
with their requirements for milk.  But such an obligation can be implicit as well as express, 
and the inference would be compelling if the contracts forbade the districts to turn 
elsewhere for milk.” (citation omitted)). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 1109–10. 
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districts made the required promise of exclusivity or that the option was 
supported by consideration, the court reversed, finding that the districts 
“lose.”256 
What is interesting in Modern Dairy, for our purposes, is Judge 
Posner’s analysis of why it would be appropriate to infer a seller’s 
promise to sell from a buyer’s promise to purchase, juxtaposed with his 
recognition of a buyer’s option in that case.  He explains, 
A buyer would be unlikely to commit to take all his 
requirements for some good from the seller if the seller 
had no reciprocal obligation to supply those 
requirements . . .  Contract law, in inferring an obligation 
to sell in these circumstances, would be performing its 
frequent office of interpolating a contractual term to 
which the parties would almost certainly have agreed 
expressly had they thought about the matter.257 
The same logic would apply to the statement that, “a seller would be 
unlikely to commit to sell to the buyer all of its requirements if the buyer 
had no reciprocal obligation to buy those requirements.”  The reason this 
inference is not equally valid as a legal matter is that a seller can commit 
to sell the buyer all of its requirements without expecting a reciprocal 
promise from the buyer to purchase them if the seller is making a 
buyer’s option or firm offer under section 2-205.  Because this alternative 
is more than theoretically possible,258 courts should not infer the 
obligation of the buyer to purchase based on the seller’s obligation to 
sell.  Thus, the existence of the buyer’s option supports rejecting the rule, 
articulated in Propane Industrial, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., that “[i]n 
construing a contract in which only the seller has agreed to sell, a court 
                                                 
256 Id. at 1110. The Modern Dairy decision was followed in this respect by the Third Circuit 
in Masda Corp. v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 69 Fed. Appx. 85 (3d Cir. 2003), where the court 
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that “the evidence 
purporting to establish a requirements contract does so neither explicitly nor by 
implication and therefore could present no genuine, material issue to a factfinder.” 
257 Modern Dairy, 171 F.3d 1108. 
258 See McCallon, supra note 4, at 733 n.191 (“A requirements-type contract wherein a 
buyer/offeree purports to provide consideration beyond its promise to buy goods, 
however, is scarce at best.”) (footnote omitted).  Such consideration was provided by the 
buyer in Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Products, Inc., 164 F.3d 957 (5th Cir. 1999), where the 
buyer claimed the contract reciting consideration of $10 paid to guarantee a price for five 
years was a requirements agreement.  The court found it was an options agreement, which 
was void under the Code’s  statute of frauds for lack of a written quantity term.  Id.  “To be 
binding, an option contract must:  (1) be signed by the offeror; (2) recite a purported 
consideration for making the offer; and (3) propose an exchange on fair terms within a 
reasonable time.”  Id. at 964 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 87 (1979)). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/1
2009] Enforcing Open Quantity Contracts 939 
may find an implied reciprocal promise on the part of the buyer to 
purchase exclusively from the seller, at least when it is apparent that a 
binding contract was intended.”259  Because a buyer’s option can be a 
binding contract if consideration is provided, or even if consideration is 
not provided, for three months,260 such an inference is unfounded. 
Several years after Modern Dairy, the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
issued a decision that applied the Propane Industrial inference to enforce 
as a requirements contract a document that the Modern Dairy court 
would have considered to be a buyer’s option.  In G.B. “Boots” Smith 
Corp. v. R. Cobb, Jr.,261 the contract provided that the seller would sell the 
buyer “all fill dirt” for a specific road construction project, specified the 
price per cubic yard, and gave an estimate of the quantity that would be 
needed.262  The buyer purchased some of its requirements from the 
seller, but also purchased fill dirt for the project from one of the seller’s 
competitors.  In affirming the trial court’s finding that the contract 
implied a promise of exclusivity, the court relied on Propane Industrial, 
and found that “[w]hile the contract does not contain the phrase ‘buyers 
agree to buy all fill dirt for the Project,’ there would be no reason to 
include the wording ‘all fill dirt for [the] project’ unless Smith intended 
to buy all the fill dirt needed for the project from these particular 
sellers.”263  The court did not consider the possibility that a seller’s 
promise to supply the buyer with its requirements at a particular price 
was also consistent with the creation of a buyer’s option, even when the 
buyer’s course of performance indicated that this is how he interpreted 
the parties’ agreement. 
The rule that a buyer’s promise to purchase his requirements 
exclusively from the seller may be inferred from the seller’s promise to 
supply the buyer with all of his requirements is unsound, is 
inconsistently applied,264 and should therefore be given the prompt 
burial it deserves. 
                                                 
259 Propane Indus., 429 F. Supp. at 219 (citing City of Holton, 9 P.2d at 679) (emphasis 
omitted); Hutchinson Gas, 267 F. at 39; Cold Blast, 114 F. at 81. 
260 U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004). 
261 860 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 2003). 
262  Id. at 776. 
263 Id. at 777–78. 
264 The court properly refused to find an implied obligation to purchase on the part of the 
buyer from an express obligation on the part of the seller to sell the buyer all of its 
requirements in Seaside Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Steve E. Rawl, Inc., 339 S.E.2d 601(Ga. App. Ct. 
1985).  The court declined to find an implied obligation on the part of a gasoline dealer to 
buy all of his requirements for gasoline from the seller where the parties’ agreement was 
silent on this point.  The parties’ contract stated that the seller, a wholesaler of a particular 
brand of gasoline, would sell and deliver the buyer’s requirements of the stated brand of 
gasoline for a 10-year period but said nothing about a corresponding promise to purchase 
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B. Letters of Intent 
Courts have also issued inconsistent decisions based on whether to 
enforce the rule that, as with fixed quantity contracts, statement of future 
intent are insufficient to create a binding contract.   Some courts rely on 
contract language that expresses the buyer’s future intent to purchase its 
requirements from the seller, rather than on any evidence that the buyer 
has actually agreed to purchase its requirements from the seller, even 
though the same language would be rejected if viewed in a preliminary 
agreement or agreement to agree context.  In PMC,265 for example, the 
court enforced a requirements contract based on a document which 
began as a draft letter of intent from PMC to Houston with a cover sheet 
explaining that it was “‘an intent to purchase’ that in no way locks 
[Houston] into purchases from PMC but merely indicates an intent.”266  
Houston’s president had the letter of intent to purchase letter retyped, 
and added some details, but was meticulous in avoiding any language 
indicating that he was making a commitment to buy.  He consistently 
used words of intent, not agreement, writing that, Houston “expects” to 
purchase, it is Houston’s “intent” to purchase, and Houston is 
“projecting future . . . business” at certain levels.267 
Similarly, in Universal Power Systems, Inc. v. Godfather’s Pizza, Inc.,268 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the buyer’s argument 
that the parties’ letter agreement was unenforceable as a requirements 
contract because it did not state that the buyer promised that the seller 
would be its exclusive supplier for the goods at issue (deep-dish pizza 
                                                                                                             
on the part of the buyer.  After the buyer began purchasing a different brand of gasoline 
and notified the seller that it would not require any further goods and services from the 
seller, the seller brought suit, claiming that there was an unexpressed obligation on the part 
of the buyer to buy all of his requirements of gasoline and not just his requirements of the 
stated brand from the seller.  The court found that not only was there no obligation on the 
buyer’s part to buy all gasoline from the seller, but there was not even an obligation to buy 
the named brand of gasoline.  Since there was likewise no promise to sell only the seller's 
particular brand of gasoline in the contract, the court found that the buyer had made no 
agreement to purchase any products from the seller and had properly been found not to be 
in breach of the contract.  Id.  See also Dedoes Indus., Inc. v. Target Steel, Inc., 2005 WL 
1224700 (Mich. App. May 24, 2005) (holding that a three-year price guarantee indicating 
that the defendant would satisfy the plaintiff’s steel needs, where the parties had done 
business for 18 months, was unenforceable because it did not contain a quantity term); 
Acemco, Inc. v. Ryerson-Tull Coil Processing, 2008 WL 140982 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 
2008).  Contra Hutchinson Gas, 267 F. at 39; Cold Blast, 114 F. at 81; Propane Indus., 429 F. 
Supp. at 219; City of Holton, 9 P.2d at 679; Brem-Rock, Inc. v. Warnack, 624 P.2d 220 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1981). 
265 PMC Corp. v. Houston Wire & Cable Co., 797 A.2d 125 (N.H. 2002). 
266 Id. at 127. 
267 Id. 
268 818 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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pans), but only its “intention” to use the seller as a supplier.  The court 
relied on the fact that the seller had been the buyer’s sole supplier for the 
goods for the last three and a half years as evidence of the buyer’s intent 
to be bound,269 and the contract’s use of the words “confirm” and 
“intention” to show the buyer’s intent to purchase the pans.  The court 
did not address the evidence that the contract was also contingent on 
two factors, both of which were mentioned in the letter agreement:  final 
approval of the deep dish pizza concept, and acceptance of the seller’s 
products by the non-company owned franchises.270 
Faced with similar “letters of intent” that did not contain an 
agreement from the buyer to purchase all or any portion of its 
requirements from the seller, but only a statement of its “intention to 
purchase” the goods described, the court in Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp.,271 
properly concluded that the letters were not binding contracts.272  
Similarly, in Acemco, Inc. v. Ryerson-Tull Coil Processing,273 the Michigan 
Court of Appeals awarded summary judgment for the defendant-seller 
where the parties’ supply agreement provided that  
the Seller agrees to sell to the Buyer and the Buyer 
agrees to buy from the Seller such quantities of the 
Products as the Buyer may specify in its purchase orders, 
the estimated volume of which will be a total of 
33,950,000 pounds for all of the Products, plus or minus 
20%, over the term of the Agreement.274   
Even if the validation mechanism is modified to cover all agreements 
that provide a method for determining an ascertainable quantity, the 
courts should still be consistent in distinguishing between enforceable 
agreements to purchase goods and unenforceable statements of intention 
to reach an agreement in the future. 
                                                 
269 Id. at 669. 
270 Id. at 671. 
271 863 N.E.2d 503, 507–08 & n.3 (Mass. 2007). 
272 Id. at 513 (citations omitted).  See also Quality Croutons, Inc. v. George Weston 
Bakeries, Inc., 2008 WL 373181 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that a letter of intent stating 
that the seller would “confirm” the buyer’s “intention” to enter into a contract whereby the 
seller would be the buyer’s exclusive supplier for three years, was unenforceable, where 
the letter of intent contained a provision indicating that parties would not be bound unless 
they entered into a written agreement, despite evidence that the buyer proceeded to 
purchase exclusively from seller under purchase orders for the next year and a half). 
273 2008 WL 140982 (Mich. App. Ct. 2008). 
274 Id. (emphasis added). 
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C. Master Purchase Agreements and Blanket Purchase Orders 
Courts fall into at least two camps in their approaches to interpreting 
business documents that contain the general terms and conditions that 
the parties agree will govern their future business transactions.  These 
documents are often known as “Blanket Purchase Orders” or “Master 
Purchase Agreements,” (referred to collectively as “MPAs”).  These 
documents are often presented on a “take it or leave it basis” by large 
buyers to suppliers, and state expressly that they do not commit the 
buyer to any estimated quantity, and that firm orders are only made 
when purchase orders are submitted.  Their purpose is to set out the 
terms by which the parties will do business, or give authorization for 
expenditures of a maximum amount, as long as signed purchase orders 
are provided, but they do not purport to impose any obligation on the 
buyer to buy any product or on the seller to sell any product.  Once the 
purchase order is issued, the purchase order may incorporate by 
reference the terms and conditions of the MPA. 
In one set of cases, courts enforce the disclaimer of liability in MPAs, 
finding that they are unambiguous in expressing the parties’ intent that 
the buyer has not committed to purchasing its requirements from the 
seller.  In another set of cases, courts interpret the disclaimer as raising 
an ambiguity as to the buyer’s intent, and send the formation issue to the 
jury to decide.  If the MPA does not contain a disclaimer or a promise by 
the buyer to purchase its requirements from the seller, courts will either 
infer a promise by the buyer to purchase its requirements from the seller 
and enter judgment enforcing the MPA as a requirements contract, or 
send the case to the jury for a determination of enforceability. 
An example of decisions from courts that enforce disclaimers of 
liability in MPAs includes James L. Gang & Associates, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc.,275 where the seller offered course of dealing evidence in 
support of its claim that Abbott’s “Purchase Agreement 855” represented 
a commitment, not a mere estimate of its future requirements.  The court 
refused to consider the course of dealing evidence on the grounds that 
the agreement was unambiguous, based on language in the contract 
stating, “‘Seller understands and agrees that Buyer has made no 
guarantee or commitment hereunder to purchase any minimum quantity 
of these Products[,] . . . the quantities of Products actually purchased 
may vary from the estimates listed in Table One[,]’” and that “’firm 
orders shall only be on purchase orders issued hereunder.’”276 The Sixth 
                                                 
275 198 S.W.3d 434, 437–38 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).  See also In re Anchor Glass Container 
Corp., 345 B.R. 765 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
276 James L. Gang, 198 S.W.3d at 437. 
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Circuit also takes this approach, and assumes that when the blanket 
purchase order requires the buyer to submit releases governing supply 
and delivery, the blanket purchase order does not constitute a 
requirements contract, and that the only contracts between the parties 
are the releases that are issued by the buyer and accepted by the seller.277 
In two cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, Brooklyn Bagel Boys,278 
and Keck Garrett & Associates, Inc. v. Nextel Communications, Inc.,279 the 
courts strained to interpret MPAs with disclaimers as enforceable 
agreements, even when they correctly found that these documents could 
not be enforced as requirements contracts.  In Brooklyn Bagel Boys, 
Earthgrains entered into a “Contract Packaging Agreement (the “MPA 
Contract”)” in 1996 with Brooklyn Bagel Boys to supply “ordered 
quantit[ies]” of bagels for Earthgrains’ Fort Payne, Alabama facility 
based on a set price schedule.280  The MPA Contract also provided that 
Earthgrains would supply a non-binding forecast of its orders every 
three months and that either party could terminate the MPA Contract on 
ninety days written notice.281  In 1997, Earthgrains began installing 
equipment to manufacture bagels at its Fort Payne facility.  When the 
installation was complete, Earthgrains gave Brooklyn Bagel Boys notice 
of its intent to terminate the MPA Contract.  Upon termination, Brooklyn 
Bagel Boys sued Earthgrains for breach of contract.  The district court 
granted summary judgment for Earthgrains, finding that the terms of the 
MPA Contract were unambiguous and did not obligate Earthgrains to 
purchase its bagel needs from Brooklyn Bagel Boys.282 
On appeal, Judge Williams held that the MPA Contract was not a 
requirements contract, as a matter of law, because it did not, “expressly 
obligate Earthgrains to purchase all, or any specified quantity, of its 
requirements of bagels for the Fort Payne facility from Brooklyn 
Bagel.”283  Because the MPA Contract did commit the seller to firm prices 
that could only be changed at six month intervals, the court held that it 
was enforceable under UCC section 2-205, as a buyer’s option, which “is 
enforceable even though Earthgrains made no reciprocal commitment to 
                                                 
277 See Urban Assocs., Inc. v. Standex Elec., Inc., 216 Fed. Appx. 495, 496 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Advanced Plastics Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., No. 93-2155, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1047 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995); Precision Rubber Prods. Corp. v. George McCarthy, Inc., 872 
F.2d 187, 189 (6th Cir. 1989); Harris Thomas Indus., Inc. v. ZF Lemforder Corp., 2007 WL 
3071676 at *5 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
278 212 F.3d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 2000). 
279 517 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2008). 
280 Brooklyn Bagel Boys, 212 F.3d at 375–76. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 376–77. 
283 Id. at 378. 
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buy all of its bagel needs from Brooklyn Bagel.”284  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on an incomplete quotation from Modern 
Dairy, stating that “‘[a] seller’s firm offer to supply the buyer’s needs for 
some good at a specified price and other terms is enforceable . . . even 
though the buyer makes no reciprocal commitment to buy all its needs 
from [the] seller . . . [.]’”  The complete version of the quote adds, “[B]ut 
unless the offer is supported by consideration, it is revocable after three 
months.”285  As in Modern Dairy, Judge Williams should have found that 
the purported requirements contract was unenforceable as a buyer’s 
option because the parties had not identified any additional 
consideration to support extending the buyer’s option beyond the three-
month deadline set forth in section 2-205. 
Rather than finding that the MPA Contract was an enforceable 
buyer’s option, the court should have held that it was not enforceable, 
and did not need to be.  Each order placed by Earthgrains and accepted 
by Brooklyn Bagel Boys when it shipped the goods constituted an 
enforceable contract for the sale of goods, subject to the terms and 
conditions incorporated by reference from the MPA Contract.  The 
district court judge had reached an alternative holding that the parties 
entered into a series of contracts, each of which related back to the 
original MPA Contract, when each order was placed.286  Judge Williams 
noted that this characterization was “consistent with a buyer’s option” 
because the MPA Contract could be viewed as an offer, and each order 
an acceptance.287  But the MPA Contract did not contain a quantity term, 
so an acceptance could not have created an enforceable contract.  Thus, 
the better view is to consider each order as an offer, incorporating the 
terms of the MPA Contract, which was accepted when the goods were 
shipped, as permitted under section 2-206(b). 
In the second case, Keck Garrett,288 Keck, a marketing agency, sued 
Nextel, a telecommunications company, for breach of Nextel’s $1 million 
blanket purchase order.  Nextel issued the blanket purchase order 
during the course of the parties’ discussions concerning a new design 
project that would be undertaken the upcoming year.  The function of 
the blanket purchase order was to authorize Nextel representatives to 
assign work to vendors up to a maximum amount by signing estimates 
of the cost of requested work submitted by the vendors.289  The blanket 
                                                 
284 Id. at 379. 
285 In re Modern Dairy of Champaign Inc., 171 F.3d 1106, 1110 (7th Cir. 1999). 
286 Brooklyn Bagel Boys, 212 F.3d at 379 n.4. 
287 Id. 
288 517 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2008). 
289 Id. at 480. 
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purchase order did not describe any particular projects that would be 
performed and stated that the “Supplier shall be paid upon the 
submission of proper invoices or vouchers, the prices stipulated herein 
for work completed and/or Articles delivered and accepted, less any 
proper deductions or setoffs.”290  Four months later, Nextel informed 
Keck that it would not be using Keck’s services for the project. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the proper 
conclusion on the main issue in Keck Garrett, affirming summary 
judgment for Nextel, based on its finding that the blanket purchase order 
did not guarantee any minimum payments to Keck and “simply 
authorized specific Nextel employees to release funds to Keck Garrett 
against the purchase order, up to a total of $1 million over the course of 
2003.”291  No terms in the blanket purchase agreement required Nextel to 
assign any work to Keck, or required Keck to perform any services for 
Nextel, or prohibited Keck from working for Nextel’s competitors.292 
The court’s doctrinal detour occurred when it responded to Keck’s 
claims that the court’s analysis rendered the contract illusory, and Keck 
would have a claim for quantum meruit if the contract was 
unenforceable.293  Despite having several solid reasons for rejecting 
Keck’s quantum meruit claim, the court made the additional argument 
that the blanket purchase order was enforceable in the sense that it 
would function as a guarantee of payment and as a recitation of 
applicable terms and conditions if Nextel ever assigned any work to 
Keck.294  Neither the purported “guarantee” that Nextel would stand 
behind estimates of work signed by its representatives nor the terms and 
conditions contained set forth in the blanket purchase order would be 
enforceable unless Nextel asked Keck to perform specific services, Keck 
made an offer to perform those services for an estimated price, and 
Nextel’s representative accepted that offer by signing the estimate.  Since 
the court seems to acknowledge as much, its argument that the blanket 
purchase order will have some effect once a contract is created by other 
means is perplexing.  A more appropriate response, given the evidence, 
would have been that as a matter of law Keck was entitled to recover on 
the contract any estimates of work that were submitted by Keck and 
signed by Nextel.  As in Modern Dairy, the MPA did not contain a 
promise from the buyer to purchase any goods or services, and the 
                                                 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 485. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 486.  Keck claimed that it incurred $145,000 in investment-specific costs on the 
project, but the court determined that none of this work had been requested by Nextel or 
had any value to Nextel.  Id. at 484. 
294 Id. at 486. 
Smith: A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quan
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
946 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
subsequent communications and actions between the parties authorized 
the purchase and sale of a specific quantity of goods or services.  One 
would need to read the MPA together with the subsequent documents to 
understand the total agreement, but one would not conclude that the 
MPA was enforceable without these documents. 
The Keck Garrett facts also provide a template for testing the theory 
of commentators who advocate applying the Code’s gap-filling remedies 
to contracts for the sale of services and eliminating the exclusivity rule 
for validation.  Using this approach, the court could have applied 
section 2-306(1) as a gap-filler for the missing quantity term and held 
that the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract for Nextel’s 
new design project up to $1 million at the prices and on the other terms 
and conditions set forth.  Other supporting evidence would include the 
parties’ extensive history of prior dealings, Nextel’s initial oral 
assurances that Keck would secure the contract, and the parties’ lengthy 
negotiations on the new design project.  The language in the blanket 
purchase order that Nextel used to protect itself from such exposure 
would be found ambiguous, in favor of parol evidence, thereby 
encouraging costly litigation and strategic behavior. 
The decision that gets it just right, in keeping true to commercial 
realities, is Tingstol Co. v. Rainbow Sales Inc.295  The supplier’s 
representative in Tingstol described how such “blanket order[s]” are 
used in business:  “[A]s ‘the carrot that [the buyer] waves in front of you.  
‘This is what we think we’re going to use.’  You jump on that.  Business 
is business.’”  When asked whether the blanket order was a 
commitment, the witness answered, “No.  It’s [the buyer’s] way out 
when they want to.” 296  Consistent with this testimony, the blanket order 
expressly limited the buyer’s liability to the parts it scheduled for 
release.297  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit correctly held 
that the blanket order was not a requirements contract, on the one hand, 
because it did not bind the buyer and that also was not a buyer’s option 
because it  was not supported by consideration.298 
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit’s Judge Ripple wrote a decision in Zemco 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.299 that is 
largely irreconcilable with Modern Dairy, which was decided a few 
months before Zemco, and with Judge Williams’ opinion in Brooklyn Bagel 
                                                 
295 218 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2000). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 772. 
298 Id. at 773 (“Because it did not bind UTA and there was no element of exclusivity, the 
blanket order was not a requirements contract.”). 
299 186 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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Boys, which was decided a year after Zemco.  In Zemco, the district court 
had held that the parties’ contract was not a requirements contract, as a 
matter of law, because the buyer had not agreed to purchase all of its 
requirements from the seller.  The contract provided that the buyer 
would purchase “such quantities of the items listed herein as [it] might 
order or schedule[,]” but that “the Buyer shall not be obligated to take 
any goods, the delivery of which has not been specified in such shipping 
schedules[.]”300  Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged this 
language, the court nevertheless found the contract sufficiently 
ambiguous to reverse summary judgment,301 noting that “in the absence 
of any explicit agreement as to quantity, the section of the Code 
authorizing requirements contracts is ‘the primary ‘gap filler’ in the 
Code for quantity terms.’”302  But there are many other forms of 
commonly utilized contracts and business documents that do not contain 
quantity terms, such as price sheets, proposals, buyer’s options, and non-
binding blanket purchase orders, and the express language of the 
contract in Zemco indicated that the buyer was not committing itself to a 
specific quantity.  So why should the court have concluded that there 
was ambiguity concerning whether the parties intended to form a 
requirements contract?  The court’s answer was that the affirmative 
statements and omissions rendered the contract ambiguous in this 
regard,303 but the affirmative statements and omissions could not have 
created an ambiguity in this case.  The omission was a missing quantity 
term, and that term was explained by language stating that the buyer’s 
commitment was limited to quantities the buyer “might order or 
schedule” and by the express statement that the buyer would not be 
obliged to accept any goods that were not “specified in such shipping 
schedules[.]” 
What may actually have been the most persuasive factor in the 
court’s analysis was the parol evidence that Navistar had purchased all 
of its requirements from Zemco for the past twelve years.304  Indeed, the 
court distinguished Modern Dairy on the grounds that the parties in that 
                                                 
300 Id. at 817. 
301 Id.  Finding ambiguity in this language, the court noted that while it could be read to 
give the buyer complete authority over how many goods to purchase, it could also be 
interpreted as an articulation of the manner in which parts would be ordered.  Id.  The 
court also relied on a provision stating that the seller would give the buyer’s orders priority 
under UCC section 2-615, as creating additional ambiguity.  If anything, this provision 
would appear to undercut the concept that the seller was obliged to sell the buyer all its 
requirements, regardless of the orders placed by other customers.  Id. 
302 Id. at 818. 
303 Id. at 817. 
304 Id. 
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case only had a two-month history of exclusive dealing.305  But Navistar 
could just as easily have been a repeat customer because it was satisfied 
with Zemco’s goods and service, and courts have warned against relying 
on a prior course of dealing to establish the existence of a requirements 
contract for this very reason.  When the buyer expressly reserves its 
rights not to be bound to its requirements in the contract, its prior 
dealings should not be sufficient to send the case to a jury. 
Another decision on this side of the divide was issued in 2005 by a 
federal court in Michigan in Metal One.306  In Metal One, the court entered 
summary judgment for the seller enforcing the buyer’s blanket purchase 
order as a requirements contract despite the order’s express disclaimer of 
liability.  The seller, Metal One, was a trading company that sold custom 
steel bars to the defendant, the Center, for resale to Sony for making TV 
frames.307  The Center’s blanket purchase orders provided that the 
volumes stated were estimates and did not constitute a firm 
commitment.308  These estimates indicated the number of steel bars the 
Center predicted it would need for the next few months, but Metal One 
never shipped any steel until it received a “firm release” from the 
Center.309  Because Sony and the Center operated on a “just-in-time” 
inventory system, Metal One had to keep three or four months of the 
custom inventory on hand to satisfy the Center’s needs.  The Center 
protected Metal One’s reliance interest through a cancellation provision 
in the blanket purchase order whereby the Center would reimburse 
Metal One for any goods the Center cancelled before delivery that could 
not be resold.310  The Center’s position was that it had complied with this 
provision by cancelling its latest order, made in a July 30, 2003 firm 
release, within five days.311  The court rejected this argument, holding 
that because the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract, the 
Center was liable for the entire inventory Metal One had procured to fill 
the Center’s needs, and that the Center had breached the contract by 
shutting down its plant due to financial losses.312 
The court’s interpretation of the blanket purchase orders began with 
a citation to General Motors,313 for the proposition that section 2-306 
expresses a legislative intent to enforce non-exclusive as well as exclusive 
                                                 
305 Id. at 817 n.3. 
306 2005 WL 1657128 (W.D. Mich. 2005). 
307 Id. at *1. 
308 Id. at *2 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at *7. 
312 Id. 
313 90 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
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requirements contracts.314  But while the buyer in a non-exclusive 
requirements contract does not have to promise to purchase all of its 
requirements exclusively from the seller, it must still promise to 
purchase some portion of its requirements from the seller, and the court 
does not explain how the blanket purchase orders can be interpreted as 
non-exclusive requirements contracts when they expressly state that 
their estimates are non-binding, and the orders apparently contained no 
references to the buyer’s requirements.   
The court also relied on course of performance evidence that the 
parties had done business using these blanket purchase orders and firm 
releases for a year and a half, during which time the Center was aware 
that Metal One had to keep sufficient inventory on hand, not only of the 
steel bars but also of the hot roll bars used to make them.315  Based 
entirely on Metal One’s reliance interest, the court held that all these 
blanket purchase orders somehow constituted a single requirements 
contract not only for the steel bars, but also for the hot roll bars that were 
held by third-party suppliers for Metal One.316  The court’s reasoning 
appears to be that if Metal One did not protect its reliance interest by 
including the necessary language in the contract documents when the 
deal was struck, then the documents must be interpreted in light of the 
subsequent evidence of Metal One’s reliance to protect that interest.  By 
ignoring the cancellation provision, the court’s approach destroys 
parties’ incentives to bargain for specific risks and rewards.  Metal One 
may well have assumed the risk of losing custom inventory beyond the 
goods covered by the cancellation policy as a condition of obtaining the 
Center’s business.  That was most likely the case because Metal One 
could not have reasonably understood that it would receive cancellation 
damages for its entire inventory, including raw materials for goods the 
Center had not ordered in firm releases, especially where the Center had 
expressly stated that it made no firm commitment for the volume 
estimates in the blanket purchase orders. 
These cases illustrate why it is so important for courts to insist on 
evidence that the buyer has agreed to purchase all or an ascertainable 
portion of its requirements from the seller before concluding that the 
parties have entered into a requirements contract.  A valid requirements 
contract should include an agreement by the purchaser to purchase all or 
an ascertainable portion of its requirements from the seller for the term 
of the contract, thereby providing consideration for the seller to maintain 
its prices and other terms of sale for the duration of the contract.  If the 
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315 Id. *1, *5. 
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buyer has not promised to purchase all or an ascertainable portion of its 
requirements from the seller, but has only provided estimates of its 
needs, and has expressly stated that it will be liable only for released 
quantities, the seller should not be bound to the terms of sale for the 
duration of the contract when it has received no return promise from the 
buyer to purchase all or any ascertainable part of its requirements from 
the seller for the duration of the contract. 
In a document that included both a disclaimer of liability except for 
released quantities and an express promise by the buyer to purchase all 
of its requirements from the seller, one could argue that the disclaimer 
would be inconsistent with the express promise because the disclaimer 
would arguably cover any requirements above those identified in 
specific purchase orders or releases.  As long as the buyer has made an 
express promise to purchase its requirements from the seller, the 
disclaimer should be interpreted to mean that the buyer is liable only for 
the ordered quantity of requirements, rather than for estimated 
quantities.  The disclaimer should not be interpreted to contradict the 
buyer’s express promise by denying liability for the seller’s lost profits 
damages based on the buyer’s requirements through the end of the 
contract term, should the buyer perform an anticipatory breach.  As one 
court put it, albeit under different circumstances, the parties’ purchase 
order contract was “in essence, a ‘requirements’ contract, in which [the 
buyer] was liable to purchase only those quantities of [the product] that 
it actually required in its production operations.”317  Here the court was 
discussing a situation where there was no evidence that the buyer 
promised to purchase its requirements from the seller, and the court’s 
reasoning is unclear.  The conclusion is correct, however, that as between 
estimates and actual orders, the buyer is only liable to pay for its actual 
orders, even in a requirements contract.  As long as the document 
contains language indicating that the buyer has undertaken an obligation 
to purchase its requirements from the seller, a provision stating that the 
buyer is liable not for the forecasted amount, but only for the quantities 
it orders, should not change the classification of the agreement as a 
requirements contract.  But if the document does not reflect the buyer’s 
commitment to purchase its requirements from the seller, and consists 
only of an agreement on the terms that will govern any subsequent 
orders the buyer may make in the future, the agreement should not be 
enforced as a requirements contract. 
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D. Pricing Proposals, Volume Discounts, and Course of Dealing Evidence 
As in Zemco, courts have also placed undue reliance on the parties’ 
history of exclusive dealing to enforce MPAs as requirements contracts, 
where the only mention of quantity in the MPAs is an offer of volume 
discounts and the buyer has not committed to purchasing all or any 
identifiable portion of its requirements from the seller.  In Kansas Power 
& Light Co. v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,318 for example, the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea 
for a declaratory judgment by Kansas Power & Light Co. (“KPL”) to 
enforce a purported requirements agreement with the Burlington 
Northern Railroad (“BN”) to transport coal.  The agreement consisted of 
a letter from the BN stating that it served as “an outline of intent and 
understanding” that BN had regarding movement of coal from a mine to 
KPL’s proposed plant site.319  The letter attached a proposed rate sheet 
that would be filed with the ICC and contained an escalation formula 
that would be applied to these rates.320  After transporting KPL’s coal for 
nine years under the rate sheet, BN applied for and was granted an 
increase by the ICC that raised rates above the list prices, which led to 
the lawsuit.321  Despite the absence of any language in the letter 
indicating that KPL was required to use BN’s services to transport all or 
any part of its coal, the court held that the letter’s incentive pricing 
system based on tonnage provided a sufficient reference to quantity to 
support enforcing the price list as a requirements contract.322 
When BN pointed out that the alleged contract left KPL free to use 
other transportation providers, the court relied on the fact that KPL had 
not explored alternatives until BN raised its price, and on the implied 
promise that the buyer’s requirements must be maintained in good 
faith.323  KPL’s implied promise of good faith was also the answer to 
BN’s argument that under KPL’s long term contract with the coal mine, 
the mine could supply coal from multiple locations which might be 
serviced from a carrier other than BN, so that KPL would have to ship 
                                                 
318 740 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1984). 
319  Id. at 782. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. at 782–83. 
322 Id. at 789–90.  The court also relied on the letter’s provision stating, “In those years 
when KP&L’s coal requirements from Belle Ayr to Delia become less than 2,000,000, 
carriers will seek to amend the tariff to reduce the annual minimum tonnage requirement, 
but not less than 1,500,000 tons, to apply only in KP&L’s cars.”  Id. at 789.  This provision 
could just as plausibly be read to mean that the minimum volume needed to trigger a 
discount will be amended, rather than that KPL must ship that quantity or be in breach of 
the agreement. 
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Smith: A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quan
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
952 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
via a different carrier.324  Since BN might not service these other 
locations, KPL’s “good faith” obligations to maintain its requirements 
would put KPL in a difficult position if KPL’s coal supplier insisted on 
its contractual right of delivering the coal to a location that BN did not 
service.325  In cases like this one, the contract and surrounding 
circumstances are so ambiguous that each party is essentially given an 
option to wait and see how the other behaves, and how the market 
changes, and then take a position on contract formation based on their 
financial interests.326 
Courts have also relied on the parties’ history of exclusive dealings 
combined with an offer of volume discounts to support a requirements 
contract even when that history included the buyer’s practice of 
routinely accepting bids for the business and negotiating for better terms 
from the seller’s competitors.  This was the case in Cryovac Inc. v. 
Pechiney Plastic Packaging, Inc.,327 where Pechiney successfully bid for a 
supply contract with buyer, National Beef, and was sued by the seller, 
Cryovac, for tortious interference with its alleged requirements contract 
with National Beef.  Pechiney moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the alleged agreement between Cryovac and National Beef 
was not an enforceable requirements contract, because it did not contain 
a commitment by National Beef to purchase its requirements, or any 
specific quantity of goods, from Cryovac.328  The court in Cryovac denied 
Pechiney’s motion and sent the issue to the jury, holding that the jury 
would be entitled to find an enforceable agreement based on letter 
agreements listing the minimum quantities National Beef had to 
purchase to receive reductions of the purchase price in the form of 
discounts and rebates.329  In support, the court relied on Zemco, Kansas 
Power and O.N. Jonas330 as cases in which under similar situations, courts 
had found either that a requirements contract did exist or that there were 
                                                 
324 Id. at 789 n.3 
325 The key to the decision is most likely an internal memo from BN referring to the 
alleged letter agreement, which stated, “BN’s revenue in shipper cars for the 30 year term 
of the contract will be $479,250,000.”  Id. at 788.  KPL did not have access to this letter, 
however, and the court failed to identify any other evidence signifying agreement. 
326 See George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1664, 1669 (2006) (presenting the thesis that “indefinite contracts are sometimes created 
because an imprecise term—combined with judicial willingness to fill gaps—can generate 
an embedded option[]”). 
327  430 F. Supp. 2d 346, 359–60 (D. Del. 2006).  I represented the defendant, Pechiney 
Plastic Packaging, Inc. in this matter. 
328  Id. at 354–55. 
329  Id. at 360. 
330 O.N. Jonas Co. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1983). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/1
2009] Enforcing Open Quantity Contracts 953 
material issues of fact sufficient to deny summary judgment.331  But the 
decisions in Zemco and Kansas Power were wrongly decided.  The buyer 
in Zemco unambiguously stated it had not promised to purchase any 
goods from the seller, and the buyer in Kansas Power made no promise to 
purchase its requirements from the seller in response to its price list.  The 
decision in O.N. Jonas was irrelevant because it involved a sole source 
trademarked product where the exclusivity term was properly implied 
from the parties’ agreements, which the court compared to exclusive 
dealership agreements.332 
The court in Cryovac also relied, without explanation, on a provision 
in one of the alleged agreements stating that “‘[i]n the event National 
Beef’s packaging purchases fall short of 2003 minimum volume targets 
due to market conditions other than the use of competitive supply, 
Cryovac will consider the minimum volume target to have been met.’”333  
This language demonstrates that the parties anticipated that National 
Beef’s packaging purchases might fall short of the minimum volume 
“targets” due to the use of “competitive supply,” and that the 
consequence would be that National Beef would forfeit its right to the 
rebates and discounts, not that it would be liable for breach of a 
requirements contract.  Like the decisions issued in Kansas Power, Zemco, 
and Metal One, the decision in Cryovac ignored the parties’ own 
allocations of risk, which, in all these cases, left the seller with the risk as 
to any reliance damages it incurred in preparing to supply estimates 
beyond those the buyer had ordered. 
A different case is presented, however, when a supplier has to incur 
tooling and research and development expenses to offer the buyer a 
discount on specially manufactured goods, and informs the buyer that 
the discount can only be provided if the buyer purchases a minimum 
quantity.  If the buyer accepts such an offer, it has entered into an 
agreement to purchase the minimum quantity required to provide the 
discount, rather than a requirements contract.  In Detroit Radiant Products 
Co. v. BSH Home Appliances Corp.,334 the buyer rejected the seller’s initial 
quote of a range of prices based on the buyer’s estimated usage of 30,000 
custom-made stove burners and asked for a specific quote for 30,000 
units.335  The seller then agreed to a unit price based on 30,000 units, 
indicating that for this volume it would absorb all tooling and R&D 
                                                 
331 Cryovac, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 360. 
332 O.N. Jonas, 706 F.2d at 1165. 
333 Cryovac, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 360. 
334 473 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2007). 
335 Id. at 625. 
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costs.336  The buyer accepted this quote by submitting two purchase 
orders, one for 15,000 units and one for 16,000 units, each at the discount 
price offered for 30,000 units.337  The purchase orders called for 
shipments to be made pursuant to “release schedules[.]”338  Litigation 
ensued when the seller issued a release schedule showing orders 
dwindling down to zero and began buying its burners from another 
company, allegedly as a cost-savings measure.339  The Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that the use of the term “Blanket 
Order[]” for one of the two purchase orders and the existence of an 
unsigned “[s]upplier [a]greement” stating that only the first month’s 
orders were binding did not convert the parties’ initial agreement for a 
minimum fixed quantity order of 30,000 necessary for the seller to 
provide the discount into a requirements contract. 
E. Intentionally Ambiguous Supply Contracts 
Another reason courts should insist upon some modicum of 
evidence of a buyer commitment as a condition for enforcing 
requirements contracts is to avoid the danger that buyers will engage in 
opportunistic conduct by drafting intentionally ambiguous open 
quantity contracts.  Given the confused state of the case law in this area, 
if the market price goes up, the buyer can take advantage of the below 
market contract price by arguing that an MPA is an enforceable 
requirements contract, based on Zemco and Metal One, but if the market 
price goes down, they can avoid the contract and take advantage of the 
low market prices by arguing, based on Brooklyn Bagel Boys and Tingstol, 
that they only agreed to be liable on an individual purchase order basis.  
Three cases that demonstrate this point, Modern Dairy, Zemco, and Kansas 
Power, have already been discussed above.  In all three cases, the buyers 
sued to enforce purported requirements contracts, thereby holding the 
sellers to their quoted sale prices, without any evidence that the buyers 
had promised to purchase their requirements from the sellers. 
Buyers utilizing requirements contracts have been at this game for 
some time, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Willard 
Sutherland & Co. v. United States.340  In Willard, the Navy issued a request 
for bids for all of its requirements of coal at ten different ports or 
stations, including a request for 600,000 tons at Hampton Roads, Virginia 
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at $2.85 per ton.341  The plaintiff submitted a winning bid for 10,000 tons 
of the 600,000 ton total.342  The Navy later advised the plaintiff that its 
requirements had increased by approximately ten percent.343  The 
plaintiff supplied the additional coal to the Navy at the contract price, 
under protest, and then sued to recover the market price, which had 
risen to $6.50.344 
In its decision, the Court relied on language that was included in the 
Navy’s request for bids, and its contract, as follows:   
It shall be distinctly understood and agreed that * * * the 
contractor will furnish any quantity of the coal specified 
(i.e., of the kind and quality specified) that may be 
needed * * * irrespective of the quantities stated, the 
government not being obligated to order any specific 
quantity; * * * and that the stated quantities are estimated 
and are not to be considered as having any bearing upon 
the quantity which the government may order under the 
contract; * * * the right is also reserved to make such 
distribution of tonnage among the different 
bidders * * * as will be considered for the best interests of 
the government.345   
Based on this language, the Court held, “There is nothing in the writing 
which required the government to take, or limited its demand to, any 
ascertainable quantity.  It must be held that, for lack of consideration and 
mutuality, the contract was not enforceable.”346  If the Navy had 
promised to purchase its requirements exclusively from the plaintiff, the 
contract would have been enforceable as a valid requirements contract.  
Alternatively, if the Navy had agreed to purchase a percentage of its 
total requirements from the plaintiff, the indefiniteness issue would have 
been resolved without limiting the Navy to a single supplier.  As it was, 
the Navy could not disclaim any liability for its requirements to any 
contractor in the agreement and still hold the contractor to its bid price 
for all or any portion of its requirements. 
Moving forward over a hundred years, courts dealing with the same 
issue demonstrate less sophistication than the Court in Willard.  In a 2007 
case decided by a federal court in Michigan, Johnson Controls, Inc. v. TRW 
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Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc.,347 Johnson Controls (“JC”) ordered component 
parts for several years from TRW for seat assemblies for two GM vehicle 
platforms under annual purchase orders.  Based on the “just-in-time” 
supply system that has become standard in the automotive industry,348 
the purchase orders contained prices but no quantities.349  The quantities 
ordered were dependent on GM’s production schedule, and would be 
requested, as needed, in material releases submitted to TRW.350  Each 
purchase order expressly incorporated by reference JCs’ “Global Terms 
of Purchase[,]” which was available on the company’s website.351  The 
Global Terms described the purchase order as an offer to purchase that 
was conditioned upon the seller’s acceptance, which allegedly occurred 
when TRW shipped goods in response to material releases.352  Where the 
quantity term in the purchase order was left blank, or provided “see 
release[,]” the Global Terms provided that TRW granted JC an 
irrevocable option for one year, supported by recited consideration of 
$10 and a minimum purchase of at least one part of each of the described 
supplies.353  The releases were not to be considered separate contracts 
but were part of the purchase order and were governed by the Global 
Terms.354  JC would purchase no more than 100% of its requirements of 
the supplies.355 
With its ruling, the court gave JC the upper hand by sending the case 
to the jury rather than interpreting the contract it drafted as a matter of 
law.  As a result, JC was able to advance beyond the summary judgment 
stage of the litigation, often a fatal blow in high-stakes cases, with a 
contract that was essentially a buyer’s option that included the word 
“requirements[.]”356  Noting that a promise to buy exclusively from the 
seller is not required to enforce requirements contracts under Michigan 
law, the court denied summary judgment because questions of fact 
existed as to whether the contract “could be construed as permitting JCI 
to purchase its requirements from TRW for the duration of the purchase 
order.”357  JC would be in breach, according to the court, if it failed to act 
                                                 
347 491 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
348 For an economic analysis of these contracts, see Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, 
Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006). 
349  Johnson Controls, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 709. 
350  Id.  
351  Id. at 710. 
352  Id. 
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in good faith or consistently with commercial standards of fair dealing in 
ordering parts it was “permitted” to order under this contract.358 
Even as articulated by the court, and certainly as drafted by JC, the 
contract was no more than a buyer’s option, which should not have been 
enforced beyond one part for each of the supplies listed.  Agreements 
that “permit” the buyer to purchase goods are at most buyer’s options, 
they are not requirements contracts.  And under the agreement as 
drafted, JC did not obligate itself to purchase more than one part.  Nor 
did JC present any evidence to raise a material issue of fact as to whether 
it promised to purchase all or an ascertainable portion of its 
requirements from TRW.  Without such a promise the buyer has not 
made a reciprocal commitment to purchase goods from the seller, and 
the problems of mutuality, consideration and definiteness remain.  JC 
wrote the contract as a buyer’s option, with enough intentional 
ambiguity to argue that it was a requirements contract, and then 
enforced it as a requirements contract when TRW tried to increase its 
prices to reflect the increased cost of materials.  This type of 
gamesmanship was not tolerated by the Supreme Court in Willard and 
should not be tolerated today. 
An example of how such cases should be handled is provided by 
Penncro Associates, Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.359  In Penncro, Sprint 
retained Penncro to provide collections services, in an arrangement 
whereby calls from Sprint customers would automatically be routed to 
Penncro or to one of two other vendors.360  Their agreement was 
governed by a Master Services Agreement (“MSA”), a Contract Order 
with an Attachment A and an Addendum.361  The MSA contained 
general terms and conditions but did not obligate either party to perform 
and expressly stated that the scope and specific terms of the services to 
be provided were governed by contract orders.362  Under the terms of the 
parties’ three year Contract Order, Penncro would maintain staffing 
levels sufficient to provide Sprint with “80,625 productive hours” per 
month, represented by call center staff available at Sprint’s disposal.363  
Sprint would “pay for 80,625 productive hours per month” at a set 
                                                                                                             
that there was conflicting evidence of whether JC’s contract with its own customer required 
it to buy the product from TRW.  Id.  While relevant, this evidence would not prove 
whether JC promised to purchase its requirements from TRW, an issue the court had 
already determined, in its discussion of exclusivity, was irrelevant.  Id. 
358  Id. at 719. 
359 499 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007). 
360 Id. at 1152.  
361 Id. at 1153. 
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rate.364  Attachment A provided that poor performance for three 
consecutive months could result in reduction of the productive hours by 
twenty percent, and six months of poor performance allowed Sprint to 
terminate the contract.365  The 80,625 hour level was never supplied, 
billed, or paid for, due to problems on both sides, but well before a year 
into the contract, Sprint gave notice of termination under the six-month 
poor performance clause.366  Penncro sued for breach on the grounds that 
its performance did not meet the conditions for termination, and won 
summary judgment on liability.367  Sprint went to trial on damages and 
lost.368 
On appeal, Sprint argued that the contract was ambiguous as to the 
quantity of productive hours for which it was obligated, and that the 
court should consider the extrinsic evidence of the parties’ course of 
performance, which showed that Penncro supplied and accepted 
payment for a much lower number of hours than the 80,624 provided for 
in the contract.369  The court found that the contract order was an 
unambiguous agreement to pay for a set capacity figure, regardless of 
Sprint’s actual use, based in part on Penncro’s agreement to “maintain 
staffing levels” and Sprint’s agreement “to pay for 80,625 productive 
hours per month[.]”370  In reaching this conclusion, the court excluded 
the extrinsic evidence of the parties’ course of performance because the 
contract was unambiguous and because the MSA included an integration 
clause.371  The buyer was therefore required to abide by its express 
agreement to purchase its full maximum capacity requirements from the 
supplier.372 
VI.  USING THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH TO DETERMINE BREACH IN 
DIMINISHING REQUIREMENTS CASES 
As we have seen, under current law, the buyer has an implied duty 
of good faith to maintain reasonably foreseeable requirements for the 
product under a requirements contract, and the seller has an implied 
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370 Id.  The court noted, however, that Sprint could have contested liability on the 
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duty of good faith to maintain a reasonably foreseeable supply of the 
product under an output contract.  Thus, both the common law and the 
UCC have given the parties to these contracts the dubious advantage of 
taking each other to court so that the factfinder can decide whether the 
allegedly breaching party acted in good faith in running its business so 
that it would produce the appropriate output or requirements for the 
product, even if it did not produce the product for other buyers or 
purchase the product from other suppliers.  Because I advocate 
eliminating the mandatory rule of good faith, allowing the parties to set 
their own upper and lower quantity limits by contract, and using other 
tools like provisions for termination and liquidated damages to allocate 
quantity risks, I will examine the duty of good faith cases to determine 
what would be lost if this duty were eliminated and whether leaving the 
issue of quantity risk as one for the parties to resolve is a realistic option. 
In his Empire Gas decision, Judge Posner commented on the lack of 
authority on how good faith is to be measured in determining when a 
buyer may decrease or eliminate its orders under a requirements 
contract, saying that this paucity of case law is “a good sign” because it 
suggests that parties have ongoing relationships that give them strong 
incentives to work out their disputes without resorting to litigation.373  
My research indicates that there is now a considerable body of case law 
on the issue, but few defensible standards.  Beginning with Empire Gas, 
Judge Posner articulates a rule under which American Bakeries 
Company, a buyer that had not purchased the product from any other 
supplier, and had not produced the product itself or acquired the 
product through an inter-company transaction, was nevertheless 
required to convince a jury that it had a legitimate business reason, 
unconnected to its assessments of the merits of the contract itself, for the 
reduction or elimination of its requirements.374  The business judgment 
made by American Bakeries’ new management in Empire Gas—that its 
capital would be better employed in an investment rather than 
converting to the new equipment necessary to use the seller’s goods—
would not, in Judge Posner’s view, be a legitimate business reason, on 
the grounds that this risk was not one the seller implicitly agreed to take 
on as part of the parties’ bargain.375  But it is unclear why he concluded 
that the risk of a change in the buyer’s management or business 
judgment was not one the seller implicitly assumed, especially where the 
buyer had not made the investment in equipment necessary to begin 
procuring propane when the contract was made, and therefore had no 
                                                 
373 Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1340 (7th Cir. 1988). 
374  Id. at 1342. 
375 Id. at 1340.  
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present requirements for the product in its ongoing business, as is 
normally the case, and where there was no evidence that the seller had 
incurred any reliance expenses in preparing to perform under the 
contract. 
Using Judge Posner’s formulation, “[t]he essential ingredient of good 
faith in the case of the buyer’s reducing his estimated requirements is 
that he not merely have had second thoughts about the terms of the 
contract and want to get out of it.”376  Stated this way, it sounds quite 
reasonable, and many courts have adopted his analysis as the legitimate 
business purpose test, perhaps in reliance on his comment that the seller 
is entitled to expect that the buyer will purchase “something like the 
estimated requirements unless it has a valid business reason for buying 
less.”377  There are two problems with the test.  One is that avoiding 
serious economic losses due to market changes is presumably a “valid 
business reason for buying less[]” under a requirements contract, but the 
buyer’s motivation for reducing or eliminating its requirements under 
these circumstances is a desire to avoid the terms of the contract, which 
have become disadvantageous as a result of changes in the market.  As 
Judge Posner himself perceived, this distinction between permissible, 
good faith motivations and impermissible, bad faith motivations is a 
distinction not in kind, but in degree, since the issue is “how exigent the 
buyer’s change in circumstances must be to allow him to scale down his 
requirements[;]” they “need not be so great as to give him a defense 
under the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration, or 
under a force majeure clause[,]” but “more than whim is required[.]”378  
Under a requirements contract, the “seller assumes the risk of a change 
in the buyer’s business that makes continuation of the contract unduly 
costly[.]”379  Thus, this analysis of “good faith” rests on a quantitative 
evaluation of the losses sustained by the quantity-determining party, not 
on whether that party was having second thoughts about the contract 
and wanted to get out of it, since this test for bad faith would always be 
                                                 
376 Id. at 1340–41. 
377 Id. at 1340.  In the following cases, courts found that the general test for determining 
whether a buyer has acted in good faith in determining the amount of its requirements is 
whether the buyer has exercised valid business judgment, acted pursuant to a valid 
business purpose, or set its requirements with a valid business reason, rather than basing 
its decision on  a desire to avoid what has turned out to be an unfavorable contractual 
obligation:  Brewster of Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp., 33 F.3d 355, (4th Cir. 1994); Schawk, Inc. 
v. Donruss Trading Cards, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 18, 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Abrasive-Tool Corp. v. 
Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, 1991 WL 97445 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Ind.-Am. Water Co., Inc. v. 
Town of Seelyville, 698 N.E.2d 1255, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), and N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Conoco, 
Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tex. 1998). 
378 Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1340. 
379 See id. 
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satisfied where the party was incurring losses as a result of the contract 
based on changes in its business. 
Judge Posner’s use of the phrase “unduly costly” offers little 
guidance, but more than any other courts have provided, in the way of a 
standard for determining when the buyer’s losses are sufficient to excuse 
him from his obligations under a requirements contract.  In Professor 
Goldberg’s analysis of the early New York Court of Appeals case, Feld v. 
Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., where the court reversed summary judgment 
for the defendant on the issue of good faith, he finds that the evidence 
before the court proved that the contract price would not cover the 
quantity-determining party’s variable costs, and that it would have been 
cheaper for that party to close the operation.380  Other decisions in this 
area which are discussed below, NCC Sunday Inserts, Inc. v. World Color 
Press, Inc., Schawk, Inc. v. Donruss Trading Cards, Inc., and Miami 
Packaging, Inc. v. Processing Systems, Inc., reveal the lack of principled 
analysis by courts when asked to determine whether the losses the buyer 
has sustained in a requirements contract are sufficient to provide a good 
faith basis for reducing or eliminating its requirements. 
As articulated in Empire Gas, the second problem with the test is that 
it is too narrow.  The test imposes a standard “which requires at a 
minimum that the reduction in requirements not have been motivated 
solely by a reassessment of the balance of advantages and disadvantages 
under the contract to the buyer.”381  The court expressly declined to 
decide whether any greater obligation was required to satisfy the duty of 
good faith.382  If this test of bad faith accounts only for the cases where 
the only reason for the requirements-reducing decision is a desire to 
avoid the contract, in whole or in part, and courts were to apply it this 
way, the test would apply in very few cases.  In most cases, the buyer 
should be able to prove that it reduced or eliminated its requirements for 
at least one reason that was unrelated to its evaluation of the merits of its 
requirements contract.  The facts in Empire Gas, however, suggest that 
the court actually held that when a buyer eliminates or reduces its 
requirements under a requirements contract, it must come up with a 
rationale that is completely untainted by any consideration of the terms 
of the contract—a far more difficult standard to meet. 
In Empire Gas, the court found that the facts indicated that the buyer 
acted in bad faith under its test because the buyer’s only reason for the 
change was that it had been taken over by new management, which had 
                                                 
380 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 353 (discussing Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 
N.E. 2d 320 (N.Y. 1975)). 
381 Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1341 (emphasis added). 
382 Id. 
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decided that the company’s capital was better allocated to another 
investment than to the conversion units needed to utilize the seller’s 
propane.383  This evidence should have satisfied the minimum standard, 
considering that the buyer did provide a reason for its decision that was 
not based solely on an evaluation of the merits of the requirements 
contract when it explained that its new management had decided that its 
capital was better spent on another investment.  When the parties 
entered the requirements contract in Empire Gas, the buyer had no 
requirements for propane, and had not even contracted to purchase the 
conversion units necessary to utilize propane.384  Thus, the court 
essentially held that the buyer had made an implied promise to enter the 
contract to make the investment necessary to generate requirements for 
the goods, and could not simply say it had changed its mind about that 
investment, even if it had changed its mind for reasons unrelated to the 
terms of the requirements contract.385  Either the test is so narrow that it 
applies in very few cases—perhaps not even in Empire Gas—or it is so 
broad that any business justification for reducing or eliminating 
requirements can be second-guessed on the grounds that at least one 
motivation for the decision was the savings to be derived from avoiding 
all or part of the expense of the requirements contract.  
There are many reasons a buyer may reduce or eliminate its 
requirements, and the trick may be to identify those which the courts can 
justifiably claim represent risks that have been assumed by the seller in 
agreeing to the requirements contract.  The following is a non-exhaustive 
list of the reasons a buyer may lower or eliminate its requirements:  
                                                 
383 Id. at 1340. 
The seller assumes the risk of a change in the buyer’s business that 
makes continuation of the contract unduly costly, but the buyer 
assumes the risk of a less urgent change in his circumstances, perhaps 
illustrated by the facts of this case where so far as one can tell the 
buyer’s change of mind reflected no more than a reassessment of the 
balance of advantages and disadvantages under the contract.  
American Bakeries did not agree to buy conversion units and propane 
for trucks that it got rid of, but neither did Empire Gas agree to forgo 
sales merely because new management at American Bakeries decided 
that its capital would be better employed in some other investment 
than conversion to propane. 
Id. 
384 Id. at 1335. 
385 Under the minimum standard announced in Empire Gas, the buyer should have been 
able to satisfy the standard even if the buyer’s decision was based on its evaluation of the 
terms of the contract for acquiring the conversion units, rather than the terms of the 
requirements contract.  Instead, the court wrapped the two contracts into one, holding that 
a requirements contract does not simply require a buyer to maintain its existing 
requirements, but to enter into other contracts necessary to generate requirements 
contemplated under the requirements contract. 
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1) the buyer is purchasing some of its requirements from one of the 
seller’s competitors; 
2) the buyer has found a way to do business more efficiently or 
profitably by reducing its use of the seller’s product; 
3) the buyer has obtained new technology that reduces its 
requirements for the seller’s goods; 
4) the buyer has acquired the equipment to produce the product 
internally; 
5) the buyer has acquired or been acquired by a company that makes 
the same product or has affiliates that make the same product; 
6) for requirements used in connection with a new or experimental 
project or product, the buyer is unable to overcome technological, 
commercial, or competitive challenges to the success of the project or 
product; 
7) the buyer has sold its business; or 
8) the buyer has gone out of business. 
 
Of these, only the first represents a risk that is expressly allocated to 
the buyer under a requirements contract when the buyer promises to 
purchase its requirements from the seller.386  The others are risks that the 
seller should foresee and be expected to bargain for protections from 
because they are not expressly or logically provided for under the bare 
bones terms of a basic agreement whereby the buyer purchases its 
requirements of certain goods or services from the seller.  Current law, 
however, is based on the flawed reasoning that the duty of good faith 
not to reduce requirements for these reasons is justified because the 
buyer must have assumed these risks when it signed the contract, 
despite the fact that they are all foreseeable risks that the parties are 
perfectly capable of allocating as part of the bargaining process.  That 
said, the courts are strikingly inconsistent in their application of the 
standard of good faith to reductions in requirements. 
Even as to the risk that the buyer will not purchase its requirements 
from other suppliers, courts have come to different conclusions under 
the good faith standard.  In Abrasive-Tool Corp. v. Cystic Fibrosis 
Foundation,387 the court found that the buyer had acted in good faith in 
terminating the agreement, assuming it was a requirements contract, 
based on a valid business judgment that it was “economically superior” 
                                                 
386 This would not be true of course in those jurisdictions that sustain requirements 
contracts that do not contain promises from the buyer to purchase his requirements from 
the seller, and instead rely solely on the buyer’s implied duty of good faith to maintain his 
requirements at foreseeable levels. 
387 1991 WL 97445 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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to purchase the goods directly from the manufacturer rather than 
through a supplier such as the plaintiff.  One could simply view this case 
as wrongly decided, or dismiss the relevant language as dicta, but it is 
nonetheless evidence of how useless the duty of good faith has become 
as a legal standard capable of producing reasonably predictable results. 
Corporate reorganizations and technological improvements leading 
to reductions in requirements are foreseeable changes relating to the 
buyer’s management of its business from which the seller could protect 
against by using appropriate contractual provisions.  Despite the fact 
that vertical integration is a well-recognized practice for maximizing 
profits, and merger and acquisition activities can hardly be described as 
unforeseeable events in today’s business climate, courts generally find 
that buyers have acted in bad faith when their diminished requirements 
are a result of a corporate reorganization.388  And both the corporate 
reorganization and the technological change cases would satisfy Judge 
Posner’s “bad faith[]” test because the buyer in these cases would be 
having “second thoughts about the terms of the contract[,]” based on its 
new understanding that it can run its business more profitably either by 
reducing or eliminating its requirements for the seller’s product. 
Indeed, Judge Posner’s “second thoughts” test is inconsistent with 
the judgments he makes in Empire Gas concerning requirements cases 
where the change in the buyer’s situation occurred due to technological 
innovations.  In Empire Gas, Judge Posner cites Southwest Natural Gas Co. 
v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., as a case that demonstrates the 
distinction between the risks of changes in the buyer’s circumstances that 
the seller does and does not assume in a requirements contract.389  
According to Judge Posner, the court in Southwest Natural Gas held that 
when the buyer reduced its requirements for gas by eighty percent seven 
years into a fifteen-year requirements contract because it purchased a 
more efficient new boiler, this was a “bona fide” change in the buyer’s 
requirements because it would have been “unreasonable” to prevent the 
                                                 
388 In MDC Corp. v. John H. Harland Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 387, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the court 
held that the defendant had adequately pled its counterclaim that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith and had no legitimate business purpose for its actions by alleging that after the 
plaintiff was acquired by another company, it began purchasing the goods from affiliates of 
its parent rather than from the defendant.  Evidence that the buyer entered into an 
agreement for the sale of its company under which the acquirer would not assume the 
requirements contract was sufficient in Kock Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 324 (D.N.J. 2002), to raise a fact issue as to the buyer’s good faith, despite the 
contract’s silence on successor liability or the buyer’s duty to ensure successor liability. 
389 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939) (holding that the buyer did not act in bad faith when it 
reduced its requirements for gas by eighty percent by replacing its old boiler with a more 
efficient, modern unit). 
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buyer from replacing its equipment with a modern unit.390  Unreasonable 
or not, the seller could certainly argue that the buyer was having 
“second thoughts” about its contract, as evidenced by the fact that it 
made the decision to buy a more modern replacement boiler that 
allowed it to avoid its contractual obligation to buy eighty percent of its 
prior coal requirements from the seller.  If the motivation for the action is 
to avoid what, based on changed circumstances, have now become 
disadvantageous terms under the requirements contract, why does it 
matter whether the changed circumstances are changes in technology 
rather than a simple drop in the market price for the product?  Certainly 
both are equally foreseeable given the rapid pace of technology. 
A special case was nevertheless recognized for technological change 
in Indiana-American Water Co., Inc. v. Town of Seelyville,391 where the court 
held that it was not a breach for the buyer to develop its own well for 
water, thereby diminishing its requirements from the seller.  The court in 
Indiana-American relied in part on the “well-settled” rule under Southwest 
Natural Gas that “it is not bad faith to take advantage of a technological 
advance which reduces the buyer’s requirements.”392  The rule is not, 
however, evenly applied.  In Empire Gas, Judge Posner cited as a 
reduction that was unexcused, unexplained, and therefore made in bad 
faith, the case of Chalmers & Williams v. Bledsoe & Co.,393 where the buyer 
converted its facilities from the use of coal to electricity.394  Why was it as 
“unreasonable” to expect the buyer in Chalmers & Williams to refrain 
from updating its facilities to the latest energy source as it was 
unreasonable to expect the buyer in Southwest National Gas to refrain 
from installing the most up-to-date replacement boiler?  Judge Posner 
claims that in the Chalmers & Williams, case the buyer gave no 
explanation for its decision,395 but the explanation was undoubtedly the 
same one that motivated the buyer in Southwest National Gas—more 
advanced technology was available that reduced or eliminated the 
buyer’s requirements for the seller’s product.  There is no evidence the 
buyer in Southwest National Gas listed all the reasons a modern boiler is 
better than an obsolete one, and no reason the buyer in Chalmers & 
Williams should have had to explain why electricity is preferable to coal. 
One of the examples Judge Posner gives in Empire Gas of when a 
buyer would “clearly” be “acting in bad faith” by eliminating its 
                                                 
390 Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1340 (7th Cir. 1988). 
391 698 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing S.W. Natural Gas, 102 F.2d 630).  
392 Id. at 1261. 
393 218 Ill. App. 363 (1920) (holding that the buyer was in breach of its requirements 
contract for coal when the buyer converted its facilities from the use of coal to electricity). 
394 Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1339–40. 
395 Id. at 1340. 
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requirements is when the buyer begins producing its own products.396  
As with other applications of the good faith standard to open quantity 
contracts, the courts’ decisions on this point are a model of inconsistency.  
Courts have permitted this conduct in connection with requirements 
contracts for services, 397 they have condemned it when the product is 
produced by the buyer’s newly acquired corporate affiliates,398 and they 
have reached inconsistent results when the buyer produced the product 
internally.  For example, in Indiana-American, 399 the court held that the 
Town of Seelyville, which had a twenty-five-year contract to purchase its 
requirements of water from the plaintiff, did not act in bad faith when it 
announced a plan to sell bonds to finance the construction of 
improvements necessary to obtain water from its own undeveloped well 
field in order to reduce its requirements for water from the plaintiff 
under the contract.400  Before reaching this result, the court considered 
Andersen v. La Rinconada Country Club,401 a decision holding that a golf 
course which had agreed to buy water under a requirements contract 
acted in bad faith by purchasing a well field to obtain its own supply of 
water.402  The court distinguished Andersen on the grounds that the golf 
course in that case had to purchase its well field, while Seelyville had 
owned the well field before entering into the requirements contract.403  
Applying the Empire Gas test, the court held that Seelyville’s decision to 
develop its preexisting well field could therefore be viewed as a 
“legitimate, long-term business decision, and not merely a desire to 
                                                 
396 Id. at 1338–39 (emphasis omitted). 
397 In cases involving requirements contracts for services, the majority of courts have 
rejected claims that such contracts are illusory when the buyer has retained the right to 
perform an indefinite amount of the work itself. Compare Ralph Constr. Inc. v. United 
States, 4 Cl. Ct. 727, 733 (1984) (holding that for a requirements contract, “the unfettered 
right of the government to perform work in-house renders the contract unenforceable 
because of the lack of mutuality”), with Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521, 524 (1960) 
(stating that “nothing in the [requirements] contract would have prevented the 
Government from enlarging its own repair facilities to fill completely its needs.”); Dynamic 
Science, Inc., 85-1 BCA 17,710 at 88,383, 1984 WL 13911 (A.S.B.C.A. 1984) (holding 
enforceable an agreement to provide services beyond those which the government could 
provide for itself); Maya Transit Co., 75-2 BCA 11,552 at 55,125, 1975 WL 1551 (A.S.B.C.A. 
1975) (same); Alamo Automotive Services, Inc., 1964 BCA 4354 at 21,043, 1964 WL 306 at *5 
(A.S.B.C.A. 1964) (same). 
398 See MDC Corp. v. John H. Harland Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 387, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Kock 
Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D.N.J. 2002); Miami Packaging, 
Inc. v. Processing Sys., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
399 698 N.E.2d 1255. 
400  Id. at 1259. 
401 40 P.2d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935). 
402 Ind.-Am., 698 N.E.2d at 1261. 
403  Id. 
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avoid the terms of its contract with [the] Water Company.”404  There was 
no evidence, however, that the investment requiring the sale of 
municipal bonds that Seelyville had to make was any less significant or 
unanticipated than the investment the golf course had to make to acquire 
the well field in Andersen. 
The attempt by the court in Indiana-American to distinguish Andersen 
on the grounds that Seelyville’s decision was not “merely a desire to 
avoid the terms of its contract with [the] Water Company[,]” also 
suggests that good faith can be established even if the buyer’s legitimate 
business decision has been influenced by impermissible factors.405  The 
court appears to recognize that, like the golf course in Andersen, 
Seelyville undoubtedly took the costs of purchasing water under its 
requirements contract into account when it decided to invest in the 
improvements necessary to access water from its own well field.  Thus, 
when the court applied the Empire Gas “second thoughts” test of good 
faith, it did not interpret that test to require proof that Seelyville had not 
been motivated by a desire to avoid the terms of its requirements 
contract when it made the decision to begin producing its own water, 
only that Seelyville was not merely or solely motivated by this desire.  
Even with this modification, however, the test is a poor one, as the 
court’s analysis of the facts in Andersen and Indiana-American 
demonstrates; the timing of the purchase of the asset should not separate 
good faith from bad. 
When the buyer eliminates its requirements because it has closed the 
plant or business that generated the requirements, courts appear to have 
followed, at least to some extent, the distinction made in the Official 
Comments to UCC section 2-306 between a “lack of orders[,]” which 
serves as a good faith basis for a discontinuance of the buyer’s business 
and presumably also for a reduction in its requirements, and a desire to 
“curtail losses[,]” which does not.406  This distinction has been criticized 
as nonsensical from an economic perspective,407 and its purpose is 
unclear.  If it is designed to place the same market risk on the buyer 
under a requirements contract that the buyer bears under a fixed 
quantity contract, the analogy is a poor one.  In a fixed quantity contract, 
the buyer is taking a risk that by the time of delivery, use, or resale, the 
price and/or demand for the product or for goods made using the 
                                                 
404 Id. 
405 Id. (emphasis added). 
406 U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. n.2 (2004).  
407 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 382.  Goldberg’s proposed Official Comments to UCC 
section 2-306(1) would eliminate this distinction as follows:  “[t]his distinction, which 
makes no economic sense, is superseded under the current Code.”  Id. 
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product will drop below the contract price.  In a requirements contract, 
the parties have agreed that the buyer will purchase its requirements, or 
some portion of its requirements from the seller, and the seller will 
assume the risk of “good faith” reductions in those requirements.  If the 
buyer’s “good faith” were not interpreted to include some market-based 
limitations, the buyer could incur damages equal to the entire contract 
price of its estimated or normal quantity of goods for the duration of the 
contract, assuming the price and/or demand for the product dropped to 
zero. 
The Official Comments do not solve this dilemma because there is no 
logical distinction between a shutdown to curtail losses and a shutdown 
due to the lack of orders.  Both spring from the same source—lack of 
demand—and the only distinction is whether the seller offers the goods 
for a low enough price to obtain orders, thereby incurring losses.  In the 
case of a decline in the market price below the contract price for the 
goods, for example, the Code Comment gives the buyer the choice of (1) 
selling its goods at noncompetitive prices which will result in a “lack of 
orders” but will allow the buyer to terminate its requirements contract; 
or (2) selling its goods at a competitive price which will result in losses 
and will not allow the buyer to terminate the requirements contract.408  
Creating such a perverse and useless incentive hardly seems in 
alignment with the Code’s goal of facilitating sensible business practices.  
Factors other than price also affect demand, such as new technology that 
makes the goods obsolete or less desirable, but even here there is no 
reason for distinguishing between losses due to a market decline and 
losses due to other factors.  In Judge Posner’s words, the contract will 
still be “unduly costly[]” for the buyer to perform, regardless of the 
cause. 
In the “lack of orders” cases, courts have been relatively consistent in 
sustaining reductions in requirements.409  Courts have come to a wide 
array of conclusions, however, when called upon to decide whether a 
buyer in a requirements contract has acted in “bad faith[]” by closing a 
plant or a business to curtail losses.  In some cases, such as Brewster of 
                                                 
408  U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. n.2. 
409 For example, a distributor in a requirements contract for a particular brandname 
product may reduce its requirements to zero if its customers stop ordering the branded 
product.  See Trimed, Inc. v. Sherwood Med. Co., 772 F. Supp. 879, 886 (D. Md. 1991).  See 
also Sea Link Int’l, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 781, 784 (S.D. Ga. 1997) 
(granting the buyer’s motion for summary judgment on seller’s action for breach of a 
requirements contract for component parts, where the buyer had notified the seller that the 
buyer’s own customer for the parts would no longer be ordering them). 
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Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp.,410 and U & W Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Martin 
Marietta Alumina, Inc.,411 courts have accepted the buyer’s explanation 
that they closed or sold their businesses because they were unprofitable, 
and have not conducted any analysis into whether the buyer was 
attempting to avoid the terms of the contract.  Depending on how central 
the requirements contract is to the business, the price the seller was 
charging for the goods under the requirements contract could be a 
contributing, if not the primary, factor leading to the businesses’ losses 
and therefore could be a contributing, if not a primary, factor in the 
buyer’s decision to close the business. 
In two cases where the cost of the goods under the requirements 
contract with the seller was a significant factor the buyers considered in 
deciding to eliminate their requirements, the courts came to opposite 
conclusions as to whether the buyers acted in good faith.  In NCC Sunday 
Inserts, Inc. v. World Color Press, Inc.,412 the plaintiff, NCC, sought a 
declaratory judgment that it did not violate its contract to purchase its 
requirements of coupon inserts from the defendant, WCP, a printing 
company, when its assets were sold by its parent corporation to an entity 
that had its own in-house printing capabilities.  The court denied NCC’s 
motion for summary judgment, based on testimony from WCP’s expert 
that while NCC might have upwards of $35 million in losses for the next 
two years under the requirements contract with WCP, there would be a 
resurgence in the market thereafter, and NCC would turn a significant 
profit if it remained in business.413  This speculation, no matter how well 
founded, on a resurgence in the market three years hence, hardly seems 
sufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the buyer was acting in 
good faith in selling the business rather than incurring $35 million in 
losses, especially when the seller had not included a minimum take or 
pay clause in the contract.  And what would the jury instructions be in 
                                                 
410 33 F.3d 355 (4th Cir.1994).  In Brewster, the buyer terminated its requirements contract 
for plastic bottles with the supplier when it closed its plant, as part of the corporate 
parent’s decision to shut down the division of which the plant was a part, because it was 
unprofitable.  Id. at 362.  The court did not discuss whether the unprofitability of the plant 
provided a sufficient justification unrelated to a desire to avoid the contract, as required 
under Empire Gas, but summarized the case with the note that a buyer may eliminate its 
requirements in the face of a drop in demand.  Id. 
411 34 F.3d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1994).  In U & W Industrial Supply, the court held that the 
buyer did not act in bad faith when, based on a plant closing, it canceled orders and then 
terminated its requirements contracts with the seller.  Id.  The court did not question the 
reasons for the plant closing to find out whether they were related to the economics of the 
requirements contract but stated simply that the risk that a buyer will go out of business is 
one of the risks inherent in requirements contracts.  Id. at 188. 
412 759 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
413 Id. at 1010. 
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such a case?  That the jury could enter a finding of bad faith if the 
evidence showed the buyer would incur multimillion losses in the next 
two years under the requirements contracts, just because the business 
might return to profitability thereafter?  Without any evidence of reliance 
interests of this magnitude on the seller’s side, what possible basis does 
the factfinder have for such a conclusion?  How does the factfinder, 
using the standard of “good faith,” decide what losses are sufficient to 
release the buyer from its obligations under a requirements contract, or 
how likely a future recovery must be to require the buyer to sustain 
those losses? 
In the second case involving losses attributable to the contract, 
Schawk,414 the plaintiff had a five-year contract to provide graphic arts 
services to the defendant, a corporation that manufactured and sold 
sports trading cards.415  About a year and a half into the contract, the 
defendant sold its trading card business, based on a record of declining 
sales for the past four years and a loss in the prior year of $7 million.416  
When the plaintiff filed suit to enforce the contract, the defendant filed a 
summary judgment motion on the grounds that its sole purpose in 
selling its business was to curtail losses.417  The district court granted the 
motion, finding that the defendant had acted in good faith.418  The 
appellate court affirmed, despite evidence that in evaluating its losses, 
the defendant “determined its profit margins were burdened by the 
fixed nature of prepress expenses on such considerably reduced sales 
quantities.”419  In addition to the defendant’s recognition of the role the 
requirements contract played in causing its losses, the other similarity to 
NCC Sunday Inserts was that in Schawk, the defendant estimated a future 
turnaround whereby its sales would increase from $47 million in 1995 to 
almost $70 million in 1996.420  The appellate court distinguished NCC 
Sunday Inserts on the grounds that this increase still did not reach the 
$134 million sales mark that the defendant enjoyed in 1991.421  The court 
did not attempt to compare the $7 million loss to the $35 million loss in 
the two cases, or consider the fact that unlike in NCC Sunday Inserts, in 
Schawk, the defendant admitted that its parent could have provided the 
                                                 
414 746 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
415  Id. at. 25. 
416  Id. at 21. 
417  Id. at 20. 
418  Id. 
419 Id. at 21. 
420  Id. at 26–27. 
421  Id. at 25. 
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financing necessary to keep it in business, but preferred to use its 
resources to concentrate on its food packaging businesses.422 
The primary rationale for the court’s opinion in Schawk appears to 
have been its reliance on Judge Posner’s “unduly costly[]” test.  As the 
court explained, “[T]he seller under a requirements contract assumes the 
risk of a change in the buyer’s business that makes a continuation 
unduly costly.  If a seller wishes to reallocate some of the risks inherent 
in such a contract, however, it may specify some minimum 
requirement.”423  Thus, the court identified two of the many inherent 
defects in the Official Comment’s distinction between financial losses 
and a lack of orders.  One is that the seller in a requirements contract has 
arguably assumed the risk of changes in the buyer’s business that result 
in the seller’s goods being priced so far above the market price that the 
buyer would sooner go out of business than pay for them, as well as 
changes in the buyer’s business that reduce orders for the buyer’s goods 
such that the buyer cannot remain in business.  The other is that the 
parties can allocate such risks by specifying a minimum requirement in 
the agreement, so there is no need for applying a mandatory good faith 
rule to requirements contracts. 
At the other extreme, the absurdity of a rigid application of the 
Code’s losses/lack of orders distinction is demonstrated by the decision 
in Metal One,424 where the court held that the buyer acted in bad faith 
when it terminated a requirements contract as part of a plant shut-down 
because its incoming orders had not been reduced to zero.425  The court 
in Metal One granted summary judgment for the seller on blanket 
purchase orders for specially manufactured steel bars used to 
manufacture two sizes of TV screen frames for Sony.426  After a year and 
a half of purchasing all of its requirements from the seller, the buyer 
stopped issuing “firm releases” for the steel because it had closed its 
manufacturing plant.427  Sony had been reducing its orders from the 
buyer over the past several years, and when Sony stopped making the 
21-inch sets, the buyer’s plant began losing between $150,000 and 
$200,000 a month.428  Thus, the buyer stopped purchasing steel bars from 
the seller due to its financial losses caused by the decline of orders from 
Sony.  While there was no evidence that the buyer closed the plant 
because it was having “second thoughts” about any specific terms of the 
                                                 
422 Id.at 26–27. 
423 Id. at 26. 
424 2005 WL 1657128 (W.D. Mich. 2005). 
425  Id. at *7. 
426  Id. 
427  Id. at *5. 
428 Id. at *3.  
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requirements contract, it was no longer economically feasible to run the 
plant that generated the buyer’s requirements.  Relying on Official 
Comment 2 to UCC section 2-306 and the evidence that Sony continued 
to order steel bars for the 29-inch frames, the court held, “Because [the 
buyer] shut down the plant to ‘curtail losses,’ [the buyer] breached the 
contract in bad faith as a matter of law.”429 
In a more recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Basell USA Inc.,430 the court 
decided the issue of a buyer’s breach of a requirements contract under 
the Restatement’s five factor test for material breach, and discussed good 
faith only as the last of these factors.431  In Basell, the seller had agreed to 
provide a discount if the buyer used the seller for ninety-five percent of 
its carriage needs, and sued for breach when the buyer used the seller for 
only eighty percent of its needs.432  The court reversed the summary 
judgment ruling for the buyer, noting that determining whether breach 
is material is “inherently problematical where, as here, the materiality 
analysis may well turn on subjective assessments as to the state of mind 
of the respective parties.”433 This observation was specifically addressed 
to the good faith inquiry, which “calls for an evaluation of what 
motivated [the buyer’s] conduct[.]”434  As in NCC Sunday Inserts, the 
court found that the buyer’s explanation that its diminished 
requirements were the result of “good faith[,]” in this case due to a 
business decision made to serve the buyer’s operational needs, was 
insufficiently credible to warrant summary judgment.435 
Part of the difficulty in using a good faith test that asks whether the 
buyer’s motive for reducing or eliminating its requirements is related to 
the terms of the contract lies in the impossibility of separating market 
factors from the variability of demand in an open quantity contract.  If 
the buyer is a distributor, its requirements will track the market price 
because its demand will inevitably fall, potentially to zero, if it cannot 
offer a competitive resale price.  This relationship between the market 
price and the buyer’s requirements was actually the reason some early 
                                                 
429 Id. at *7. 
430 512 F.3d 86, 93 (3d Cir. 2008). 
431 Id. at 92  (“[T]he extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer 
to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.” (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (1981))). 
432  Id. at 89. 
433 Id. at 96. 
434 Id. 
435 Id. at 95. 
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courts found these “middleman” contracts illusory.436  While the market-
demand relationship is not as direct, it also exists when the buyer is an 
end-user.  Manufacturers or other end-users of the goods will also have 
lower requirements if the contract price is so far above what all of the 
buyer’s competitors are paying for their materials that the buyer can no 
longer sell its finished goods at a competitive price.  In either case, the 
buyer does not have requirements within the reasonable anticipation of 
the parties if the seller’s price is so far above market that the buyer 
cannot pay those prices and earn a return that will cover its costs of 
doing business.  Even if factors other than price have resulted in the 
decline in demand, such as introduction of new technology or changing 
consumer preferences, the seller’s price will still be relevant if it is too 
high for any customers to purchase the obsolete products. 
If the seller’s prices are so far above market that the buyer will 
actually close the plant or business that generates the requirements to 
avoid the contract, the exigencies of the buyer’s situation, as Judge 
Posner put it, would seem to have reached the point where a 
requirements contract buyer should be released from its obligation.  But 
some courts,437 and commentators,438 see this situation as a ruse and 
believe that courts should not permit the buyer to avoid the contract by 
going out of business.  If the concern is that the buyer could simply 
reincorporate as a new entity, and continue in the same business with a 
new supplier, principles of successor liability should, however, be 
sufficient to address the issue without resorting to the implied duty of 
good faith.  
The duty of good faith has also been used to compel a buyer in a 
requirements contract to spend inordinate amounts of time and money 
supporting the project necessary to sustain its requirements.  In Miami 
Packaging,439 Miami, a manufacturer of wax paper products, entered into 
a twenty-five-year contract to supply Hollymatic, a manufacturer and 
distributor of food processing equipment and supplies, with all the wax 
                                                 
436 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at § 2.15 (explaining that in several early cases, such 
as Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869, 871–72 (7th Cir. 1901), courts held that requirements 
contracts with “middlemen” were illusory because the buyers’ requirements would 
fluctuate with the market). 
437 See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Atofina Chem. Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1236 (D. Kan. 
2005) (granting motion for summary judgment to seller and finding that buyer acted in bad 
faith, where its principal reason for closing its plant was the losses it incurred arising from 
the high prices it was paying under the requirements contract). 
438 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at § 3–9 (“A buyer may go out of business 
altogether and hope to escape a burdensome requirements contract in this way.  But if he 
only reorganizes the form of his business, a court will surely see through this and hold him 
liable on the contract.”). 
439 792 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
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paper it would require for use on a new machine for processing sheets of 
wax paper to wrap hamburger patties once the machine was built.440  
Miami’s president admitted that he knew Hollymatic’s needs were 
dependent on production of a new, innovative machine, and that this 
project may fail.441  Undisputed evidence was also introduced to show 
that even after Hollymatic spent over thirty months of work and almost 
double its estimate of $425,000 in an attempt to make the machine fully 
operational, it “never produced proper patty paper[,]” but only “a 
relatively small amount of interleaver paper[.]”442 Despite this evidence, 
the court denied summary judgment on the issue of Hollymatic’s good 
faith in terminating the requirements contract.443 
The only reason the court gave for its decision to deny Hollymatic’s 
summary judgment motion was that the company may have acted in bad 
faith if it “made no purchases of wax paper in order to aid [the 
investor’s] interest in [Miami’s competitor,]” rather than “because of the 
time delays and cost overruns.”444  Nine months into the contract, an 
investor who owned one of Miami’s competitors had purchased a 
controlling interest in Hollymatic.445  Hollymatic did not terminate the 
patty paper converter project immediately, but continued working on 
the project for another six months before reaching the conclusion that it 
would never be operational.446  The court made two flawed assumptions 
in reaching its decision.  The first was that Hollymatic could have had 
only one reason for its decision to terminate the project—either the 
permissible reason or the impermissible reason—when the undisputed 
evidence already presented to the court established that Hollymatic did 
have the permissible reason; it was undisputed that the company 
believed the project would never be operational when it terminated the 
project.447  If the presence of one legitimate business justification were 
sufficient to show good faith, the possibility of an additional motive 
should have been immaterial.  What the court’s holding therefore 
suggests is that it was applying a test that forbids the quantity-reducing 
party from having even a single bad faith motive for its decision.  This 
test would represent an application of the broadest interpretation of the 
Empire Gas test, where the buyer acts in bad faith if one of its reasons for 
reducing or eliminating its requirements is a desire to avoid the contract, 
                                                 
440  Id. at 566. 
441  Id. at 565. 
442 Id. at 562. 
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even if it has many other unrelated business justifications for the 
decision. 
In finding evidence of a possible bad faith motive, the court in Miami 
Packaging made a second flawed assumption that Hollymatic diverted 
requirements it had committed to Miami to the company owned by 
Hollymatic’s investor.  In fact, Miami had no right to expect it would 
receive Hollymatic’s business unless the new patty paper converter 
generated requirements for Miami’s paper.  The agreement with Miami 
included a sub-lease of the equipment, and the requirements were based 
on the paper needs of the new equipment.448  Thus, there was no basis 
for concluding that it was an act of bad faith for Hollymatic to purchase 
paper from a company owned by its investor when it believed that the 
converter equipment the parties knew was necessary to generate 
requirements for the seller’s paper could never be made operational.  
Commentators have decried the lack of principled reasoning in 
quantity-reducing cases, and have expressed concern over how the 
court’s application of the good faith standard upsets the parties’ own 
allocation of risks, punishes buyers for making economically sound 
decisions to shut down businesses, and provides a windfall to sellers that 
exceeds any reliance damages they may have incurred in investment 
specific expenses.449  Since one of these cases is Empire Gas, authored by 
Judge Posner, one of our most preeminent legal economists, what we 
need is not a judiciary with more sophistication in its understanding of 
economic theory, but a reformation of the law of open quantity contracts 
to eliminate the good faith standard. 
The heart of the problem with respect to breach is that open quantity 
contracts are designed for situations in which the parties are not willing 
to commit themselves to liability for a specific quantity of goods due to 
various uncertainties in the market and in their respective business 
prospects.  Yet the law steps in and creates a cause of action for breach of 
contract to give them rights that it is not clear they bargained for, but 
could easily have contracted for, using the nebulous concept of “good 
faith.”  Thus, with the goals of implementing the intent of the parties, 
and decreasing unnecessary burdens on our judicial system, we should 
ask whether the businesses that enter these requirements contracts, often 
for multi-year terms, actually intend to enter into implicit agreements for 
the rights the courts create for them.  If they were given an opportunity 
to reflect on the matter, would they agree to ban the buyers from 
reducing their requirements based on financial losses, no matter how 
                                                 
448 Id.  
449 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 347–66; M. Finch, Output & Requirements Contracts:  The 
Scope of the Duty to Remain in Business, 14 UCC L.J. 347, 366 (1982). 
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great, as opposed to declining orders, as the Official Comments to UCC 
section 2-306 indicate?  Can we assume they are agreeing that for the life 
of the contract, the buyer must continue the business, and cannot sell it, 
unless it can prove that the contract played no part in its decision?  Are 
they likewise agreeing that if the requirements are dependent on 
development of a new technology, the buyer will devote unlimited 
resources to the success of that technology?  Is the buyer surrendering its 
business judgment so that it cannot, even acting in good faith, increase 
its requirements above what is “reasonable” in light of prior estimates?  
Even if it were appropriate to make these assumptions about the parties’ 
intent in specific cases, the concept of good faith is a poor tool for 
carrying out their intent because the Code posits a system whereby the 
parties’ ability to define the implied duty of good faith is restricted by 
their inability to disclaim it. 
Rather than making dubious assumptions about the parties’ implied 
intent in open quantity contracts to create a duty with liability 
ramifications of such great and uncertain magnitude, courts should 
interpret open quantity contracts as promises by the quantity-
determining party not to deal with any other party for all or an 
ascertainable portion of the identified goods or supplies.  The mandatory 
good faith rule should be replaced with the principle of personal 
autonomy, under which the parties could protect themselves from risk 
by bargaining for the appropriate contractual provisions, with far more 
precision and certainty than the good faith standard could ever provide. 
VII.  THE BUYER’S OPTION PROBLEM 
In Empire Gas, Judge Posner asked “a fundamental question . . . in 
the law of requirements contracts[]”450 that must be answered by anyone 
advocating the position, as I do, that requirements contracts should be 
interpreted to prevent the buyer from purchasing all or an ascertainable 
portion of its requirements from other sellers, but should not subject the 
buyer to implied duties of good faith that limit the quantities he may 
demand.  Judge Posner’s question is whether a requirements contract is 
essentially a buyer’s option, entitling him to purchase all 
he needs of the good in question on the terms set forth in 
the contract, but leaving him free to purchase none if he 
wishes, provided that he does not purchase the good 
                                                 
450  Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1334 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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from anyone else and is not acting out of ill will toward 
the seller[.]451 
The question itself suggests that the only difference between a buyer’s 
option and a requirements contract would be exclusivity and good faith.  
In a buyer’s option, unless the buyer made a reciprocal promise to buy 
exclusively from the seller, the buyer would be free to purchase the 
goods from another supplier.  This assumption is incorrect, however, 
because it fails to disaggregate the issues of quantity and the buyer’s 
reciprocal obligation to buy. 
To deconstruct these aspects of the distinction between options and 
requirements contracts, I will begin by considering four hypothetical 
buyers’ options.  In the first, the seller agrees to supply the buyer with a 
fixed quantity of goods for a set price for the term of the option, and the 
buyer provides consideration for the option.  The differences between 
this option and a requirements contract are that in the options contract 
the buyer may choose not to exercise the option, he may buy as many 
products as he likes from other suppliers or may buy none, and there is 
no implied duty of good faith that restricts his discretion in making these 
choices.    
In the second hypothetical, if the option was for the buyer’s 
requirements, rather than for a fixed quantity, the same distinctions 
would hold, since the option would not include a reciprocal promise 
from the buyer to purchase its requirements from the seller, or an 
implied duty of good faith restricting the buyer’s discretion in exercising 
its option. 
In the third hypothetical, the buyer’s option requires the seller to 
supply the buyer with only fifty percent of his requirements, and the 
buyer provides consideration for the option but does not promise to buy 
any of his requirements from the seller.  This case is still distinguishable 
from a requirements contract because the buyer may choose not to 
purchase any of his requirements from the seller and may purchase all of 
his requirements from other suppliers.  In a comparable requirements 
contract, the buyer would have to buy fifty percent of his requirements 
from the seller, and would have a good faith duty in connection with any 
reduction in his requirements, and a duty not to demand an 
“unreasonably disproportionate” quantity above the estimate.  Under 
this hypothetical, however, the requirements contract is not 
differentiated from a buyer’s option because the requirements contract 
buyer “could not purchase the good[s] from anyone else[,]” as in Judge 
Posner’s question, because in both contracts the buyer can purchase up 
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to fifty percent of his requirements from other suppliers.  Thus, 
exclusivity, in the sense that Judge Posner appears to use the concept, is 
not necessary to distinguish requirements contracts from options. 
In the fourth hypothetical, the seller agrees to supply fifty percent of 
the buyer’s requirements for a set term at the prices stated, and the buyer 
promises to buy fifty percent of his requirements from the seller.  This 
arrangement is more than a firm offer under UCC section 2-205, or an 
offer made irrevocable beyond the three-month period set forth in UCC 
section 2-205 by the exchange of recited consideration.  The contract has 
now become a promise to sell in exchange for a promise to buy.  There is 
still no need to add an implied duty of good faith other than to avoid 
quantity and market risks that the parties can deal with more effectively 
by allocating these risks in their agreement.  Exclusivity is also 
unnecessary because the agreement includes a method for ascertaining 
the quantity of goods the buyer has agreed to purchase.  Thus, my 
proposal for eliminating the implied duty of good faith and the 
exclusivity rule could be implemented without converting a 
requirements contract into a buyer’s option.  The requirements contract 
would, unlike a buyer’s option, include a promise by the buyer to 
purchase all, or an ascertainable portion of, its requirements, if any, from 
the seller. 
In Empire Gas, Judge Posner discusses the interpretation of a 
requirements contract, explaining “that the buyer need only refrain from 
dealing with a competitor of the seller,” and concluding that it would 
still constitute an option.452  As he explains:   
If no reason at all need be given for scaling back one’s 
requirements even to zero, then a requirements contract 
is from the buyer’s standpoint just an option to purchase 
up to (or slightly beyond, i.e., within the limits of 
proportionality) the stated estimate on the terms 
specified in the contract, except that the buyer cannot 
refuse to exercise the option because someone offers him 
better terms.  This is not an unreasonable position, but it 
is not the law.453   
The law Judge Posner refers to, however, is the questionable case law 
preventing buyers from reducing their requirements based on well-
founded business judgments, including the nonsensical distinction in the 
Official Comments to UCC section 2-306 between plant shut downs 
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made to curtail losses and those made as a result of a lack of orders, and 
pre-Code cases holding that a buyer breaches a requirements contract 
even when its requirements have been eliminated based on a 
fundamental change in its operations, or because it has become cheaper 
to buy the finished product rather than the goods to manufacture it.454  In 
addition, other courts that have held that the alleged requirements 
contracts were actually options have emphasized that the distinguishing 
feature of a requirements contract is that it is a contract that, “although it 
does not establish the amount that a buyer must purchase from the 
seller, prohibits the buyer from purchasing from other sellers.”455 
Conversely, viewing a requirements contract as an option that the 
buyer cannot refuse to exercise just because someone else offers him 
better terms, as Judge Posner puts it,456 takes the agreement so far 
outside the real world of options that the analogy no longer assists the 
analysis.  The whole purpose of an option from the buyer’s perspective is 
to give him the ability to compare the seller’s offer to the offers made by 
the seller’s competitors before the option expires so that he can exercise 
the option or not, as best serves his interests.  Once you eliminate the 
“option” aspect of the agreement, it becomes an agreement by the buyer 
to purchase any needs it may have for a particular product from the 
seller on the terms stated.  The critical distinction between an option and 
a requirements contract still exists under my proposal because the buyer 
under a requirements contract has given up the right it would have had 
under an option to accept other competitive offers for its requirements, 
and is bound to purchase any requirements it has from the seller on the 
seller’s terms for the duration of the contract. 
                                                 
454 Id. at 1339–40 (citing Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 43 N.E. 774 (Ill. 
1896)) (holding that the contract did not violate a statute against options as a form of 
gambling because the buyer had agreed to purchase all of its requirements for coal from 
the seller, up to a maximum amount, and the reasonable assumption was that the buyer 
would remain in business, so the promise was not illusory); Nat.’l Furnace Co. v. Keystone 
Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. App. 363 (1920) (holding that requirements are more than “wants[,]” and 
that the contract was not void for lack of mutuality because the buyer agreed to purchase 
its requirements from the seller and could not purchase them from other sources); 
Chalmers & Williams v. Bledsoe & Co., 218 Ill. App. 363 (1920) (holding that the buyer’s 
decision to switch from coal to electricity did not excuse it from its obligation to purchase 
its coal requirements from the seller); Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tenn. Phosphate Co., 
121 Fed. 298, 303 (6th Cir. 1903) (holding that the buyer breached its requirements contract 
when it stopped purchasing raw materials to make fertilizer when it became cheaper to 
buy the finished product for resale because otherwise the contract would be an 
unenforceable option). 
455 Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 963 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added).  See also Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
456 Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1339. 
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Accordingly, as long as open quantity contracts include language 
under which the quantity term can be determined at the time the parties’ 
dispute is adjudicated, the difference between a buyer’s option and a 
requirements contract should be that in an options contract the buyer 
receives the option of buying a fixed quantity of goods at a set price from 
the seller until the option expires,457 and remains free to purchase the 
goods from other suppliers rather than exercise the option, but in a 
requirements contract the buyer promises that it will purchase all, or an 
ascertainable portion of, its requirements, if any, from the seller. 
VIII.  PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
A. A Uniform Rule for Validating Open Quantity Contracts 
Based on the foregoing analysis, I have formulated three proposals 
for reforming the current law of open quantity contracts.  The first is for 
courts to adopt a uniform validation rule for open quantity contracts.  
This rule would replace the following:  (1) the exclusivity rule that the 
quantity-determining party must deal exclusively with the contracting 
party for all the goods or services under contract; (2) all of the 
modifications and exceptions to the exclusivity rule (except to the extent 
they are incorporated in the new rule); (3) the approach taken from 
Comment 2 to UCC section 2-306 that validation is accomplished by the 
quantity-determining party’s duty to run its business so that its “output 
or requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure[]”; 458 
and (4) any other attempts to substitute the common law requirement of 
exclusivity with the duty of good faith.  Because this lack of uniformity 
has arisen from judicial interpretations of the Code, courts should be 
able to remedy the situation without a statutory amendment. 
The approach I recommend has been foreshadowed in a number of 
decisions recognizing various exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine but 
has not been developed into a uniform rule.  It would address the 
doctrines of mutuality and definiteness and provide a flexible method 
for defining quantities that could be adapted to suit businesses’ needs.  It 
would also give the seller in requirements contracts assurance that the 
buyer has made a commitment to buy all or a portion of its requirements 
from the seller in exchange for the seller’s promise not to change its 
terms for the duration of the contract.  At its core, the key to this new 
validation rule is an attempt to satisfy the mutuality and definiteness 
requirements for contract formation by requiring that the buyer promise 
                                                 
457 Consideration is necessary if the option is held open for longer than three months 
under UCC section 2-205. 
458 U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (2004). 
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to purchase its requirements of an uncertain, but ultimately 
ascertainable, quantity of goods from the seller. 
Using this approach, courts should enforce open quantity contracts 
for the sale of goods or services as long as, for a requirements contract, 
the buyer is obligated to purchase all, or an ascertainable portion of, its 
requirements, if any, from the seller, and, for an output contract, the 
seller is obligated to sell all, or an ascertainable portion of, its output, if 
any, to the buyer.  The parties may define an “ascertainable portion” of 
requirements or output in many of the ways already recognized as 
exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine, although these methods should 
not be seen as limitations on the scope of the doctrine.   So, for example, 
a valid requirements contract could provide that the buyer will purchase 
a percentage of his requirements from the seller, that the buyer will 
purchase all of his requirements needed to fill the orders of particular 
customers from the seller, or that he will purchase all of his requirements 
needed for a specific project from the seller.  Either in combination with 
such provisions, or alone, the parties could also apply minimum and 
maximum limits on the buyer’s requirements, so that the buyer will 
purchase all of his requirements from the seller up to a maximum 
amount, after which he will be free to obtain his requirements from other 
sources, and the buyer will pay the seller for a minimum quantity to 
cover his reliance expenses if the buyer has no requirements. 
B. Rules of Interpretation Concerning Implied Promises 
My second recommendation is to end the methods of contract 
construction which permit the courts to imply the required promise by 
the buyer in a requirements contract to purchase all, or an ascertainable 
portion of, its requirements from the seller based on: 
(1) the seller’s promise to sell the buyer his requirements, which 
could be intended to serve as a price list, an offer, or a buyer’s 
option; 
(2) a statement of intention concerning future purchases, which 
could be intended to serve as a non-binding letter of intent 
rather than as an agreement to purchase; 
(3)  an MPA containing a disclaimer providing that the buyer is 
liable only for the goods ordered on individual purchase orders 
or firm releases accepted by the seller, or words to that effect, 
where there is no other language in the MPA to indicate that the 
buyer agrees to purchase all or an identifiable portion of his 
requirements from the seller for the duration of the MPA; or  
(4)  a pricing proposal or volume discount combined with a history 
of prior exclusive dealings between the parties.  
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In each of these cases, the implied promise by the buyer is not well-
founded without evidence of the buyer’s intent to commit him to 
purchasing an identifiable quantity of goods, given the many other, 
equally plausible explanations of the parties’ intent.  The party in the 
best position to solve the ambiguity, at the lowest cost, is the buyer.  The 
buyer can state, in either the MPA or its individual purchase order or 
release, that his promise to purchase all, or an identifiable portion, of his 
requirements from the seller and the seller’s obligation to supply those 
goods to the buyer are terms of his offer, and that his offer is expressly 
limited to acceptance of these terms. 
As we have seen, the buyer also stands to gain from the ambiguity if 
courts continue to apply loose standards to enforcement of open 
quantity contracts.  If the buyer’s obligation is left unstated, the buyer is 
free to argue that the contract is either enforceable as a requirements 
contract, or enforceable only for the quantities ordered, depending on 
the prevailing market price for the goods.  If the buyer will not state 
expressly that he is making a commitment to purchase his requirements 
from the seller, he should not have the benefit of the ambiguity he has 
created, given the costs this ambiguity imposes on the seller, on our 
judicial system, and the frustration of the flow of commerce that occurs 
when the private intentions of contracting parties become critical to 
understanding their contracts. 
C. A New Version of UCC Section 2-306(1) Designed To Eliminate the 
Implied Duty of Good Faith in Open Quantity Contracts 
The final change I would make to current law is to eliminate good 
faith as a limitation on the quantity of goods that could be tendered or 
demanded under open quantity contracts.  Unlike my first two 
recommendations, this reform would require amending the Code, now 
that it has adopted the common law duty of good faith for open quantity 
contracts.   While amending UCC section 2-306(1) would not be as 
pressing if good faith were applied as a default rule, courts often apply 
the duty of good faith regardless of how carefully parties attempt to 
allocate the quantity risks by agreement.  Even where parties do not 
allocate quantity risks, good faith is a poor tool compared with other 
methods used to discern the parties’ intent.  I therefore propose 
replacing the current good faith rule with a default rule providing that in 
an output or requirements contract, all that the promisor obtains from 
the promisee is the promise not to purchase or sell the specified quantity 
from or to another entity. The revised version of UCC section 2-306(1) to 
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incorporate my first two changes to the current law would read as 
follows: 
Unless otherwise agreed, a term that measures quantity 
by the output of the seller or the requirements of the 
buyer means the actual output, or an ascertainable 
portion of that output, that the seller agrees to sell to the 
buyer, or the actual requirements, or an ascertainable 
portion thereof, that the buyer agrees to purchase from 
the seller. 
Under this revised version of UCC section 2-306(1), there would be 
no breach of an open quantity contract for output or requirements that 
were either too high or too low as compared to estimates or “normal” 
quantities, and the parties could not violate the contract by terminating 
or selling their businesses.  The primary forms of breach would be 
violating any minimum or maximum quantity limits set forth in the 
contract and selling their output to, or purchasing their requirements 
from, third parties.  There is no need to revise UCC section 2-306(2) 
because the “best efforts” standard in that section would no longer create 
a conflict with the good faith standard under UCC section 2-306(1) that 
was used to apply to those output and requirements contracts that were 
also exclusive dealing contracts. 
The only right the promisor would give up in such open quantity 
contracts, when contrasted to fixed quantity contracts, is the right to 
claim breach for nonperformance based on the promisee’s failure to 
produce or order goods when the goods were not produced for or 
ordered from another party within the terms of the agreement.  Thus, 
while a seller in a fixed quantity contract can sue for breach when the 
buyer does not purchase the goods from the seller even if the buyer did 
not purchase them from any other supplier, the seller would not have 
this right in a requirements contract. 
As described above, this new rule would not require exclusivity.  For 
example, if a requirements contract provided that the buyer had to 
purchase all of its requirements of product A from the seller that were 
needed for buyer’s customer B, the seller will only be able to sue for 
breach if the buyer stops buying product A because it is filling the orders 
of customer B for product A through another supplier.  For an output 
contract, if the contract states that the buyer will buy all of the seller’s 
output of product A at facility 1, the buyer will not be able to claim 
breach if the seller stops producing product A at facility 1 for the buyer 
for any reason other than supplying it to another customer. 
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The risk of a loss of business through vertical integration is a 
foreseeable one that should be dealt with by agreement, but the default 
rule should leave the risk with the seller; after all, the idea is that the 
party that does not determine quantity assumes the risk that the required 
quality will change.  Thus, unless otherwise agreed, no breach would 
occur if the output of a seller was eliminated because the seller begins to 
use the product for inter-company sales to the seller’s own new 
subsidiary.  Similarly, no breach would occur if the requirements of a 
buyer were eliminated because the buyer began to source the product 
from its own newly acquired subsidiary or used its own equipment to 
manufacture the product.  What the seller in such a requirements 
contract would gain would be an award of the buyer’s business as 
against the seller’s competitors, not protection from the benefits the 
buyer may gain from vertical integration.  Vertical integration is hardly 
an action demonstrating the buyer’s “bad faith” or its “ill will” towards 
the seller, especially when the buyer is a publicly traded company. 
Parties can also avoid the risk of speculation that good faith caps on 
requirements were designed to prevent if they use field of use or 
customer restriction provisions.  For example, in a case such as Orange & 
Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp.,459 where the court found that 
the defendant-utility company had acted in bad faith by taking 
advantage of rising market prices to purchase large quantities of gas to 
resell to new utility customers that were included in the calculations for 
the estimates in the contract, defined as “nonfirm” customers, the seller 
could have protected itself by limiting the contract to the buyer’s 
requirements for sale to its “firm” customers.460  Similarly, a buyer that 
uses a product as a component or material could be prevented from 
entering into competition with the seller by limiting the contract to the 
buyer’s requirements for its own manufacturing business, and by 
excluding purchases made for resale in competition with the seller.  In 
this way, the seller could refuse to supply any amounts a manufacturer-
buyer ordered in a rising market in order to compete with the seller, 
rather than in the normal course of the buyer’s business.  If the seller is 
concerned that the buyer may stockpile goods, or order quantities in 
excess of the seller’s capacity, periodic caps can always be placed on the 
buyer’s requirements.  Enforcement of express contractual language 
placing these limitations on buyer’s demands should not be an issue, as 
courts already use the doctrine of good faith to prevent buyers from 
demanding more quantities than are justified by their current needs.461 
                                                 
459 59 A.D.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div.1977). 
460  Id. at 116. 
461 See Homestake Mining Co. v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 476 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 
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While somewhat less common, courts have also suggested that the 
upper quantity limits will be placed on output contracts.462  Here, the 
danger of speculative conduct could be prevented by using provisions 
stating that the seller will only tender the output it has manufactured, so 
the seller could not obtain supplies from third parties in excess of its 
capacity to take advantage of a drop in market prices.  Maximum 
quantity limits, or even quantity limits tied to market prices could also 
be used for this purpose. 
In addition to “take-or-pay” minimum quantity provisions, another 
drafting remedy for solving the problem of diminishing requirements is 
to add a termination clause to the contract with a provision for paying 
the seller for any materials acquired before the termination notice was 
received, such as the clause enforced in Q.C. Onics.463  For the “just-in-
time” inventory buyers who refuse to enter long-term requirements 
contracts but still want prompt delivery of goods on an individual 
purchase order basis, the seller might consider insisting on other types of 
contracts to cover his inventory risk.  If the seller wants the buyer to keep 
six months of inventory on hand, a guaranty could be obtained from the 
buyer for any losses sustained if the seller does not place a purchase 
order for that inventory.  Or, a buyer’s option could be entered, for 
consideration, with a termination date that equals the inventory period. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The UCC section 2-306(1) imposes a mandatory “good faith” rule 
governing quantity that makes courts, but more often juries, the 
overseers of how the businesses of the parties entering into requirements 
or output contracts must be run to generate acceptable orders or 
supplies.  Under the Official Comments to section 2-306(1), the parties to 
such contracts must operate their companies so that their output or 
requirements approximate those that would result from businesses run 
in “good faith” such that they cannot tender or demand goods under 
these contracts that are “unreasonably disproportionate” to either a 
                                                                                                             
(N.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d 652 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a supplier was not required 
to sell the buyer more uranium than needed for the initial nuclear core requirement of 
nuclear reactor, where the buyer had no good faith requirements for uranium based on 
concerns that proposed regulations may require additional uranium).  There is also a line 
of cases supporting the proposition that a buyer cannot attempt to nullify the effect of the 
seller’s termination of a requirements contract by ordering so many goods as to effectively 
extend the term of the contract.  See Mass. Gas & Elec. Light Supply Corp. v. V-M Corp., 
387 F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir. 1967); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Fisons Corp., 1993 WL 54535 at *4 
(N.D. Ill. 1993). 
462 Atlantic Track & Turnout Co. v. Perini Corp., 989 F.2d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 1993). 
463 2006 WL 1722365 (N.D. Ind. 2006).  
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“stated estimate,” or the “normal” or “comparable” quantities.  Too little 
attention has been paid to whether the costs are worth the benefits of this 
type of oversight of business by courts and lay juries.  It may well be 
incompatible with the duties of a publicly traded company to enter into 
an output or requirements contract under these conditions, given the 
Official Comments that “bad faith” by a requirements buyer may consist 
of shutting down a plant to avoid losses or of a “sudden expansion” of a 
plant to take advantage of rising prices.464  In open quantity contracts 
that give one party control over the quantity term, both sides should be 
sensitive to the risks this arrangement entails and should not be relieved 
of the obligation of bargaining for an allocation of these risks by using an 
equitable doctrine such as the implied duty of good faith. 
Sophisticated businesses are much better served by crafting their 
own protections from the risk of requirements or output quantities that 
are either far higher or lower than expectations, than by leaving this 
question to be decided, usually by a jury, as an issue of fact.  After 
decades of scholarship analyzing the law of contracts in the context of 
the “efficient breach,” it seems a legal anachronism for courts to 
distinguish between cases when parties are failing to perform a contract 
for “valid business reasons” unrelated to the terms of the contract, which 
is not a breach, and when they are failing to perform because the contract 
has become disadvantageous, which is a breach.  Even when courts 
make the right calls, which they sometimes do, the fact that disputes rise 
to the appellate court level over whether, for example, a requirements 
buyer acted in bad faith by closing its business after incurring millions of 
dollars in losses, is ample evidence of the need for change.465 
Unlike other areas of law, the law of contracts should give private 
parties the ability to write the rules, to a considerable extent, that will 
govern any disputes that result in litigation.  In a broader sense, a social 
bargain is struck in contract, whereby the courts, which must also 
resolve many other disputes of importance to the community, are 
available to private parties to enforce their agreements, provided those 
agreements meet certain standards.  Decisions are published by the 
courts, and studied by lawyers.  Private parties then rely on their 
counsel’s advice in drafting their agreements, so that if there is a dispute 
as to formation, breach, or damages, counsel will have a better than 
50/50 chance of successfully predicting the outcome.  If all goes well, 
many disputes that arise despite careful drafting will still be resolved 
without resorting to litigation because one side will be able to convince 
the other of the probable outcome of litigation given the legal 
                                                 
464  U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. n.2 (2004). 
465 See Schawk, Inc. v. Donruss Trading Cards, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
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precedents.  A large percentage of the disputes that do result in litigation 
should be resolved on summary judgment, with the court interpreting 
the contract as a matter of law.  This vision may be overly optimistic, but 
it is nevertheless what society has a right to expect from the law of 
contracts and what the legal system should strive to provide.   
As applied to open quantity contracts, the doctrine of good faith has 
been taken too far, and is now constricting the parties’ ability to allocate 
the quantity risk of their transactions.  While a dialectic may be 
constantly unfolding in the courts between the forces of law and equity, 
adjustments are in order when the balance tips so far on the side of 
equity that the law risks losing its legitimacy as well as its utility.  
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